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ABSTRACT

“A Christian World Order:” Protestants, Democracy and Christian Aid to Germany, 1945-1961
By
Ky Woltering
Advisor: Benjamin Hett
This dissertation examines the relationship between the German and American Protestantism
from 1945-1961. I argue that in response to the threat of Nazism and communism, mainline
ecumenical American Protestants aimed to create a universalist “Christian World Order” based
on liberal democracy and Christian ethics. Only this new order, they argued, could supersede
nationalist and materialist agendas and restore world peace. By rhetorically depicting Nazi and
Communist "totalitarianism" as anti-Christian, a construction I refer to as the ChristianTotalitarian Dichotomy, these Protestants drove German conservatives away from Nazism and
toward Western liberal democracy through association with Christianity. They accomplished this
through two primary methods. First, by politicizing Allied occupation policy as "vengeful" and
positioning the majority of Germans as "victims" of Nazism, ecumenical Protestants successfully
lobbied for political leniency that facilitated the German transition from enemy to ally. Second,
American Protestants embarked on a widespread philanthropic aid campaign that brought
millions of dollars of goods to Germany. Their aid campaigns continuously emphasized horrific
material conditions in postwar Germany, with the necessity of humanitarian aid to stave off both
a return of nihilism and an aggressive Soviet-communist advance. By reinforcing the need to
spread and defend global democracy, ecumenical Protestants also helped forge a new postwar
American nationalism that embraced international responsibility.
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Matthew 5:43-48

Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine
enemy.
But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them
that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you;
That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the
unjust.
For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans
the same?
And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the
publicans so?
Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.
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Prologue: God’s Task for America

At midday, Friday November 23, 1945, two unassuming Americans arrived in Geneva,
Switzerland. Each carried in some secure, tucked away corner of their traveling cloaks a letter of
some importance signed by President Harry Truman himself. Earned through weeks of hard
lobbying, their respective letters granted permission to “survey the religious situation in
Germany,” but in truth the two men had a more pressing goal; to save Western Civilization from
the perils of nihilism.1 Upon arriving, Ralph H. Long, Executive Director of the National
Lutheran Council of America, and President of the Norwegian Lutheran Church of America
Johan Arnd Aasgaard, were met by a welcome sight, their longtime friend and colleague
Sylvester C. Michelfelder. Michelfelder had arrived in Europe just five months earlier on the
troopship Mariposa with his wife Florence.2 The fifty-one-year-old American of German descent
did not possess the rigorous theological credentials of his colleagues, but his service at Lutheran
conferences in Pittsburgh and Toronto had earned him a certain degree of respect within
ecumenical Protestant circles, enough so that Long had appointed him as the American Lutheran
commissioner to the World Council of Churches. With the war finally at an end in Europe,
concerned ecumenists knew that if they were to ever realize their dream of a united world body
of Protestant churches, they would have to bring the Germans back into the fold.

1

See report from Michelfelder Nov. 23rd- Dec 15th 1945. 5/344-2/6. Z45, Allied Control Authority Religious Affairs
Committee Z45. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), Koblenz, Germany.
2
Archives of the Lutheran World Federation. Accessed online 10/26/16
https://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/archives-section/LWF-GS-since-1947.pdf
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Figure 1: Johan Arnd Aasgaard (left) with Ralph H. Long (center) of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America meeting Sylvester C. Michelfelder (right) of the World Council of Churches3

The fledgling World Council of Churches (WCC) did not officially convene until 1948,
although leading Protestant leaders in America, Britain and Sweden had agreed to organize in the
mid-1930s, at least until the Second World War disrupted their plans. Unlike the name suggests,
the World Council of Churches hardly represented the entirety of global Christianity.
Membership excluded the Roman Catholic Church entirely (the Vatican refused to send invited
representatives, though two “observers” did attend) and most of Orthodox Christianity as well.4
Initially however, Western Protestant churches composed almost the entirety of the WCC’s 147member churches.5 Despite the limited inclusion of non-Western churches in the 1940s, the
WCC’s significance should in no way be casually dismissed. Its founding was entirely
unprecedented within the scope of Christian history, especially considering its true genesis
predominantly occurred during the height of European nationalism between the two World
3

Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, October 26, 2016.
Though Eastern Orthodox churches would eventually join en-masse in the 1960s.
5
For a brief overview of the founding of the WCC, see its official website World Council of Churches, “History,”
oikoumene.org. http://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/wcc-history (accessed February 5, 2018).
4
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Wars.6 Proponents of Protestant unity therefore had good reason to be concerned at war’s end.
Reconciling European national churches after the most destructive war in human history would
be difficult, but maintaining the theological unity necessary to sustain the movement would be
even more challenging. Still, the WCC symbolized peace for millions of American Christians.
They believed that only the creation of a new international organization based on Christian
values and cooperation could usher in a new age of world peace. The World Council of
Churches, was that organization.
By 1944, the WCC had already made a name for itself amongst the Western Allies. Soon
to be WCC general secretary Willem Adolph Visser ‘t Hooft, a Dutch Reformed Theologian
whom close friends affectionately referred to as “Wim,” participated directly in the struggle
against Nazi Germany, establishing a network of contacts within resistance circles both inside
and outside of Germany. His residence in Geneva Switzerland quickly became a home to both
refugees and illegal gatherings of the German Resistance, a particularly daring combination
given the latter’s obvious need for discretion.7 ‘t Hooft understood better than most, that
Europe’s best chance for survival was to form some sort of federation that bound together its
disparate and warring nation-states. Ecumenical Christianity’s universalist message offered a
way forward.
But ‘t Hooft also knew that for European federalism and Christian ecumenism to work,
he needed to solve the German Problem. The ecumenical movement had tried and failed to unite
during the interwar years, principally because of the rise of National Socialism and European

6
Michael G. Thompson, For God and globe: Christian internationalism in the United States between the Great War
and the Cold War. (Cornell University Press, 2015).
7
Antonella Braga, “The 1944 Meetings at the House of Willem Adolph ‘t Hooft.” “Die Welt war Meine Gemeinde”
Willem Visser ‘t Hooft: A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism. Filippo Maria Giordano and
Stefano Dell’Acqua (Eds). (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2014). 166-168.
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Fascism.8 With the Nazi end in sight and a real chance to rebuild the moral character of Europe,
‘t Hooft called on allies in America to take a vested interest in the German churches. He had
hoped that his good friend Dietrich Bonhoeffer would be there with him. But the Nazis executed
Bonhoeffer for his role in the July 20th plot to assassinate Hitler just before the end of the war,
ending all hopes of a German escort. Bonhoeffer, he knew, had the potential both to convince the
Allies that “good Germans” lived and fought against Hitler, and convince his colleagues in
Germany to join the universal church. “His death” ‘t Hooft would lament, was “a death for
Germany, indeed for Europe too.”9 Instead, Michelfelder, Long and Aasgard would have to
make their journey without a representative from Germany.

Figure 2: Visser ‘t Hooft of the World Council of Churches10
By Fall 1945, Michelfelder had made good use of his first five months in Europe. His
first tour through Germany with ‘t Hooft, former Lutheran pastor of the American Church in
Berlin Stewart W. Herman and executive Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches Samuel
McCrea Calvert established contact with Confessing Church pastors like Martin Niemöller and

8
Martin Erdmann, Building the Kingdom of God on Earth: The Churches’ Contribution to Marshal Public Support
for World Order and Peace, 1919-1945. (Wipf & Stock Pub, 2005). 100-105.
9
Ferdinand Slingenspiepen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer 1906-1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance. (Bloomsbury
T&T Clark, 2012). 380.
10
World Council of Churches, General Secretary ‘t Hooft. https://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/organizationalstructure/general-secretary/since-1948/willem-a-visser-t-hooft. (accessed February 5, 2018)
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Eugen Gerstenmeier to see what American Protestants might do to help Germans rebuild both
materially and spiritually. The devastation appalled Michelfelder. In Freiburg, Michelfelder
recalled seeing a solitary “brave soul” trying in vain to fix the bent pipes of the Gottfried
Silberman Organ in the Lutheran St. Marien Cathedral. The organ, which had once played host
to the great Johann Sebastian Bach, now sat silent surrounded by broken pews and a small touch
of sunlight cascading in from the damaged roof above. The church’s brilliant stained-glass
windows had all been shattered, but in truth the building fared better than the surrounding city,
which had been burned to the ground by a 35-minute long air raid of American bombers. The
attack set the surrounding buildings on fire, claiming the lives of 3,000 Germans.11

Figure 3: Stewart W. Herman (1967) Sylvester C. Michelfelder Samuel McCrea Calvert12

11

See Report from Michelfelder to the Religious Affairs Office, October 15th-25th 1945, Z45, BAK. Michelfelder
cites an extremely high figure of 35,000 killed, which was almost certainly an exaggeration. It is unclear precisely
which raid he was referring too, but most likely it is that of November 27th, 1944, which included the use of
incendiary weapons and caused a great deal of structural damage to the city. For more on the bombing raid at
Freiburg see Randall Hansen, Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-1945. (Penguin Books, 2008).
218.
12
Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, October 26, 2016.
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Figure 4: Freiburg then and now.13

Figure 5: Workers outside the Cathedral. Date unknown.14

13

Freiburg im Breisgau – Feuersturm. Hist-chron.com. http://www.hist-chron.com/2wk/b/1944-11-27-Freiburg-imBreisgau-feuersturm.html (accessed February 5, 2018)
14
Ibid.
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Stained Glass windows at St. Marien’s Cathedral today.

Figure 6: St. Marien Cathedral, Gottfried Silbermann Organ today.15

15

The Great Organ by Gottfried Silbermann, 1711/14
http://www.freiberger-dom.de/en/concerts/organs-by-silbermann/great-organ-by-silbermann.html. http://www.histchron.com/2wk/b/1944-11-27-Freiburg-im-Breisgau-feuersturm.html (accessed February 5, 2018)

Woltering |8
On just his second day in Germany journeying with Calvert to Stuttgart, Michelfelder’s
car was struck by a large coal truck. It was a miracle the two emerged relatively unharmed. The
car lay broken, leaking gasoline and water onto the road while the truck had toppled over
scattering coal all across the ground. Michelfelder knew then, that he had “been spared only by
the Providence of God.” He also knew that he had a task; convince his colleagues of Germany’s
great need. “As Christ fed the multitude in the wilderness, not merely to satisfy physical hunger,
but for the purpose of his miracles…” so must he.16
The following month when Michelfelder met with Long and Aasgaard, he knew what
they must see. After acquiring the necessary military permits in Berne on November 27th, the
trio, now joined by two rival members of the Lutheran Missouri Synod,17 boarded a train for
Mulhausen, France before being escorted by American Captain E. Richard West via Jeep to
Frankfurt. There, doctors Long and Aasgaard soon realized Michelfelder properly understood
Germany’s condition.
On the journey to Frankfurt, the committee stopped at the small German village of
Ostheim. All that remained of the town was a single wall with a Stork’s Nest of the town’s old
church (the stand-alone wall still exists today with a small plaque as a reminder of the war) and a
new wooden structure in the middle: A barracks church sent by the World Council of Churches
Department of Reconstruction, where Michelfelder now served as co-chair.

16

5/344-2/6 Report from Michelfelder Religious Affairs Office, October 15th-25th 1945. Z45, BAK.
The Missouri Synod and the Evangelical Lutheran Synod are two of the three largest Lutheran Churches in
America and differ on several serious matters related to doctrinal interpretation and church structure. The Missouri
Synod adheres to strict interpretations of the Bible (including Biblical inerrancy), whereas the Evangelical Synod
allows for varying interpretative methods. Related to ecumenism, the Missouri Synod often refuses to join with
Christian denominations that do not share their theological beliefs. For instance, in the 1920s and beyond, the
Missouri Synod refused to join the American ecumenical body The Federal Council of Churches, unlike the
Evangelical Synod.

17
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Figure 7: Stork’s Nest Ostheim Germany (Postwar and Now)18

From there the committee traveled from Frankfurt to Augsburg through Munich and on to
Nuremberg. Along the way, they saw refugees living in box cars, young girls who had been
raped, mothers holding starving sick children and thousands of amputees. They met German
pastors besieged with letters asking for food, medical supplies and help locating lost family
members. The only relief they could offer, was news that additional wooden barracks churches
were on their way, paid for by the World Council of Churches and generous congregations in
Switzerland.19 By the time Long and Aasgard returned home, they felt that God had given them a
task.

18
19

See report from Michelfelder and the WCC Department of Reconstruction and Inter-church aid November 23December 15th, 1945. 5/344-2/6. Z45, BAK.
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Introduction

Michelfelder, Long and Aasgard’s initial impressions of postwar Germany illustrated in the
prologue represents an important but often overlooked theme in the evolution of German
democratization; the role of sympathetic, influential American churchmen. Their hopes for the
future hinged on the restoration of a Christian Germany in the crusade against dictatorship and
tyranny. This dissertation seeks to reconfigure interpretations of American Cold War Policy and
Western German democracy by incorporating the often neglected historiography of
Protestantism into existing meta-narratives. It has two primary aims: First, to consider the
religious dimensions of West German democratization by investigating how American and
German Protestants built a “useable past” for Germans after the Second World War.20 Second,
by connecting mainline American Protestant interpretations of Nazism to the evolution of the
“spiritual” Cold War and the construction of a Christian American identity during the Second
World War and early years of the Cold War. Only by connecting the four often separate
historiographical strands of West German Democratization, the historiography of German
occupation, American and German Church history and American Cold War Foreign Policy, can
scholars fully appreciate the important contributions of religious leaders to German
democratization.
This dissertation therefore adds to existing scholarship in three ways. First, I argue that
the needed integration of former Nazis into West German society for democratization occurred
20

Robert Moeller argues one of the primary difficulties in building community in postwar Germany stemmed from
the fact that any sort of nationalist sentiment would inherently be contaminated by National Socialism. Instead, a
shared sense of victimhood and the insistence that “totalitarian” forces were a European, not just a German,
problem, made space for a new sense of political unity. See Robert G Moeller. War Stories: The Search for a Usable
Past in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 2003.)
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in part because German and American Protestants composed a narrative of German victimhood
and Christian resistance during and after the Second World War. Only Christianity had the
international, historical and moral reputation to facilitate such a transition after the Third Reich,
despite the actual conduct of its representatives in Germany. Second, this process likewise could
not have occurred without the acquiescence of international, and particularly American,
Christianity. Because the United States developed a strong Christian identity during the war, and
because the material and military realities of 1945 made the United States a major world
superpower, American Protestantism necessarily took center stage in Western Christianity.
American Protestants actively contributed to democratization by whitewashing the conduct of
many former Nazis during occupation, thereby encouraging the tacit acquiescence of democratic
systems by former opponents. This process ironically fostered democracy by opposing many of
the policies designed to root out and eliminate Nazism.21 Finally, I suggest that the “spiritual
battle” America waged during the Cold War began in the fight against Nazi “totalitarianism” in
the years preceding the Second World War. This is not to say that many Americans had not
internalized opposition to communism prior to the 1930s, but rather to say that the “religious”
conception of Christianity’s incompatibility with both Nazism and communism emerged prior to
the Cold War. The transition from one “totalitarian” enemy to the next was only possible because
religious groups had already mobilized in active opposition to Nazism. American political
leaders during the Cold War internalized these changes and consequently sought to harness
religious mobilization for political gain.
21

On this point, my analysis also supports recent studies on the British ecumenist and friend to German Confessing
Church leaders George Bell. Both Andrew Chandler and Gerhard Besier argue that Bell held positions
overwhelmingly similar to that many of the American protagonists in this dissertation. See Andrew Chandler,
George Bell, Bishop of Chichester: Church, State, and Resistance in the Age of Dictatorship (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2016). Gerhard Besier, ed., “Intimately Associated for Many Years”: George K. A. Bell’s and Willem A.
Visser’t Hooft’s Common Life-Work in the Service of the Church Universal – Mirrored in Their Correspondence,
Parts 1 and 2 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2015). Steven P. Remy The Malmedy Massacre: The War
Crimes Trial Controversy. (Harvard University Press, 2017).
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At first glance, one might feel hard pressed to find common threads between these
nuanced historical sub disciplines, but I propose that the intellectual and theological crisis of the
1930s fostered the creation of a powerful dichotomy that permeated almost every aspect of social
and political life in the early 1930s, aspects which endure well into the present day. I have taken
to calling this the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.22 Because mainline American Protestants
saw potential Allied victory during the war as “a great opportunity to educate, educate, educate
for a Christian world order”23 and Germany quite clearly presented the greatest challenge to this
order, the encounter between the two groups would have lasting impact on the social and
political formation of what would become the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in America operated on three key premises. First
and foremost, it posited that both National Socialism and communism were entirely incompatible
with Christianity on a theological level. Because, Protestants argued, Hitler attempted to replace
the Christian God with the Aryan race, National Socialism could never be acceptable to
universalist Christian doctrine. Communism’s materialism likewise sought to replace Christian
values with base mundane concerns and was therefore also unacceptable. Second, drawing upon
America’s long history of both democracy and English Protestant dissenting tradition,24 the
Dichotomy contended that Christianity and democracy were fundamentally inseparable.
Democracy needed Christian universalism to buttress natural rights theory, just as democracy
offered the best possible method for limiting man’s natural inclinations towards injustice and
therefore offered the greatest potential for bringing civilization nearer to a Kingdom of God on

22

I will henceforth often refer to this simply as the Dichotomy for the sake of brevity.
Quote from Dr. Eric M. North at the Foreign Missions Conference of North America in Swarthmore, PA June
13th, 1940. RG 18 74 25. Presbyterian Historical Society Archives (PSHA). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United
States of America.
24
See Jonathan D. Sasse, "The First Party Competition and Southern New England's Public Christianity." Journal of
the Early Republic 21, no. 2 (2001): 261-99. See also, Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s
Millennial Role. (University of Chicago Press, 1968).
23
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earth. Finally, it contended that Nazism and Communism formed when secularism and
materialism overtook Christian values in any given nation. Both were symptoms of a larger
“spiritual” disease, the replacement and redefinition of Christianity’s superior moral values given
to man from God with profane and fundamentally selfish values drawn from man. In this sense,
they often subscribed to the popular notion that Nazism and communism were in fact “political
religions.”25 Protestant leaders often saw both communism and Nazism as but two sides of the
same coin and used the term “totalitarianism” interchangeably.
In Germany however, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy took on a different meaning.
While German Protestants likewise saw “godless” communism as unredeemable and the primary
enemy of Christianity, they did not equate democracy with Christianity. Instead, they cherished
hopes that National Socialism might rejuvenate the German nation through a combination of
authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, anti-communism and nationalism. While the Second World War
and twelve years of National Socialism had soured most Germans on the concept of Nazism
while reinforcing their hatred for communism, German pastors still did not see democracy as
compatible with Christianity in the mid-late 1940s. Crucially therefore, while both Germans and
Americans would evoke the Dichotomy, their nuances of its meaning varied from individual to
individual.
To scholars familiar with either American or German Protestantism in the 20th century,
this is hardly new. In fact, existing scholarship has been making similar observations about the
25

Jason Stevens lays out Reinhold Niebuhr’s sophisticated definition of totalitarianism. See Jason Stevens, God
Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America’s Cold War. (Harvard University Press, 2010). 20. See
specifically footnote 59 on page 352. The idea that Fascism, Communism and or/Nazism were fundamentally
religious in their construction features prominently in many explanations for the rise of these respective movements.
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German churches and American Cold War views for over twenty years, even if, to my
knowledge, no scholar has used the phrase Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in his or her
analysis.26 However, very few scholars have considered the relationship between the two groups,
and those that have focus almost exclusively on institutional developments within the German
Church.27 I aim to build on the work of German Church scholars like Gerhard Besier and Martin
Greschat by contextualizing the transnational relationship of German and American Protestants. I
argue that only by inserting these church narratives directly into both interpretations of West
German democratization and American Cold War policy, can scholars gain a full understanding
of both processes. To this end I strive to take up Mark Ruff’s call to “integrate religious history
into the mainstream.”28
In the United States, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy functioned as a critical arm of
what John Fousek calls the rise of American “nationalist globalism.”29 By simultaneously
reinforcing notions of both American greatness via the superiority of democracy and global
responsibility through the fight against totalitarianism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
articulated a distinctly Christian national identity while also reinforcing the need to spread and
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defend American values internationally.30 Germany, as both the heart of the Second World War
and the geographical and cultural center of Europe, became the primary focal point for
ecumenical Protestants because they saw it as the central battle ground over which the
ideological struggle for Europe was to be waged. That ecumenical Protestants, most especially
Midwestern Lutherans, also shared cultural and theological affinities with German Protestants
undoubtedly likewise influenced the importance of Germany in their political and religious
thinking.
The development of Fousek’s nationalist globalism formed as a reluctant embrace of
Cold War politics rather than as a desired outcome of the Christian World Order. Indeed,
Michael G. Thompson describes the ecumenical movement as a rejection of nationalism in favor
of universalism.31 Mark Edwards likewise argues the American ecumenical Protestant left
imbued “theo-political” democratic Progressive ideals such as the preservation of small-group
freedom (from big government and big business) and distributive justice with the recovery of
Protestant Christian traditions through a “supra-national” world church. Its eventual realization
was intended to overcome nationalistic agendas and imperialism in favor of a “new
Christendom.”32 This dissertation therefore also adds to recent scholarship of the American
Protestant left by examining how ecumenical leaders implemented their aims in occupied
Germany.
The concept of a Christian World Order, emerged distinctly as a production of the
American (Western) fight against Nazism. At its core, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
articulated a distinctly non-national religious identity that ostensibly united Western Christianity
(and perhaps even East Orthodox Christians and Jews) against communism, nihilism and the
30
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forces of totalitarianism. However, because this non-national identity emerged from narratives
emphasizing and reinforcing America’s mission to the world, it also simultaneously constructed
a new nationalist globalist identity in America itself. Conversely in Germany, this ostensibly
non-nationalist identity attempted to reconstruct and save Germany through a rehabilitating reChristianization. To borrow from both Benedict Anderson and John Fousek’s definition of
nationalism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy posited the possible creation of a newly
“imagined community” built around Christian identity.33 Because both Americans and Germans
utilized this concept to construct and reorient their own national identities, national Christian
identity often overrode this newly imagined international order. 34 The slogan of the National
Council of Churches emphasized this contradiction clearly: “building of a Christian America in a
Christian world.”35 Still, as Protestants imagined it, this new Christian World Order functioned
as an ideological framework through which Western Civilization might perpetuate Christian
morality and save itself from disaster.
The relevance of the Dichotomy to historical change in the late 1940s and 1950s relates
to the broader religious renewal occurring in most Western nations after the Second World War.
In the United States, approximately 47 percent of the US population attended church on average
between 1955-1958,36 an increase of 30 percent from just thirty years prior.37 Church
construction increased from $26 million in 1945 to $409 million in 1950, while church
membership increased from 57% to 63.3% throughout the 1950s. On average, church attendance
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increased by 70 percent in a single generation, twice the rate of the booming 1950s general
population.38 Distribution of religious scripture increased 140% from 1949-1953, with over fourfifths of adult Americans calling the Bible “the revealed word of God.”39 This increase in
religious life has long attracted the interests of scholars, particularly since it stands outside of the
orthodox secularism thesis, but also because it inspired significant social, political and cultural
transformations.40 While scholars have rightly debated the precise characteristics of this revival,
addressing concerns of superficiality, intellectual versus populist religion and the sacralization of
political life, the underlying religiosity remains unquestionably potent.41
In the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), no such participatory religious
revival occurred. Church attendance remained roughly around 10 percent, with membership
remaining static at 48% Protestant and 47% Catholic of the total population.42 Nonetheless, as
the only institution to survive the Nazi era intact, an “Hour of the Church” dominated the moral
landscape of the late 1940s and 1950s even if the aimed at “re-Christianization” of Germany
proved superficial and temporary. Spurred by the emergence of the CDU (Christian Democratic
Union), Protestant and Catholic confessional publications dominated political discourse about
democracy and family life.43 The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore emerged in a
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moment of intense religious sentiment and probing, a moment in which a return to “stability,”
“normalcy” and “morality” understandably garnered the attention of much of the Western
World.44
Broadly speaking, scholars interpret the remarkable stabilization of postwar West
German democracy in four separate ways. First, the economic thesis, which posits the incredible
growth of the economy in the 1950s generated jobs and raised living standards thereby
stabilizing the country and fostering belief in American-style economic and political systems.45
Second, the Allied imposition thesis, which argues that the Allies, particularly the Americans,
imposed democracy on the Germans by mandating legal, economic and institutional reforms.46
Third, the "democratization via integration" thesis, which theorizes that West German democracy
stabilized because the administration of West Germany’s first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
brought former Nazis into the fold of the new government, thereby limiting political turnover
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and potential opposition.47 Fourth, the internationalist interpretation suggests that West German
leaders' desire to attain greater autonomy after the war required a certain adoption of Western
principles for the sake of geopolitics. Therefore, the Federal Republic bound itself to Western
Europe and the United States by joining institutions such as the EEC and NATO, while also
significantly paying reparations to Israel to foster international goodwill. Over time, this process
embedded democratic values within German society by stabilizing European politics and
placating residual nationalistic claims. The developing Cold War remains crucial to this
interpretation, as Germans saw democracy as a preferred alternative to Soviet communism.48
Further sub-disciplines consider lingering anti-democratic sentiment in the Federal Republic
often examining specific individuals, localities or individuals.49
However, often missing from these works are the German churches, particularly the
Protestant churches. This notable absence stands out not only because German Protestants made
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up a large part of the Nazi electorate,50 but also because of the electoral dominance of the
Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) in the early Federal
Republic. While the CDU/CSU predominantly built upon the old Catholic parties of the Weimar
Republic, the early inclusion of Protestants into the party was a notable change from the past,
and subsequent disputes between Protestants and Catholics certainly influenced internal CDU
politics and policy.51 Much of what has been discussed about the transformation of the Protestant
churches does not engage with broader questions of democratization, and instead focuses only on
internal democratization.52 In many ways the two bodies of historiography function in complete
isolation from one another.53
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Recent scholarship on the Cold War argues US policy makers understood the conflict
with the Soviet Union first and foremost as a "spiritual battle" which pitted "godly" American
freedom against the forces of atheistic communism.54 Much of the material discussing the
religious origins of the Cold War has been published in the past decade. However, while scholars
have examined religious influences on Soviet policy and American conduct in Latin America,
very little attention has been paid to Germany, the initial testing grounds of US democracy and
Cold War foreign policy.55 American Protestant Church historiography on the 1940s and 1950s
tends to focus on either the divisions within church leadership, church leaders’ efforts in
planning and imaging a postwar peace or the theological debates between Christian Realists like
Reinhold Niebuhr and liberal Protestants like John Dewey. Nonetheless, such historiography
clearly shows that Christian groups in America sought to recast the postwar world on the basis of
universalist Christian thought and democracy.56 The success of the ecumenical movement and

between "profane" historiography and church historiography, see Mark Edward Ruff, "Integrating Religion into the
Historical Mainstream.” Recent historiography on gender and sex politics in modern Germany does a far better job
of encapsulating and including the role of religion in German politics and society than does much of church
historiography. For an excellent recent example see Friederike Brühöfener, "Sex and the Soldier: The Discourse
about the Moral Conduct of Bundeswehr Soldiers and Officers during the Adenauer Era." Central European
History, Vol 48, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2015), pp. 523-540.
54
See William Inboden, III The Soul of Containment: Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960.
(Cambridge University Press, 2008.) and Jonathan P.Herzog The Spiritual-Industrial Complex. Inboden argues that
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, in addition to high ranking officials such as Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, were greatly influenced by American Protestantism. For example, Inboden argues that Dulles believed there
could never be world peace so long as atheistic communists dictated terms in Europe. Similarly, Dulles argued that
the best way to demonstrate American resolve was in the church pew. See Inboden, pgs. 32-36. Jonathan Herzog
argues that US policy makers actively sought to establish a sort of national church voice, in which Protestants (and
to a lesser extent Catholics), would rise and lead the fight in the Cold War. As such they deliberate used State,
Federal, commercial and celebrity resources to foster religious revival in America.
55
See for example T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National
Religion. Praeger Publishers, 2008. Two excellent edited collections both with the same title Religion and the Cold
War ed. Diane Kirby. (Palgrave Macmillian, 2003) and Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective, ed. Philip
Muehlenbeck. (Vanderbilt University, 2012). Matthew Hockenos's essay on Cold War politics in West Germany
found in the Kirby is the only essay that addresses Germany. Even then, Hockenos's emphasis is on politics within
the Church but does not fully engage with the transnational dimension.
56
D.G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America: Evangelical Protestantism in the Twentieth Century (Ivan
R. Dee, 2003) and Robert S. Ellwood, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace and Jason Stevens, God-fearing and Free.
Heather A. Warren, Theologians of a New World Order: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Realists. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997). See also David A. L. Hollinger, "The Realist–Pacifist Summit Meeting of March
1942 and the Political Reorientation of Ecumenical Protestantism in the United States." Church History. 79.3

W o l t e r i n g | 22
European Christian-Democracy in the late 1940s and 1950s demonstrates the widespread appeal
these ideals had for many Europeans.
The eventual encounter between American and German Protestant interpretations of the
Dichotomy after World War II had significant bearing on the democratization of Germany for
several complex reasons.57 Americans insisted both during and after the War that National
Socialism had launched a ceaseless assault on religious liberty and the institutional autonomy
and ideology of both Protestant and Catholic Churches. This myth, carefully cultivated by
German pastors themselves, postulated that those Protestants and Catholics who had not
succumbed to the false prophet of Hitler had likewise waged an unending struggle against the
Nazi State. The power of this narrative endured well into the postwar period and carried over
into church historiography. Indeed, I suggest that Richard Steigman-Gall’s polemical book The
Holy Reich operates overwhelmingly within the confines of the Dichotomy itself. Responding to
the Dichotomy’s enduring categories of “Christian” and “Nazi,” Steigmann-Gall erroneously
attempts to meld both categories together.58
During occupation, Germans internalized and adopted for themselves a key component of
American Protestant interpretations of Nazism and its relationship to Christianity.59 In so doing
however, Americans also required Germans to ostensibly accept democracy. German
Protestants’ continued loathing of communism and their new-found rejection of Nazism as
defined by the Dichotomy left democracy as the only presentable alternative. But, in 1945
German Protestants still held democracy to be entirely suspect, and often said as much to both
(2010): 654-677. Gerald Sittser, A Cautious Patriotism: The American Churches and the Second World War.
(Chapel Hill University: North Carolina University Press, 1997). Andrew Preston, The Sword of the Spirit, The
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American pastors and Allied officials. They feared that without a Christian state, democracy
could not deter communism and would instead set the conditions for a hostile takeover.
However, because American Protestants adopted and imposed a narrative of resistance by
supporting German critiques of Allied policies, Germans continued to remain within its general
confines.
For these reasons, this dissertation best supports both the democratization via integration
thesis and the democratization via imposition thesis. American Protestants did impose
democracy on Germans via the conceptions of the Dichotomy, but it came at the cost of
integrating the morally compromised Protestant church in Germany into the wider confines of
the “Christian World Order.” Moreover, because Americans believed communism and Nazism
could (re)conquer Germany at any moment, they sought to physically and spiritually rebuild the
country through an astoundingly successful private aid campaign in the early postwar period.
The American Christian politicization of the material crisis in postwar Germany led to
widespread support for the Marshall Plan and Germany’s inclusion therein. This bound German
churches to American churches both ideologically and materially, with many congregations
dependent upon their American brethren for the very pews they sat upon. It also contributed to
West Germany’s transition from enemy to ally in the preliminary stages of the Cold War, another
burgeoning interest of scholarship that overlooks religious contributions.60
Yet by binding German Protestants to the terms of the Christian World Order, Americans
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likewise validated their domestic moral authority. This in turn allowed religious leaders to
construct many of the social values of the Federal Republic, including conservative bourgeois
gender roles and fierce anti-communism. Inclusion in the Christian World Order also allowed
German Protestants to comfortably distance themselves from the values of National Socialism
while still maintaining some of the racial, national and cultural values that led to their initial
support of Nazism. This is not to say that Americans imposed such values on Germans, or that
Germans even needed American direction to embrace anti-communism or a conservative family
orientation. Rather, I argue the Dichotomy laid the foundation for an exculpatory narrative for
German Protestantism that facilitated the Federal Republic’s transition to these positions more
broadly, even if some German Protestants, particularly Martin Niemöller, would not adopt it
entirely.
Because of the scope of this dissertation, I will readily acknowledge three inherent
shortfalls. First, my very limited inclusion of Catholic participation in these processes undeniably
means that this dissertation can only present one part of the puzzle. Catholic priests and
laypersons were highly involved at the very same levels as Protestants presented herein. While
their role often coincided with Protestant positions, this was not always the case, and the two
often vied for influence and power. However, because this project already has a very large
breadth, the inclusion of additional theological and institutional dimensions remains outside the
realm of feasibility. I welcome critiques, suggestions, additions and even reinterpretations on this
point from the academic community. Second, the encounter between German and foreign
religious leaders could be significantly expanded beyond the American-German dynamic
presented here. Undoubtedly, ecumenical Protestants in countries like Great Britain and
Switzerland played a significant role imposing the Dichotomy in Germany, and doubtlessly had
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nuanced understandings of their own. My analysis does incorporate to a limited degree the role
of international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches, but this too
represents a narrative gap overall. Finally, this dissertation often assumes categories of
confessional, theological or denominational allegiance override other categories of identity in its
analysis. While this likely goes without saying, on an individual level such things rarely line up
as neatly as presented here. But for the great need to simplify categories into working and
relatable terms, I on occasion will present claims about “Lutherans,” “liberal theology” or
“Protestantism” that will not hold up to close historical scrutiny on a micro-narrative level.
Because understanding the Dichotomy and the reasons for its effectiveness requires
taking seriously church history and theology, this dissertation by necessity will employ such
language to a limited degree. To that end I would like to clarify my use of a few important terms.
Liberal and conservative theology differ principally in their relationship to biblical text.
Theological conservatives take as a given the separation of cultural and biblical moral values.
For them, God, through the Bible, has passed down a series of metaphysical and existential truths
that offer guidance for humanity. This includes but is not limited to the preeminence of God, the
deity of Jesus, the reality of the Holy Spirit, the brokenness of humanity and the need for
restoration to the divine reality of God. Theological liberalism emerged predominantly in 19th
century German Protestantism and generally attempts to apply the principles of Enlightenmentera rationalism to Christianity and biblical interpretation. It is often non-doctrinal, emphasizing
cultural revelation (or attaining ethical values and existential meaning through human culture).
While these are loose and broad definitions, it is vital to point out the basic distinctions between
the two given the ways in which the intellectual and theological crisis of the 1930s fermented
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new, often radical, solutions in the search for existential meaning and value.61
My use of the word “democracy,” will follow Robert Dahl’s definition of a political
regime that has the following seven characteristics: Power constitutionally vested in elected
officials, fair elections, universal suffrage, universal opportunity for representation, free speech,
free press and free association.62 While German Protestants did not reject these ideals in full,
they nonetheless sought to place restrictions or limitations on almost all seven of these features.
Because Protestants favored monarchy and a powerful centralized state, they often had little
objection to limiting freedom of speech, press or association to organizations or individuals they
deemed hostile toward such interests. This in part explains their support for National Socialism,
which they believed would restore proper state power and usher in some sort of polyarchicdictatorship.
Totalitarianism as employed in this dissertation does loosely conform to Hannah Arendt’s
definition of the term in her seminal The Origins of Totalitarianism, but its use in Protestant
circles predates her scholarship by more than a decade and should not be confused with her
work.63 Protestants often used the term loosely, and I have already proffered that the general
conceptions of the word meant different things to Americans and Germans prior to occupation.
Like Arendt, Protestant leaders described the “totalitarian” State as inherently oppressive. Its
very makeup included an omnipotent dictator with an omnipresent secret police force. Likewise,
the totalitarian State as defined by Protestants deeply interfered with both the public and personal
spheres. However, unlike Arendt, Protestants traced its origins not to European Imperialism,
anti-Semitism or the rise of contradictions found within the nation-state, but rather to the
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proliferation of nihilistic and materialistic culture brought on by secularization. They also did not
emphasize mass culture, the camp system or the loss of individuality as described by Arendt.64
Protestants also did not develop a strict definition for the term, and in fact its lack of specificity
likely enhanced its appeal. For these reasons the two definitions should not be confused. My use
of the term relates specifically and directly to its usage in historical sources and should not be
taken as an endorsement of its usefulness in explaining National Socialism, Soviet Communism
or any other 20th century historical movement.
Chapter one investigates the origins of the Dichotomy in America while also addressing
how American religious leaders politicized the German Kirchenkampf and the war with Nazi
Germany. I argue American church leaders took the struggle with Nazism as a starting point to
imagine and proclaim the need for a “Christian World Order.” The chapter also provides a
summary of recent historiography on the German Church Struggle and its relationship to the
Dichotomy, including a refutation of Richard Steigmann-Gall’s polemical but important The
Holy Reich.
Chapter two considers directly the relationship between American Protestants, American
military officials and the German Protestant clergy during occupation. I argue that because
military officials desired to avoid getting caught up in what they viewed as “religious” affairs,
they ceded enormous leeway both to German church leaders and visiting American pastors. This
process allowed American pastors to present and argue for a narrative that aggrandized Christian
resistance and explained away controversial statements made by German pastors who refused to
acknowledge responsibility for the Holocaust or National Socialism. Such pastors also often
64
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expressed anti-democratic sentiments and open hostility toward certain Allied policies (like the
redrawing of German borders in the East). This not only enhanced the reputation of German
clergy during occupation but also legitimized their moral authority both nationally and
internationally.
Chapter three addresses Martin Niemöller’s tour of the United States in 1946, which
scholars have yet to examine in any detail. I argue the tour served three key purposes. First, to
rehabilitate the image of German Protestantism in America by emphasizing the Confessing
Church’s resistance to Hitler. Second, to portray Niemöller as a proponent of American
democracy in the eyes of the American public, despite his previous statements indicating
otherwise. Finally, to impress upon the American people the seriousness of the moral and
material crisis in Germany. His tour also encouraged Americans to take action by donating to
private Christian aid organizations supporting the reconstruction of Germany on a Christian
basis.
Chapter four examines Christian aid campaigns for Germans in the mid-to-late 1940s. I
argue American churchmen launched an all-out public relations campaign to convince the
American people that unless Christians supported ethnic Germans materially and spiritually,
totalitarianism was sure to retake the country and the continent. The result was a staggeringly
successful aid campaign which preceded and eventually morphed into a Christian justification
for the Marshall Plan. This process solidified free-market capitalism as synonymous with
Christian identity in America while also sacralizing American aid to Europe in the fight against
totalitarianism.
Finally, Chapter 5 offers a case study of German democratization in the 1950s by
examining the role of the Protestant Kirchentag, a series of mass week long annual rallies held in
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West Germany. I argue Kirchentag organizers desired to control what they saw as the moral and
structural shortcomings of parliamentary democracy by promoting an imagined political
community defined by religious identity. This community positioned itself in opposition to
National Socialism, and therein offered a redefinition of the German nation. However, this new
nation did not simply reject the values and norms of National Socialism, but also redefined and
repurposed them for its own use, inadvertently creating the space for democracy by repositioning
traditional conservative social and political values as anti-Nazi. Over time, internal division
within German Protestantism over issues such as rearmament and political ethics prevented the
coalescence of this new political community. However, public discourse and efforts to preserve
this new community despite disagreements served to reinforce democratic values and encourage
compromise, eventually resulting in the inadvertent acceptance of democratic rule, albeit with
reservations. The space created by the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy made this sort of
maneuvering possible.
I conclude by examining the ways in which the Dichotomy shifted in both the United
States and Germany during and after its initial triumph in The Second World War. In Germany,
the mythmaking necessary to sustain the Dichotomy came under severe strain in the 1960s,
eventually resulting in a splintering of religious thought and a general decline in religious
participation. In America, mainline Protestantism’s contradictory support of the Dichotomy and
its wavering reluctance to combat Soviet Russia directly places many liberal ecumenist pastors
into a theological and political corner. Their inability to define precisely the tenets of Christian
belief and distinguish between denominations in conjunction with their support for labor
movements opened them up to charges of being communist sympathizers. Evangelical
fundamentalists rose to the forefront by insisting upon a literal interpretation of the Bible and
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embracing both free-market capitalism and anti-communism.
Ultimately, American church leaders and European ecumenical integrationists like Visser
‘t Hooft succeeded in binding German Protestantism to the ecumenical movement through a
combination of material support, consistent lobbying that the Confessing Church had resisted
Hitler from the onset and claiming that Christianity would prevent future totalitarian movements.
American Protestants facilitated a rapid if superficial re-Christianization of Germany during the
late 1940s and early 1950s based upon a conservative family structure, anti-communism and tacit
support for democracy while also simultaneously creating and propagating numerous myths
about Nazism and its relationship to Christianity. By binding German Protestants to the confines
of the Dichotomy, ecumenists both obfuscated and tempered the nationalistic and antidemocratic ideals commonly held by leading members of the German Protestant Church while
also rehabilitating their conservative political values to make them more palatable in a post-Nazi
Germany. Over time, this eventually resulted in a reluctant embrace of democracy by the
national-conservative German Protestant milieu; those who broke overwhelmingly with
traditional conservative parties in support of National Socialism in 1933.
This means the historian’s task when confronting the formulation of a Christian World
Order requires cautious appraisal. The power of the Dichotomy and its memory enables an easy
slide into the trap of polemics. Certainly, the politicization of the Dichotomy obscured Christian
anti-Semitism and its supportive role of Nazism throughout most of the Third Reich. It likewise
provided exculpatory narratives for church leaders, everyday Germans and former Nazis after the
Second World War.65 Certainly too, American business leaders utilized the Dichotomy to defend
the expansion of free-market capitalism.66 American government officials and pastors also
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advanced the superiority of Western liberal democracy in the fight against the Nazi dictatorship
and international Soviet communism in morally compromising ways all over the world.67 Surely
too however, the Dichotomy also fundamentally attempted to protect the tenets of the Christian
faith from radical heresy while genuinely striving to combat extreme racism, nationalism and
war during and after the most destructive event in human history.68 Whatever one thinks of its
moral platform and justifications, the fragmented and short lived Christian World Order did
provide a “useable past” for democracy in Germany.
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Chapter 1: The New World Order: American Protestantism and the Moral Crisis of Modernity

In May of 1943, “The Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace” of the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCoC)69 issued a statement of guiding principles
addressing the eventual end of the Second World War. Referencing an article from The
Federalist written in 1787, the committee warned of the incredibly high stakes: “The American
People again find themselves in an era of critical decision. It must now be determined, this time
in worldwide terms, whether men are capable of establishing good government from reflection
and choice, or whether they will continue to be buffeted about by force and by accident.” The
commission asserted the world stood upon the brink of total destruction. “The ills which afflict
our society,” they noted, “are fundamentally due to non-conformity with a moral order, the laws
of which are as imperative and as inexorable as are those that order our physical world.
Indifference to and violation of these moral laws always bring such sickness and suffering as
today afflict mankind.”70 The Commission clearly implied two things. First, that the War
represented more than a disagreement between warring parties but rather spoke to the very
question of human civilization and the principles of governance. This therefore threatened the
very essence of the America idea of democratic governance. Second, that the War was but a
symptom of an underlying deviation of moral principles.
The Commission’s interpretation of the purpose of the Second World War correlated
precisely with the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. It understood and interpreted the Second
World War fundamentally as a struggle between Biblical values and anti-Biblical values,
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warning of the costs of shifting away from such principles. That Americans overwhelmingly
associated individual freedom and democracy with Christianity only reinforced their perspective.
As Vice President Henry Wallace put it in 1942, “The idea of freedom—the freedom that we in
the United States know and love so well—is derived from the Bible with its extraordinary
emphasis on the dignity of the individual.” Or as the Commission’s guiding principles put it,
“There is a moral order which is fundamental and eternal, and which is relevant to the corporate
life of men and the ordering of human society.”71
The guiding principles of The Committee established what would become the postwar
platform of American Protestantism in Germany. In emphasizing “penitence,” “no retaliation,”
“a true community of nations,” “economic security” and “international machinery,” the
Committee described the primary characteristics of the imagined Christian World Order.
Practically speaking these principles produced items such as the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt,
an enormous amount of Christian aid for postwar Germany and Europe, strong criticism of the
Potsdam Agreement and German Expulsion,72 the formulation of international bodies such as the
World Council of Churches (and strong support for the UN) and Protestant support for free trade
capitalism and the Marshall Plan. Its hallmark pamphlet, The Six Pillars of Peace likely
functioned as the most accurate articulation of American foreign policy in Europe by any non71
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governmental organization and was certainly the most publicized and circulated document of any
church publication of the 20th century.73
This chapter traces the genesis and proliferation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
in the United States and its relationship to both the international ecumenical movement and the
German Church Struggle (Kirchenkampf). I argue the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy emerged
within American Protestant circles for three conjoined reasons: First, to protect established
biblical interpretation from competing powerful worldviews like National Socialism. Second, to
defend democracy from the alternative state-structures produced during and after the First World
War by conjoining democracy with American exceptionalism and Christian morality. Finally, to
encourage and justify American participation in the Second World War against Germany.
Crucially, proponents of the Dichotomy correctly understood the threat they faced. The National
Socialist worldview could not co-exist with standard biblical interpretation any more than
Nazism could tolerate classic European ‘Jewish’ liberal democracy. These assertions held true
during and after the war. However, the construction of the Dichotomy in America also
misrepresented Christianity’s political relationship with Nazism by arguing this inherent
incompatibility mirrored the conduct of the German churches toward the Nazi-state (and viceversa). This formulation did not emerge immediately with Hitler’s rise to power, but unfurled
over the course of the 1930s, beginning first with disillusionment over Hitler’s treatment of
Confessing Church leaders and then shifting toward pro-war sentiment in the 1940s.74
This dissertation can only present a few pieces of this puzzle, as certainly individual nonAmerican and German actors were vital in the Dichotomy’s firm formulation as a political
73
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concept, most especially the British Bishop of Chichester George Bell, Dutch Theologian and
eventual General Secretary of the World Council of Churches Willem Visser ‘t Hooft and
prominent Scandinavian Church leaders such as Nathan Söderblom to say nothing of the role of
Catholicism.75 Winston Churchill’s portrayal of Britain as a lone democratic island standing
against the Satanic forces of Nazism likewise come to mind.76 With the War’s end, the question
of communism and war with Soviet Russia became all the more pertinent, reinforcing American
conceptualizations of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy against communism.77 However,
scholarship has yet to fully examine the relationship between rising Cold War spiritualism and
pro-war rhetoric.78
For Americans, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy formed principally around those
who supported definitive American action in the Second World War. The idea came into being
from both wartime propaganda portraying the Nazis as inherently anti-Christian and from
Reinhold Niebuhr’s theological dismantling of the naivety of American liberalism and Protestant
pacifistic isolationism. In a series of writings-most notably Moral Man and Immoral Society
(1932), and The Children of Light and Darkness (1943)-and public debates with pacifists,
Niebuhr fiercely defended democratic principles and interventionist foreign policy.79 Proponents
of the Dichotomy therefore often described the origins of American democracy as
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overwhelmingly Christian (if not explicitly Protestant), linking together natural rights theory
with Christian beliefs. Tracing the precise origins of the phenomenon is difficult, but by the early
to mid-1940’s, the concept had almost universal acceptance even amongst the disparate and often
disjointed groups of mainline Protestants, Evangelicals and the declining Christian
Progressivism. Certainly though, it grew gradually as the 1930s went on.
American conceptions of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy formulated around
popular interpretations of the Nazi Persecution of the German Churches. Quick to sensationalize
and politicize Protestant opposition to Hitler, American Protestants would come to see Nazism as
inherently oppressive toward Christianity. They likewise interpreted German religious resistance
to Nazism as firm support for democratic natural rights when in fact such political resistance
rarely occurred within German circles.80 Due in part to the alliance forged between American
Protestants, Jews and Catholics during the war81 and the limited amount of information on the
subject,82 American interpretations of the German “Church Struggle” (Kirchenkampf)
overlooked anti-Semitism and anti-democratic beliefs within German circles in order to craft
religious justifications for the war. However, because European nationalistic dictatorships such
as Nazism had blurred religious and political categories significantly, this interpretation required
a redefining of Christian religious categories often via political categories. To give the most
common outcome of such defining in the postwar West, calling oneself a Christian required both
a theological and a political statement of faith. It carried with it the assumption that if one were a
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Christian, one also supported liberal democracy. This process, I argue, significantly altered not
only American and German national identity but also popular memory of the war itself by
creating new fixed categories centered around Christianity.

The German Kirchenkampf

To understand the ways in which American Protestant utilized and politicized the German
Church Struggle, one must have a firm grasp on the topic itself. The German Church Struggle
took place on two levels with three distinct phases. The primary conflict consisted of a
theological dispute between the radical racial anti-Semitism of the German Christian Faith
Movement (Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen), and the conservative-nationalist Confessing
Church (Bekennende Kirche), with a majority third neutral faction (roughly 80%) often
sympathetic to both sides but unwilling to take a stand. Historians have studied the
Kirchenkampf in considerable detail and generally arrived at a strong consensus on a master
narrative, even if moral interpretations of church conduct remain polemical.83
The German Christian Movement is somewhat difficult to summarize, not only because
of its fragmented and amorphous nature, but also because of the overwhelming number of
seemingly contractionary84 beliefs inherent within its theology and practices. Generally, the
movement was an attempt to blend Christianity with Nazi racial policy by essentially 'proving'
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that Jesus was part of the Aryan race and sent by God to depose of Jews. The Institute for the
Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life (Institut zur Erforschung und
Beseitigung des jüdischen Einfluss auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben) likely provides the best
example of an institutional manifestation of these values. The institute, headed by prominent
theologians like Walter Grundmann, reorganized the Bible without the Old Testament, published
new hymnals free of Jewish “corruption” and crafted virulent anti-Semitic liturgies to better suit
the Nazi racial agenda. 85 While the Institute represented a subversion of Christian theology in an
extreme form, it had precedence in German liberal theology and völkisch religious ideas that
emphasized natural revelation over biblical revelation.86 The movement also had long-term
antecedents in European anti-Semitism in the late 1800s and völkisch Christian thought in
Austria leading up to the First World War, which expanded and radicalized after the Central
Power’s defeat and the Great Depression.87
The Confessing Church consisted of three factions, hardline national-conservative
Lutherans, more moderate Lutherans and the minority Barthian Reformed Protestants.88 Most
German Protestants were national-conservative Lutherans, who, since the Kaiserreich, had
maintained fierce loyalties to the state through their interpretation of Luther's Two Kingdoms
doctrine. Per their understanding of Luther, Christians owed their loyalty to the throne (or the
state) and subservience to the altar (or God and the Church). Thus for most Lutherans, their love
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of the Fatherland and loyalty to the state were honorable Christian virtues. Theologically,
members of the Confessing Church tended to hold very orthodox views on biblical interpretation
and doctrine.
In the Weimar era, working class opposition to traditional elites from both Communists
and Social Democrats as well as the Left’s emphasis on “free thinking,” pitted Lutheran nationalconservatives directly against the political Left.89 National-conservatives largely welcomed
Hitler’s rise to power initially, often endorsing his anti-Semitism and anti-communism.90 Church
leaders’ transition into the Nazi party largely mirrored that of their constituents, as middle-class
and bourgeoise parties generally shifted away from national-conservative and liberal parties in
favor of National Socialism and its platform.91
The theological conflict between the two sides began in earnest with the rise of the Nazi
backed Deutsche Christen in 1933. In part because Nazi leaders required party members to
participate in run-off regional elections, and Hitler himself openly endorsed the Deutsche
Christen in a national radio broadcast the night before, the elections saw Deutsche Christen
candidates capture roughly two thirds of the vote. The result paved the way for an attempted
creation of a Reichskirche, which sought to end the umbrella confederation of Germany’s 28
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regional churches and place them all within a single hierarchical national church. The
controversial appointment of the previously unknown Deutsche Christen military-chaplain and
longtime Nazi Party member (Ӓlte Kämpfer) Lüdwig Müller to the newly formed position of
Reich Bishop, despite a previously annulled election of regional church leaders overwhelmingly
selecting the respected Westphalian pastor Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, resulted in the
significant controversy. In late 1933, Müller’s subsequent attempts to impose the “Aryan
Paragraph,” which restricted membership in the church (and especially the pastorate) to Aryans,
sparked the formation of the Pastor’s Emergency League which would eventually morph into the
Confessing Church. The League openly opposed the Deutsche Christen’s policy, particularly
rejecting the Aryan paragraph for its refusal to accept Jewish converts as pastors.92
Thereafter, the primary conflict of the Kirchenkampf consisted of the two sides battling
for control of church institutions, with the Nazi party occasionally siding with Deutsche Christen
leaders until they began to fall out of favor in the late 1930s. 93 The Confessing Church’s rigid
theologically conservative beliefs manifested in opposition to the Deutsche Christen’s attempts
to redefine Christian theology and Nazi attempts to modify church institutional structures.
Undoubtedly, the Confessing Church’s insistence on theological orthodoxy marked the biggest
point of contention with the Deutsche Christen, as the 1934 Barmen Declaration clearly
denoted.94 Still, most of the Confessing Church might best be described as “loyal opposition”
during the Third Reich, as members only opposed certain aspects of Nazi State policy and the
theological outlook of the Deutsche Christen, but never took any institutionalized united steps
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against the State.95
On a secondary level, the Kirchenkampf consisted of a series of tensions between the
Confessing Church and the Nazi state. The two sides mostly warred over church policy and the
Nazi desire for denominational and institutional homogenization (Gleichschaltung) under state
control. Some members of the Confessing Church were imprisoned or even killed for their
opposition to National Socialism, but the degree of their resistance to Nazism varied
significantly. Opposition tended to erupt most forcefully during Nazi interference with Church
structures or so called “religious matters,” for example the Aryan Paragraph and its implications
for the Christian ritual of baptism. As the war began in earnest in 1939, some Protestants took a
more active stance against Nazi censorship, the T-4 euthanasia project and, in rare instances, the
persecution of Jews (mostly on behalf of converted Christians).96 However, aside from a few
exceptions (like the Protestant martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer), the Confessing Church neither
supported non-Christian Jews nor seriously challenged the validity of the Nazi state.97
Confessing Church’s conduct during the Kirchenkampf garnered considerable postwar
clout in the eyes of proponents of ecumenical Protestantism. Given its conclusive complicity
with Nazism, the German Christian Movement became the ideal scapegoat during denazification
and postwar posturing. It is worth noting however, that continued anti-Semitic ideals within
German Protestantism facilitated the quick reintegration of Deutsche Christen into the EKD.98 In
practical terms, this meant that ecumenical Protestants dealt almost entirely with members of the
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Confessing Church and publicly and privately endorsed their resistance.
In the postwar period, the overwhelming majority of German theologians and pastors
were unwilling to confront this harsh reality. They often deflected the issue of Christian inaction
and anti-Semitism by denying it entirely or reminding the Allies of their own war crimes.99
Numerous historical difficulties made this deflection even easier. Germany’s divided status,
extreme poverty, persistence of postwar anti-Semitism and widespread ignorance and confusion
about the inner workings of the Nazi government made it all too easy for German Protestants to
avoid the issue. There were attempts to evaluate Christianity's attitudes toward Jews in postwar
Germany, but most German Christians proved unwilling to consider the issue.100
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy facilitated this disengagement by making the point
of emphasis not anti-Semitism or even the degree of resistance, but instead membership in the
wider worldwide ecumenical Christian community. In this way, one’s historical conduct did not
matter as much as one’s reputation as a bearer of traditional Christian morality. American
Protestantism proselytized this message both to their own parishioners, government officials and
the general American public consistently from the very onset of the Nazi rise to power, who in
turned adopted the binary as a form of propaganda. The theological and intellectual stakes of
both the 1930s and the Second World War similarly created the space necessary for the
propagation of the Dichotomy in popular memory.
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The Proliferation of The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy: Reinhold Niebuhr and
American Religious Propaganda during the Second World War

The spread of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in the United States came predominantly
from two sources: The concern of church leaders over the nature of Nazism and American
government propaganda describing the Nazis as anti-Christian. While its rise to widespread
acceptance occurred predominantly during the Second World War and in the immediate postwar
era, its origins lay in the debates of the decade before.
For American Protestants, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy brought both unity and
disharmony. On one hand, whether progressive modernist, evangelical fundamentalist,
denominational hardliner or mainline ecumenist,101 the Dichotomy brought a form of unity and
shared purpose amongst the churches rarely seen in American History. All agreed, even if their
solutions for combatting the enemy differed, that Nazism and communism were diametrically
opposed to Christian beliefs. In the 1940s mainline Protestants (Baptists, Congregationalists,
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Disciples, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians) continued to dominate the
American religious scene as they essentially had since the country’s founding, though they often
allied themselves with Catholics and Jews occasionally embracing a form of religious pluralism
which would have been almost unheard of a few decades prior.102
The appeal of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy for Americans was, paradoxically,
both its clearly defined political position and its undetermined nature. This gave the Dichotomy
an unparalleled capacity to unite the disparate religious factions of the country while also
allowing room for maneuverability.103 For American policy makers, it provided a means of
uniting the country against Japanese militarism, Nazi barbarity and later Soviet communism.104
For Protestant fundamentalists, it offered a chance by which they might combat spreading
secularism and declining religiosity.105 For ecumenists, it was the cause needed to finally bring
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together American and international Christians.106 For modernist theologians, it offered the
potential to implement Christian values in statecraft and foreign negotiations.107 For Catholics
and Jews, it presented a mechanism through which they might be included more broadly in
concepts of the American nation.108 Finally, for the new pro-interventionists, it became the path
forward through which Christians could combat the true evils of the world. Of course,
individuals often believed and endorsed the Dichotomy for more than one reason, but
nonetheless, the concepts basic effectiveness was its flexibility: it could be turned toward almost
any political or theological argument provided one stayed within its confines.109
Several other external factors lent themselves to the spread of the concept. First, the
natural impulse of individuals and nations faced with the imminent possibility of death is to
ponder existential questions of meaning and value, and therefore a societal turn toward
religiosity is hardly unexpected in wartime. Second, the mobilization and coordination required
to fight a total war demanded a clear articulation of the enemy, which in turn meant individuals
accepted binary choices and outcomes more readily than they might otherwise.110 Finally, the
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extreme destruction and loss of life felt during the Second World War raised the stakes
significantly, as every nation desired an end to warfare.111
Reinhold Niebuhr, likely the most famous American Protestant theologian of the 20th
century, articulated many of the major points of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy by
prioritizing the threat of Nazi Germany as a fundamental threat to Western democracy and
natural rights.112 The son of German immigrants raised in the often insular communities of
Midwest German Protestantism (denominationally, the American branch of the Prussian-Union
Church), Niebuhr rose to prominence as an ethicist, theologian, political commentator and
professor at Union Theological Seminary. His influence extended well beyond the church and
into newsrooms, academic halls and even cabinet meetings.113
Defining Niebuhr’s contributions to the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy requires a
cautious hand precisely because Niebuhr’s theology and ethics changed over time.114 Moreover,
because of his penchant for both politics and dialectic theology, Niebuhr was, and still is,
sometimes misrepresented by scholars, politicians and the like.115 Ultimately though, Niebuhr’s
defense of liberal democracy from an ethical perspective proved effective precisely because it
did not defend democracy solely from a religious perspective, but rather as a method for
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restraining individual and group egotism.116 This idea, most clearly articulated in his 1943
masterpiece The Children of Light and Darkness, contended that Nazism’s very existence proved
traditional European liberalism blindly assumed rationalism could solve the ethical problems of
human existence. As he put it, “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s
inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”117
Niebuhr’s contributions to the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy are therefore threefold.
First, his defense of democracy from both a secular ethical position and Christian ethics
enhanced his appeal and more generally provided a strong moral justification for war.118 Second,
his condemnation of Nazism and communism119 as ideologies devoted to self-interest created a
firmly divided Christian justice and love from totalitarianism.120 Finally, his direct participation
in politics derived from his earlier support of Social Gospel121 activism created and reinforced an
imperative for direct political action and involvement.
Niebuhr’s debates with Protestant pacifists in the late 1930s and 1940s further bolstered
his profile and the Dichotomy.122 By equating American democracy with Christian values and
simultaneously demonizing Nazism as the antithesis of such values, Niebuhr reinforced the
either-or framework of the Dichotomy. A series of essays Niebuhr published in 1940 under the
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title Christianity and Power Politics serves as a good example of the types of arguments Niebuhr
utilized to bolster his position. Pacifism he remarked, “is unable to distinguish between the peace
of capitulation to tyranny and the peace of the Kingdom of God,” because “modern liberal
perfectionism…is unable to make significant distinctions between tyranny and freedom because
it can find no democracy pure enough to deserve its devotion…”123 Here, Niebuhr’s insistence
on supporting American democracy despite its shortfalls perhaps unintentionally helped support
the Dichotomy by nullifying critical counter-arguments about American society and democracy.
Take for example the famous dictum of African American boxer Joe Louis, "Lots of
things wrong with America, but Hitler ain't going to fix them."124 Louis whose family migrated
North during the First Great Migration to escape violence from the Ku Klux Klan, faced off in
two high profile bouts against German Max Schmeling. Louis, undoubtedly a victim of
American racism and discrimination, nonetheless expressed sentiments of the Dichotomy in a
famous propaganda poster created in 1942 which read “Pvt. Joe Louis says, “We’re going to do
our part…and we’ll win because God is on our side” (Figure 8).125 Louis’s sentiments reflected
Niebuhr’s overall argument that whatever moral shortfalls American democracy might have,
totalitarian ideologies were certainly not going to solve them.
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Figure 8126

Niebuhr’s direct intervention into political affairs during the war likewise upheld the
Dichotomy in opposition to what he dismissed as wide-eyed moralism. His mobilization against
Herbert Hoover’s Plan to feed the “neutral” nations of Europe under Nazi occupation proved
effective and consequential in Washington circles. Niebuhr and his allies charged that any aid
given to neutral European nations would either be requisitioned by the Nazis or allow Hitler to
divert resources elsewhere. Therefore, any American humanitarian aid to Europe during the way
would be morally complicit in aiding Nazi aggression.127 Thus despite disagreement and
opposition, Niebuhr’s position of wartime protagonist eventually won out in most church and
government circles.
Wartime propaganda played a key role in establishing the Christian-Totalitarian126
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Dichotomy in the psyche of Americans. This becomes quite apparent by examining just a few of
the many propaganda posters created during the war by both individual churches and the
American government (see figures 9 and 10). Created by the ad firm Kelly and Read and Co. for
the “Think American” propaganda campaign in the early 1940s, Figure 9 depicts a giant black
boot with a Nazi swastika stepping on a New-England steeple-church. Figure 10, issued from the
Office of War Information in 1942, similarly shows a large hand with a dark jacket embroidered
with a red swastika piercing a Bible with a dagger.

Figure 9128

Figure 10129

Both documents clearly depict Nazism as a violent antagonistic force opposed to
Christianity. Indeed, their respective captions “We’re Fighting to Prevent This,” and “This is the
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Enemy” clearly portray the war as a fight against Nazi oppression of Christianity. Government
rhetoric surrounding such images also linked Nazi violence with anti-American ideas, especially
in relation to freedom of worship in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights (Figure 11).
Issued by Norman Rockwell and the Office of War Information in 1943, Figure 11 shows a
group of men and women, heads bowed in prayer. The image encourages viewers to “Save
Freedom of Worship” through the purchase of war bonds. While the caption ostensibly applies to
all forms of worship, particularly the subheading “Each According to the Dictates of His Own
Conscience” overlaying the image, one man in clearly shown holding a bible and the young
woman front and center likewise holds a rosary. Moreover, the absence of any clearly
distinguishable Jews further associates “Freedom of Worship” with Christianity. The deliberate
depiction of Nazism as anti-Christian and in opposition to Christian values reinforced American
conceptions on the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in multiple ways. First, it reaffirmed the
idea that America in had been founded on Christian values, thereby inferring that American
democracy was synonymous with Christianity. Second, it portrayed Nazism as fundamentally
incompatible with Christianity and by extension America. By positing that Nazism would
disallow both American political values and Christian moral teachings, the dagger through the
Bible represented a Nazi attack on both Christian principles and democratic liberties.
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Figure 11130

The Kirchenkampf in America

Protestants in America also drove the narrative of anti-Christian Nazism by politicizing
the Kirchenkampf at home and abroad. Because of the substantial number of American
Protestants with German ancestry and the relevance of German theologians for the early 20th
century, many Americans had sympathy and personal connections with their colleagues in
Germany. Through ecumenical contacts, Germans in exile in American during the war,
American pastors living and working in Germany (the American Church in Berlin was a
significant factor here) and organized resistance groups, American Protestants politicized the
plight of the Confessing Church almost from the onset of its conflict with the Deutsche Christen.
Although some American Protestants openly expressed sympathy toward Hitler, the narrative of
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Nazi persecution of Christians began to win out after 1938, particularly when Kristallnacht, the
publicized imprisonment of Martin Niemöller131 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact convinced
even sympathetic German-American Lutherans of the merits of the Dichotomy.132
Consider the way the New York Times began a report in 1935 covering a dispute
between Minister of Church Affairs Hanns Kerrl and presiding bishop of the Confessing Church
August Marahrens: As “Germany’s struggle between the totalitarian state and the Protestant
Church took a dramatic turn when Hanns Kerrl…undertook to paralyze the opposition to his
regime.”133 Or how executive secretary of the Universal Christian Council and
foreign secretary of the FCCoC Henry Smith Leiper’s special report to the Chicago Tribune in
December of 1934, called the “Christian church…the one real barrier able to stop the totalitarian
idea of Hitler’s state.” Continuing he claimed, “The church has become the central point in the
clash…Hitler’s aim has been to take the heart of German Christianity and substitute a Nazi
heart.” Leiper continued noting “Throughout the world, thoughtful men now realize that the only
basis of democratic government is the Christian ideal of life.” The report even quoted famous
physicist Albert Einstein noting that “the puny, insignificant church is being found equal to the
task while the powerful groups [in Germany] remained impotent.” 134 Leiper’s interesting use of
the term “Christian church” instead of the Confessing Church implied that the Deutsche Christen
were not actually Christians. The use of Einstein’s description of the church as “puny” and
“insignificant” also refuted declension narratives of religious weakness and decline, undoubtedly
131
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designed to inspire believers.
Even before the creation of the Pastors’ Emergency League (the predecessor of the
Confessing Church) in 1934,135 American papers were describing German churches as resisting
and impeding Nazi rule. They described Friedrich von Bodenschwingh’s victory in church
elections in 1933 as a “hero,” and likewise conflated the meaning of the election to signify
widespread complete opposition toward Nazism by German Protestantism.136
Other reports denoted the extreme measures of “de-Christianization” taken by the Nazi
State. In a four-part special report published in The Washington Post in 1937, Ewart Edward
Turner, longtime personal friend of Martin Niemöller and pastor of the American Church in
Berlin from 1930-1934, claimed the Nazis sought to replace Christianity with a new religion of
“Blood and Soil.”137 He likewise described an extremely tense situation in the Catholic Church
leading up to the Anschluss vote, claiming the Nazis held the Austrian Catholic Church in
“Captivity.” 138
A 1938 survey conducted by showed that while 94% of Americans disapproved of the
Nazi Treatment of Jews, 97% disapproved of their treatment of Catholics. In 1940, to emphasize
the oppression and suffering experienced at Nazi hands by Christians in Europe, Time published
a special issue devoted specifically to giving voice to Christian suffering in Europe.139 A separate
article emphasizing German Protestant martyrdom made the almost certainly erroneous claim
that more than 80% of concentration camp inmates were Christian rather than Jewish.140 While
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the statistic perhaps might not be as inaccurate as one might suspect at first glance, given that in
1940 when the article was published Jewish extermination camps in Eastern Europe had not yet
become active, the article nonetheless implies that the basis for the confinement of the majority
of Nazis prisoners was their Christian faith, a claim most certainly incorrect. Such evidence
demonstrates the effectiveness of the narrative told by church leaders. While these articles may
also be interpreted as demonstrating American indifference toward Jews, the media and
government narrative of the Second World War emphasized Christian oppression.
All of these articles share five things in common. First, they conflated Protestant
opposition to Nazi church policy with political opposition to Nazism, one of the central myths of
resistance narratives.141 Second, they described Nazism and Christianity as fundamentally
incompatible. Nazi encroachments upon church sovereignty were but logical manifestations of
the “State which tried to supersede God.”142 Third, they evaluated the power of the Nazi State as
omnipotent and omnipresent, quite similar to Hannah Arendt’s definition of the totalitarian state.
Fourth, they all posited that Christian resistance to Nazism in some way strengthened the faith of
those involved for the betterment of Germany. Finally, they all implied that democratic choice
and compromise were the only viable alternatives to the totalitarian state. In short, they
reinforced the precise tenants of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Subsequent US
government wartime propaganda therefore simply made use of existing narratives already
familiar to much of the American public.
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Newspaper articles and propaganda posters were hardly the only way in which American
Protestants exalted Christian resistance to the Nazi State. Individual Germans, especially those in
exile in America, similarly argued that an “Other Germany” existed and strongly opposed
Nazism. Prominent Protestant theologians such as Paul Tillich and the Swiss born Adolph Keller
were among them. After the war, Tillich in fact specifically recommended to the Federal Council
of Churches that Martin Niemöller be brought to America as soon as possible because “nobody
could impress as strongly as he to the American public opinion with the facts about the struggle
of the Confessing Church against Hitler” Continuing he said “…it is a general impression…that
the daily press minimizes the significance of the opposition in Germany during the Nazi regime
or suppresses such news entirely, in addition to his many publications on the subject.”143
Marianne Jehle-Wildberger’s recent biography on Swiss ecumenist Adolf Keller (who spent
most of his professional career in America) makes similar claims about Keller’s work as a liaison
for the FCCoC to Deutsche Christen Reichsbischof Ludwig Müller in 1933. Keller would spend
much of the rest of the war promoting the cause of the Confessing Church to both the FCCoC
and the then-forming WCC.144
Still, widespread acceptance of the necessity of war, belief in democracy’s capacity to
solve the underlying problems of industrialism and mass politics and the incompatibility of
National Socialism and Christianity developed slowly amongst American Protestantism. Lars W.
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Boe, a member of the three-person American National Lutheran Council, remained a vocal
supporter of Hitler and openly sympathized with the Nazi State’s anti-democratic and collectivist
impulses throughout the 1930s.145 Even detailed reports of Jewish and Catholic persecution did
little to sway many American Protestants. Some like Sylvester C. Michelfelder, even expressed
concerns that press coverage of Kristallnacht might be “…turning [many Americans] away from
the German people. The persecution of the Jews has made martyrs out of the Jews. Personally I
regret this very much. It will take many years for the German people to recapture some of the
good feelings that existed just a few years ago.”146 Only through continued pressure, Nazi
persecution of Christians (many of whom were Lutheran)147 and Niebuhr’s political mobilization
toward support for war led to the eventual acceptance of the Dichotomy by most American
Protestants.148

Historians, The German Church Struggle and the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy

The historiography of the Kirchenkampf has largely focused on the degree of Christian resistance
to Nazism and National Socialism’s relationship to the Protestant Churches and Christianity
more broadly. Debates tend to revolve around two central questions: First, to what degree did the
churches collude and/or resist Nazism; and (if the answer to this question is very little) did this in
some way constitute a moral failure on the part of the church?149 Second, and very much related,
to what degree did the Nazi State persecute Christianity? A side debate of this second question,
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raised most notably by Richard Steigmann-Gall’s The Holy Reich, asks whether Nazism itself
was Christian, with the implication that if in fact it was a Christian movement, then Christianity
would be far more culpable for Nazi crimes than historiography has typically suggested.150
Building off of Manfred Gailus’s assertion that postwar historical inquiry has treated National
Socialism and Christianity as two separate monolithic blocks, I suggest that all of these debates
correlate to the formulation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in one form or another.151
Because postwar Christians in and outside of Germany advanced this view so powerfully in
public memory, debates arising in opposition to this idea attacked its very premise, namely that
to be a Christian did not preclude one from being a Nazi (totalitarian), and/or that Christianity
could not provide any sort of effective defense against totalitarianism.152 Historical myths
surrounding the Confessing Church all stem from the Dichotomy in one way or another, whether
concerning resistance, complicity or persecution. The historiographical debates that follow
largely mirror this conception in one way or another, adhering to the binary even if in moderated
forms.
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This is not to say that such historical inquiry lacks validity, quite the contrary. It has
considerable value not only for understanding the inner workings of the Nazi State but also for
contemplating ethical and political decisions in a post-Holocaust world, as many scholars have
shown and continue to show. However, I do suggest that clearly identifying the binary, the
reasons behind its historical construction and its points of origin, are necessary starting points in
dissecting the intricacies of memory construction after the Second World War and producing
knowledge that more closely resembles historical truth. From this perspective, one can
understand why scholarship has tended to partition National Socialism off from Christianity as
Gailus describes and why attempts to bring them together have been so polemical.153 Invariably,
acknowledging Christians might have been Nazis or vice-versa inverts the Dichotomy. But
likewise arguing that all Christians supported National Socialism, or that Nazism drew its
ideological framework from Christianity neglects the very legitimate concerns raised
overwhelmingly by Christians in the West during the Third Reich and immediately after.
Historiographical inquiry tends to take an either-or approach of analysis. Either Protestant
resistance to Nazism was significant and noteworthy, or it was overwhelmingly limited and
lacking in effect. Early narratives emphasized significant Protestant resistance in the face of an
overwhelmingly powerful and oppressive Nazi state. 154 Revisionist scholars challenged these
points on both fronts, arguing essentially the opposite.155 Neo-orthodox scholarship has
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emphasized the importance of factionalism within the Confessing Church, often describing
resistance amongst individual members or radical factions (such as the so called “Dahlemites”
led by Martin Niemöller), but largely still making the same distinctions in regards to limited or
successful resistance.156 Newer studies have shifted away from making broad generalizations
about Protestant acclimation or resistance toward Nazism and taken a more regional and micro
approach offering a more nuanced understanding of the Kirchenkampf.157
The controversy over Richard Steigmann-Gall’s The Holy Reich best demonstrates the
tendency to reduce the debate to the terms of the Dichotomy.158 Steigmann-Gall’s central thesis,
“to revise our understanding of the Nazi movement as intrinsically anti-Christian,”159 speaks
directly to this point. Certainly, this claim directly challenges one of the central components of
the Dichotomy: the idea that Nazism was inherently anti-Christian.160 His analysis of Nazi
religious rhetoric, rituals and church policy situated predominately in the 1920s and 1930s, leads
him to conclude that for Nazi leaders “Nazism was not the result of a “Death of God”…but
rather a radicalized and singularly horrific attempt to preserve God against secularized
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society.”161 He sees Nazi ‘Positive Christianity’ as emerging distinctly from the German
Protestant nationalist traditions of the Kaiserreich.
Steigmann-Gall’s argument that Nazi ideological tenets had links to Christianity carries
with it a certain degree of historical truth. He is also correct from an historical and institutional
point of view that many Nazis were Christian, and many Christians were Nazis. One could say
strictly from that perspective that the Nazis were Christian.162 However, the historian must also
recognize that neither the Deutsche Christen movement nor ‘Positive Christianity’ resembled
orthodox Western Christian belief in any significant way. While the central figure of Christ, the
motif of rebirth and central religious texts are related, the interpretation is radically different in
several important ways. Steigmann-Gall claims that the State’s attempts to centralize and seize
institutional control over the Protestant church (Gleichschaultung) cannot be seen as intrinsically
anti-Christian, and that in fact the decision to ‘coordinate’ the Protestant Church meant that
Nazism saw Protestantism as something potentially worthy of inclusion. However, such
inclusion required the Deutsche Christen theological viewpoint to prevail, because, as
Steigmann-Gall himself states, National Socialism did not allow for an institutional loyalty
beyond that of the State. Orthodox Lutheran Protestantism never accepted and could never
accept this precept, let alone Catholicism or Christianity as a whole.163 Steigmann-Gall claims
that because Positive Christianity emerged from Protestant cultural and liberal theological
traditions in combination with völkisch theorizes, the basis of Nazi religious belief was
161
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fundamentally Christian.164 But such an argument is only possible when one completely ignores
the broader scope of both theological and religious history in Germany outside of the Third
Reich and outside of Germany entirely. How many British, French, Italian or American
Christians would accept such a definition?
Steigmann-Gall’s desire to equate Christianity with the intellectual basis for National
Socialism leads to his dismissal of Manfred Gailus’s critique that the Holy Reich fails to account
for Christian resistance.165 He describes the eventual Christian rejection of Nazism as just “…one
of the very many instances in the history of Christendom when Christians were at odds – or,
more to the point, at war – with each other, regardless of the many exhortations to love and peace
found in their shared religion.”166 This looks entirely past Gailus’s pertinent point about the
nature of movements such as the White Rose or the importance of orthodox Christian belief in
the July 20th plot, to say nothing of the theological debates over Nazi racial policy. These facts
are crucial, because they show that even in Germany during the Third Reich, some actors
challenged Nazi historical and institutional definitions of Christianity directly.167
This leads one to conclude that The Holy Reich’s actual goal is to topple the Christian-
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Totalitarian Dichotomy. Steigmann-Gall admits this, even if he does not refer to the Dichotomy
as such. He claims:
The insistence that Nazism was an anti-Christian movement has been one of the
most enduring truisms of the past fifty years. It started as a preconception even
before the movement gained power and only gained strength after the war. For
Western societies intent on rebuilding themselves after the worst devastation in
world history and facing a new atheistic "menace "it could be argued that
preserving the truism was a political necessity. Exploring the possibility that
many Nazis regarded themselves as Christian would have decisively undermined
the myths of the Cold War and the regeneration of the German nation that the
metaphor of the Stunde Null (zero hour) so precisely represented.168
This passage stands out precisely because Steigmann-Gall articulates what is one of the central
arguments of this dissertation, that preserving this “truism” facilitated German Protestantism’s
transition into the Western World, and that American churchmen played an influential role in
propagating this concept. However, in so doing, Steigmann-Gall creates a binary of his own, and
fails to move beyond the parameters of the original conception. His binary description of Nazi
leaders as Christian or non-Christian belies the complexity of the intellectual crisis of the 1930s
and the varying ways in which both liberal and conservative theologians and intellectuals sought
to solve it.169 Moreover, it obscures the very complexity of Nazi thought about religion, which as
Samuel Koehne has shown, embraced völkisch ideas and blended them with various forms of
Paganism, Occultism and Christianity. As Koehne put it, “A heterogeneous approach to religion
problematizes the longer history of the Nazi movement.”170 The framework of the Holy Reich
does just this, even as it tries to invert historiographical categories. Steigmann-Gall’s text does
historiography a service by pointing out the ways in which scholarship has internalized the
message of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. However, as Mark Ruff put it “…he overstates
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the case when he argues that the Nazis' positive statements toward Christianity indicated a
genuine belief in Christian teachings.”171 To that I would add that Steigmann-Gall’s
determination to bring down the Dichotomy demonstrates his inability to distinguish where it
fabricated historical truth and where it properly articulated a real threat to the faith.
The Church Struggle for those invested in Christianity, both in the 1930s and today,
represents the danger of failing to uphold the main tenants of the faith both theologically and
politically.172 Despite the witting and unwitting tendency for exaggeration on the part of
American churchmen in their magnification of both Christian resistance and Nazi-oppression,
their underlying concerns over the direction of their faith were in effect justified and legitimate.
The Dichotomy was only effective because it correctly interpreted that Nicaean Christian belief
could not be reconciled with Nazi racial policy. Nor, from an American or British perspective,
could National Socialism as a political ideology be reconciled with liberal democracy. Thus, the
Dichotomy gained further strength by positing that liberal democracy was synonymous with
Christianity.173 From this perspective, Manfred Gailus’s public request for individual regional
German churches to continue to thoroughly investigate their own histories174 and his retort to
Steigmann-Gall, 175 can be clearly understood.
While The Holy Reich attempts to take this perspective into account by refuting both the
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“wolf in sheep’s clothing” arguments176 and interpretations that Nazi ‘Positive Christianity’
lacked canonical authenticity,177 his text inevitably descends into discarding the entirety of the
Dichotomy. By arguing that self-professed Christians could not possibly create a “non-Christian”
movement,178 Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation makes three key assumptions. First, that Nazism
itself had a clear definition of Christianity. Second that this definition had the greatest value
during the Third Reich simply because some Nazis in high ranking positions claimed to be
Christians. Third, that their definition of Christianity was still principally “Christian” in its
intellectual purity. All three claims are inaccurate.
Many historians may understandably not wish to enter debates of religious purity. Such
debates are often best left for theologians because they require one to take normative positions
on historical debates and theology. I certainly have no intention of rigidly classifying Christian
belief in this text. However, in this case the need to distinguish between Nazism and Christianity
has significant bearing on the historical record for two reasons. First, Steigmann-Gall’s decision
to withdraw from the inter-Nicene debate within the German Churches cedes all linguistic
territory to Nazis themselves. Such a maneuver simply allows Nazis to claim an identity or
utilize a method of classification without debate or discussion, thereby validating its assertions.
Second, numerous scholars have challenged the coherency of Nazi Christian belief. The Nazi
profession of Positive Christianity had limited, if any, meaning. Even Hitler and his closest
associates could not sufficiently distinguish the term from non-Christian belief.179 Richard
Weikart’s recent analysis of Hitler’s religious views went so far as to conclude that “evidence is
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preponderant against Hitler embracing any form of Christianity for most of his adult life.”180
Such scholarship highlights the need to examine Nazi classifications.
Even presuming a lasting coherency in Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation of Positive
Christianity, his argument still fails to hold up to scrutiny. Both Protestants and Catholics in
Germany and abroad continually challenged the völkisch content of Positive Christianity, and
moreover adherents failed to convince even most Nazis of its validity. Gary Dorrien’s analysis of
Confessing Church theology shows that its members’ primary aim was to maintain the Church’s
identity. Helmut Thielicke, a student of Karl Barth, remarked that “many Confessing Church
leaders would have allowed themselves to be burned at the stake if Hitler had impugned the
Augsburg Confessing or the Heidelberg Catechism. As it was, however, the Nazi bosses had no
inkling that such venerable documents existed.”181 Nor did they have a need to impugn them
even if they did. The Two-Kingdoms Doctrine prevented all but a few Confessing Church
members from ever developing an active political-ethos of resistance.182
Furthermore, German resistance against Nazism after the Reichstag Fire of 1933,
consisted of almost exclusively devout Christians. If Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation of the
intellectual links between Nazism and Christianity are accurate, he must explain why July 20th
conspirators183 such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dr. Karl Goerdeler and Ulrich von Hassel mobilized
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in opposition because they believed the “…murder of unarmed civilians was an integral part of
Germany’s dechristianization” (emphasis mine).184 Or why Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin called
his own execution “the will of God.” Or still why Sophie Scholl, Willi Graf and Christoph Probst
created the “White Rose” in pacifistic Christian resistance to National Socialism.185 While the
complex motivations of these individuals must be understood as more than simply Christian
resistance, to dismiss the religious framing of their opposition as simply part of an inter-Nicaean
struggle presumes that both sides operated within an agreed upon foundation of Christianity from
the onset. Just as scholars ought to be wary of aggrandizing resistance figures into demi-gods or
individuals possessing unimpeachable moral fiber as the Dichotomy often tried to do, so too
much they be cautious of dismissing the very palpable religious grounding upon which Christian
resistance rested.186
Finally, ‘Positive Christianity’ and traditional Christian belief contained vital qualitative
distinctions. Steigmann-Gall claims that the State was essentially neutral in the Kirchenkampf
aside from the fact that Hitler required centralization and coordination.187 But the very basis of
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this coordination required the subversion of orthodox Western Christian theology and could not
tolerate anything less. Yes, many Nazis leaders (especially before 1938) attended church
services, endorsed the rite of baptism and participated in outwardly Christian rituals.188 However,
the Deutsche Christen conception of baptism, the only definition of baptism viable within the
parameters of Positive Christianity,189 deviated significantly from traditional Christianity in its
assertions of racial purity. As one Deutsche Christen pastor put it, “Baptism did not bring an
infant into a church defined by a confession of faith…but expressed the community’s “belief in
the law of blood and in the race” and the parents pledge to “raise this child in German discipline
and customs and in positive Christianity.””190 Such belief obviously deviated from the standard
value of Christian baptism. As Doris Bergen put it, the Deutsche Christen emphasized “race over
grace.”191 Steigmann-Gall tries to distinguish between Positive Christianity and the Deutsche
Christen, but even based on his own definition of Positive Christianity,192 this analysis falls
short. Positive Christianity, in so far as the term has any meaning, was an attempt “to preserve
God” in the Third Reich.193 But the God it preserved was a völkisch God, one which elevated
characteristics of race beyond all other metrics. Western Christianity, even in early 20th Century
Germany, did not do so.194
The Confessing Church may have organized in greater opposition to the Nazi State
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sooner if they had not erroneously believed that Hitler was blind to the tactics of the Deutsche
Christen, and that the Nazi State would either force conformity on this point or marginalize the
Protestant Church’s public profile.195 Instead, aside from a few individuals, members failed to
recognize this reality and still naively believed that they could make Nazism work if only “…a
peaceful relation to the state could have been reached.”196 However, just because the Confessing
Church failed in this regard does not mean the values espoused by some Nazi leaders were
representative of Christianity. The national-conservative milieu desired an authoritative
government that reenergized conservative bourgeois social values, attacked the forces of
“secularism” and “materialism,” and restored the Church’s “natural” position beside the State,
but did not impose itself on the inner structure and theology of the church.197 Nazism met these
conditions aside from the latter, where it diverged significantly in its efforts to define moral
value solely through the basis of race.198
In summation, Nazi views on Christianity and religion, just like Christian responses to
Nazism, were complex historical phenomena which require the careful deconstruction of the
historical record. Steigmann-Gall correctly claims that Nazi leaders drew religious lessons from
the fringes of the German liberal Protestant theological tradition and that Kirchenkampf
historiography often overstates Nazi oppression of Christians. He does historiography a service
in pointing out that the relationship between Nazism and Christianity was often negotiated
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through much of the early years of the Third Reich, as both Confessing Church leaders and the
Deutsche Christen competed for favor. But claiming "Christianity…may be the source of some
of the same darkness it abhors…”199 requires historical clarification.200 Christianity was
responsible in many ways for both placing Hitler into office and supporting his regime.201 But
claiming that National Socialism was somehow reflective of Christian belief and not inherently
intolerant toward it is intellectually disingenuous. In this way, his argument mirrors those who
blame the entirety of the Enlightenment for 20th century totalitarianism instead of recognizing
that only some strands, and certainly not the dominant strands, might be used to justify these
positions.202 Or, those who claim that because a many terrorists are Islamic, then the entirety of
the faith is responsible.203 Reversing the binary of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy as The
Holy Reich attempts to do, will not lead to a better understanding of the past. In fact, it will
simply reinforce its power.
Conclusion
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years after its formulation demonstrates the effectiveness of government propaganda and the
narrative of the Kirchenkampf constructed in America. It is crucial to consider this context when
examining the relative ease at which German Protestants would construct their own exculpatory
narratives during the postwar period, thereby solidifying myths of Christian resistance. The
crafting of the heroic Christian resisters of the Third Reich therefore easily influenced occupied
Germany because millions of Americans were already familiar with their stories.
The brilliance of the Dichotomy narrative lay in its underlying truth. It was plain to
almost all American Christians that Christ’s commands to “love thy neighbor as thyself” could
not coexist with National Socialism. That this also clashed with democratic values was likewise
apparent. Because Protestants could agree to these truths, proponents of war and moral
intervention in Europe prevailed within American Protestant circles. The narrative of AmericanChristian responsibility in international affairs would carry over into the postwar period and
influence the cultivation of a new pro-interventionist American foreign policy.
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Chapter 2: Controlling the Narrative: American Protestants and German
Democratization

As American military authorities prepared for a lengthy occupation of Germany at the end of
World War II, a subdivision of the Cultural Affairs Division received a lengthy OSS intelligence
report concerning the conduct of the German Churches during the Third Reich. This detailed
report, sent to the newly formed Religious Affairs Office (RAO), stands out for its striking
accuracy:
...they [Protestant authorities] now glorified the state, not, to be sure, the weak
authority of the [Weimar'] Republic, but the powerful national State which was to
avenge the German defeat of 1918. This made the Protestant churches a fertile
ground for Hitler's propaganda, and the Protestant churches carry a heavy
responsibility for the National Socialist revolution of 1933...204
The report recognized not only the large role the Protestant Churches played in the electoral
success of the Nazi party, but also revealed a detailed understanding of the Kirchenkampf. It
even demonstrated a firm understanding of the German Lutheran interpretation of the Two
Kingdoms Doctrine, correctly interpreting German Protestant resistance to Nazism within this
framework:
It should be kept in mind that in Lutheran teaching the individual owes complete
obedience to the political acts of his government. Even the outward organization
of the church is a matter of no religious consequence, since the true Christian
church is not identical with its secular appearance, but a mystic entity. Only in
matters of repression and conscience, no compromise is allowed. Only passive
resistance and martyrdom are admitted. None of the groups of the Protestant
opposition in Germany ever departed from this line, though individual theologians
like Karl Barth have taken different positions.205
These observations stand out for their accuracy. At a minimum, this report shows that American
authorities firmly grasped the conduct of the German churches under Nazism. They knew that
204
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the Confessing Church as a whole did not resist Nazism as a political ideology and even shared a
great many sympathies with its political framework. It would take over forty years for
scholarship to come to a similar consensus.206
Yet toward the end of occupation, Religious Affairs officials told a much different story.
Consider for example the comments made by Dr. James Eagan, chief of the Religious Affairs
Branch in Bavaria. In a broadcast for Radio München in 1948, Eagan stated that "All during the
Nazi regime, the churches formed the only organized opposition to National Socialism. The
clergy of various faiths were persecuted, and many died in concentration camps." Eagan
continued, arguing that the virtues of the Christian Church had been attacked by the Nazis,
"Tolerance was one of the Christian virtues which the Nazis tried to eliminate from the
conscience of all Germans."207 These phrases hardly conjured the same image of the detailed
OSS report, and represented, at best, an overemphasis of Christian resistance to Nazism. Indeed,
in many respects church leaders' intolerance led them to embrace National Socialism. This shift
in rhetoric can only be explained by considering the role of American church representatives
who served as unofficial support staff to the Religious Affairs Office. Such representatives,
many of whom had connections to the US State department, the World Council of Churches, the
American Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) or some
combination therein, sought to influence Allied policy and bolster the stature of Protestantism
through a combination of intelligence gathering, offers of material support and lobbying (both
206
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public and private). These representatives broadly sought to further the overall goal of their
respective institutions: To construct a new international order based upon Christian principles.
The representatives therefore, not only had to convince their German colleagues of the
merit of their cause and enlist their aid, but also convince the Allies of the German Churches’
good standing. Doing so required proving International Protestantism’s argument that
Christianity and totalitarianism were fundamentally incompatible. However, because the record
of the Protestant churches, apart from a few standout individuals, could not substantiate this
claim in any real way, representatives instead concocted a series of convoluted and often
misleading arguments to explain away the rather “un-Christian” conduct of their new German
comrades. This stance inevitably resulted in the promotion and exaggeration of the German
Church’s struggle against Nazism and, somewhat paradoxically, simultaneously emphasized its
contrition for its conduct during the Third Reich. Politically, American Protestant representatives
in Germany often loosely endorsed the political platform of postwar German conservatism,
validating narratives of German suffering (often at the expense of Jews), opposing the
resettlement provisions of the Potsdam Conference, seriously challenging denazification policy
and fiercely assailing communism.208
I argue that during the Occupation, American church officials embarked on a consistent
campaign to rehabilitate the image of the German churches in the eyes of both military
authorities and the American and international public. Their mission stemmed almost entirely
from their understandings of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy insofar as they believed it
impossible to create a Christian world order without direct German involvement. However,
because American Protestants saw democracy and Christianity as natural counterparts and
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German churchmen fundamentally did not, the two sides often differed on the structure of
government best suited for this new world.
The process of democratization in Germany, and most especially within the Protestant
churches, therefore unfolded in a paradoxical and often contradictory manner. On one hand,
international ecumenical Protestants’ support of the German churches bolstered their already
privileged position, greatly enhancing their reputation and giving weight to their critiques of
democratic values and Allied policy. Furthermore, this protection largely facilitated the Church’s
retreat from narratives demanding German responsibility for Nazi crimes and shielded it from
military and government authorities more skeptical of the conduct of German religious leaders.
This protection largely prevented initiatives that might have structurally transformed the church
and its thinking about democracy. On the other hand, ecumenical Protestants succeeded in
binding the German churches to a rough outline for a new future that largely precluded overt
displays of racism, militarism and nationalism. Over the course of occupation, this process
confined German Protestant rhetoric within the broader confines of the Christian-Totalitarian
Dichotomy. As the Cold War progressed, this would eventually facilitate an uneasy acceptance
of democracy as a necessary concession to the fight against totalitarian values.

Religious Affairs and the Prominence of the Church

The Religious Affairs Office initially consisted only of 14 members, 8 professional officers
operating at the Office headquarters and an additional 6 field officers. While the department did
marginally increase in size in 1948 when the Office was elevated in status to that of a Branch,

W o l t e r i n g | 76
Religious Affairs in Germany certainly seemed to occupy a rather small role in occupation.209
However, the lack of staff did not portray a disregard of religion on the part of the Americans,
but rather their commitment to the idea of the separation of church and state. This did not mean
that Religious Affairs attempted to instill an American style separation of state and religion in
Germany, but rather that they ardently believed that as both a foreign power and as state
authorities they had no right to interfere with the churches. Eisenhower, Clay and Truman all
agreed that the best course of action from an administrative perspective was to only ensure that
freedom of worship was firmly established, and then to allow all internal developments, be that
the relationship between church and state, ecclesiastical organization, education or theology, to
be settled by the Germans themselves.210
Officially, the RAO was to assist in democratizing Germany. To accomplish this task, it
set three guiding principles that would dictate the Allies’ policy toward the German churches
throughout their tenure as occupying powers. First, "the guarantee of freedom of religion and
respect for religious institutions," second, "minimizing the abuse of church privileges to promote
subversive political activities," and third to ensure "the continuation of traditional German
Government services to the churches, especially in the field of church finance and the support of
denominationally controlled elementary schools."211 In short, the Americans sought to disrupt the
German churches as little as possible, while safeguarding the freedom to worship and assuring
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that the churches were not to be used as a safe haven for Nazi ideology. In theory, such policy
represented the separation of church and state Americans upheld as a principle of democracy. In
practice, this meant almost complete autonomy for the German churches provided they did not
incite revolt, which greatly undermined efforts to democratize the church.
This placed the German churches in a tremendously advantageous position, especially
considering they were one of the only remaining institutions (perhaps the only across the entire
country) to survive the collapse of the Third Reich intact. This would have tremendous bearing
on the reconstruction of the church and German society since, as Martin Greschat put it, “In the
beginning there was the Church—and no State.” This meant that occupation forces, international
organizations (such as the Red Cross and the WCC) and the German people at large looked to
the German churches as representatives of Germany. Personnel was so lacking that Allied
officers asked both the Catholic Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen and eventual head of
the EKD Bishop Theophil Wurm to function as state administrators in early 1945.212 Because of
this shortage, the churches, whether they desired this role or not, were often looked upon to serve
as representatives of the German people as well as function as local administrators. Such
circumstances thrust the position of the German churches into the limelight during occupation.213
Furthermore, US officials granted clergy members considerable privileges, including
issuing travel permits across the occupation zones (the Soviets were a bit sticky on this point),
the right to publish pastoral letters for distribution (even those critical of occupation authorities),
allowing almost the immediate resumption of church services--which were the only instances in
which Germans were permitted to congregate in large groups without supervision214--the right to
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petition the Allies and the right to organize conferences.215 Furthermore, the Allies generally
allowed the clergy to conduct their own internal denazification proceedings and punished Nazi
sympathizers and supporters within the clergy quite leniently.216 Such favoritism can be
explained partially by the inherent dilemma attached to the concept of freedom of religion.
American leaders believed freedom of religion constituted a major component of
democracy and considered interfering with religious matters to be an abuse of state power and
inherently undemocratic. Thus, they often believed that matters of "spirit" and "politics" could be
firmly separated and compartmentalized.217 In practice however, the line was often difficult to
trace. Did preaching that Jesus was not Jewish constitute a political or a religious stance? What
of conversations discussing the relationship between church and state? Or those calling for the
inclusion of German Protestants in former Prussia as part of a new Germany? What of church
officials endorsing specific political candidates or policies? In the practical reality of occupied
Germany, US officials tended to simply allow German church leaders to do as they pleased,
provided they did not pose a direct threat to the public order or promote Nazism. In fact, from the
very onset the Western Allies permitted the churches to criticize occupation policies, a privilege
not usually extended to other members of the German population.218
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By allowing German Protestants such maneuverability, the American Religious Affairs
Office had no real hope of instilling firm democratic principles within the church. Instead, they
largely validated the moral authority of German Protestantism by granting preferential treatment.
In this sense, the Allied privileging of the Church indicated that church leaders not only had a
right to be heard, but also legitimized their function as societal moral authorities whose advice
ought to be adhered to. Indeed, the many privileges of the churches guaranteed that they would
be one of the few vibrant and vocal German institutions during occupation. Through this
privileged access to the public sphere, the German churches crafted their own narrative of the
War and Nazism. Consequently, German Protestants consistently emphasized their own
resistance to Nazism as well as the state's overwhelming oppression of the churches and the
average citizen. This 'victim' narrative was not unique to the church, and indeed has been well
established by current scholarship, even if the role of American churchmen on the matter has
been overlooked.219
The lenient treatment of the churches also meant that most German Protestants
maintained many of their anti-democratic attitudes well into the founding of the Federal
Republic. For them, the uneducated masses, sexual degeneration and unstable parliamentary rule
led to the rise of Nazism. As such, democracy functioned as a gateway to totalitarianism,
allowing demagogues and materialistic ideologies to sway the masses. If the Weimar state had
properly maintained order and morality, they argued, the Nazis would not have been able to rise
to power and disaster would have been averted. This narrative would gain almost unanimous
acceptance amongst conservative Lutheran Protestants in postwar Germany.220 Their discourse
not only matched the traditional conservative values of Protestant theology and politics, but also
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served to obscure the church's conduct under Hitler.221 The development of this argument is
closely linked to that of International Protestantism and its representatives in Germany during
occupation, who fully accepted and propagated definitions of totalitarianism virtually identical to
German Protestants while not often accepting that democracy inherently functioned as a gateway
for such political developments. Ultimately though, American leniency does not fully explain
how and why the RAO embraced the narrative of Church leaders, especially since both press
statements and their own reports continuously indicated that German Protestant leaders had
serious misgivings about democracy.
Occupation church historiography tends to focus on ecumenical relations, institutional
transformation and structural changes. Sean Brennan’s analysis of religious policy in the Soviet
zone demonstrates how the Religious Affairs Office was unable to form any sort of four zone
consensus on religious policy, stemming in part from German distrust of Soviet rhetoric on
religious freedom and from the inability of Western and Soviet powers to agree on policy.222
Steven Schroeder’s analysis of postwar religious organizations likewise articulates the Allied
belief that Christianity would reinforce democratic principles,223 but notes that many leaders had
difficulty embracing German religious leaders. Their eventual shift toward liaisons and church
led NGO’s corresponded in part to contradictory Allied church policy and a desire on the part of
Allied leadership to avoid ecclesiastical conflict.224 Early historiography from the 1970s and
1980s emphasizes many of the same points echoed in this chapter, including the privileged
position granted to churches, attempts to limit both church and occupation rhetoric to
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ecclesiastics, the importance of early ecumenical contacts and internal political posturing on the
part of Protestants.225
British churches also played a key role in both the process of re-Christianization and as
proselytizers of democracy. Francis Dixon Graham argues the British government utilized the
British churches to promote democracy, which in turn eventually resulted in a “moral mandate”
within British occupation policy. This mandate espoused the principles of the Dichotomy almost
precisely.226 Dixon concludes that both British and German churches were given “an
increasingly free hand to spread their doctrines,” because authorities hoped they would provide
“German refugees and expellees with a more spiritual focus.”227 Dixon also likewise notes that
numerous British church members criticized British occupation policy for its poor treatment of
German refugees and expellees.228
My dissertation adds to existing studies by framing the encounter between American and
German Protestants within the context of American foreign policy aims and the aims of
American evangelical organizations. The formulation of Christian World Order and its rhetorical
value rested upon proving the principles of the Dichotomy in Germany. Therefore, while I cover
familiar territory such as the Protestant church’s relationship to questions of German guilt,
denazification and the disconnect between the RA office and American representatives, this
dissertation suggests there is much to gain by examining how such processes became enveloped
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within the broader confines of the Dichotomy.

Protestant Anti-Democracy and Occupying Authorities

Civilian churchmen became unofficial support staff for the RAO largely because of the
American desire to strictly separate out issues they viewed as "religious" from those considered
non-religious. An initial memorandum concerning the role of the Religious Affairs Office
intended for an almost complete separation between American officials and German Church
leaders. Officials were to initiate contact only through liaisons, and even then, were only
supposed to facilitate basic administrative needs of the church or relay concerns or requests of
the churches to governing authorities.229 To some degree this policy bore similarities to the nofraternization decrees of the early postwar period.230 Naturally in practice, this too proved
impractical, and religious affairs did often directly deal with German church authorities.
The logic behind the Allied hands-off policy stemmed from earlier meetings with US
religious leaders and the State War and Naval Coordinating Committee's advisory indicating the
future of the church-state relationship in Germany would be best left for Germans themselves.
American leadership seemed to believe that any sort of structural imposition by the Americans
would be met with resistance by the Germans, and would be seen as an abuse of power by the
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French, British and Soviets, who each had different church-state structures.231 Some evidence
also suggests that Allied command was motivated not solely by ideological tenets, but also by a
desire to exploit the moral authority of the churches for their own benefit. One report concerning
the churches advised that the "...general objectives of the German churches coincide with the
interests of the occupying authorities in the US zone, it is probable that more efficient use can be
made of the moral authority of the churches in promoting those interests." The report continued
to warn however, that the churches would "...exert continuing resistance or find means of
judicious circumvention..." 232 should their own agenda be challenged. Such pragmatic policy
seems to be mostly retrospective, although it does explain to some degree why American
authorities continued to insist on such a strong separation of church and state. By keeping the
church relegated to the religious matters, Allied command could theoretically make use of their
moral authority in promoting anti-Nazi ideology (Christianity), whilst also containing the
church's influence. That the report also noted the church's main priorities were education and
youth organization, two things also closely entwined within the apparatus of OMGUS, speaks to
some degree of an Allied desire to compartmentalize religion.
Such firm separation hinged on the appointment of official liaisons from American
churches, who were expected to engage with German church leaders more directly. The idea first
came to mind after Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, President of the Federal Council of the Churches
of Christ, suggested the matter after a tour of Germany in late 1945. Oxnam then held meetings
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with General Clay and coordinated with Eisenhower and Truman to send a liaison representing
American Protestants to Germany. Upon hearing his request, the war department recommended
that each of the three major American religious denominations (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish)
send representatives.
In his initial proposal to Truman, Oxnam stressed the anti-Nazi credentials of the EKD
and the benefits of cooperation with the churches, while also simultaneously pointing out the
inadequacies of the current logistical arrangement. He portrayed the EKD as a “gallant body of
church leaders who resisted the tyranny of National Socialism,” and argued the German church,
with its unique reach into all aspects of German society, could be a valuable ally “…in the
building of spiritual bases upon which a free society can be reared…” Oxnam also insinuated
that US military officers, unaccustomed to dealing with German church leadership, had hindered
a powerful ally in efforts to democratize and denazify Germany. The current arrangement
(church leaders reporting to a lieutenant colonel who then passed along reports) Oxnam argued,
had resulted in a “fundamental misunderstanding” between Occupation forces and German
church leadership. 233
The State Department agreed with Oxnam’s reasoning, noting that direct contact between
American and German church officials would assist reorientation efforts in Germany. General
Clay quickly agreed to the plan, but also insisted that such representatives be paid for by their
respective religious institutions rather than European Command, who would offer reasonable
logistic support but not financial support. General Eisenhower also supported the idea, and
Truman himself signed off on the decision in early 1946.234
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This decision would have longstanding effects on the German churches and German
society at large. The representatives of each faith would greatly influence American and German
rhetoric in the postwar era, which in turn influenced the course of the Cold War, gender roles,
youth politics, denazification, and the incredible unprecedented American private aid campaign
for Germany. Because church leaders had their own interpretation of Nazism and its causes and
because Allied command allowed them considerable freedom and license to publish, tour and
speak, they wielded considerable influence during postwar reconstruction. From the very onset,
the RAO faced a significant challenge. Not only were the agendas of the church and Allied
command bound to produce tension (most especially regarding the Soviets and communism in
the early years), but also, given that RAO depended almost entirely upon the intelligence of
church officials during occupation, the narrative of the church was almost certain to win out.
Allied insistence on maintaining a strict separation of religious and non-religious issues
also greatly limited possible choices. Overall, this meant that in many ways the reeducation of
Germany was bound in some ways to encompass the agenda of the church, both in terms of
moral categories and historical interpretation. One of the initial tasks of civilian church
representatives was to tour the German churches and interview key leaders to better ascertain
their circumstances and views. Their reports constituted the main sources of intelligence on
record, and described the needs, conditions, views and aims of German religious leaders. That
German pastors invariably demonstrated strong anti-democratic attitudes should come as no
surprise to scholars of Modern Germany. For the Protestant Church, a predominantly
conservative and hierarchical institution, this was especially true.
Somewhat like their ecumenical compatriots in the United States, German Protestants too
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believed the future of the world, and most especially of Germany, depended upon building an
active Christian presence in society. The RAO recorded that "According to virtually unanimous
Protestant opinion, the political future of Germany will be determined by the fact that Germany
will be the scene of the decisive engagement between the forces of Western Christian civilization
and those of the materialistic Marxist philosophy in the East,"235 a worldview bearing significant
similarities to Mainline American Protestantism's understanding of totalitarianism. Both German
and American Protestants therefore agreed that Christianity needed to take a more active role in
international affairs. Similarly, for both sides, the stakes were extraordinarily high. Failure meant
at best a third world war, at worst the destruction of Western Civilization.
However, the German Protestant worldview certainly differed from that of American
Protestantism, especially in relation to democracy. Indeed, German Protestantism had a long
history of opposing democratic governance prior to the Second World War. During the Weimar
Republic, German Protestants overwhelmingly organized in opposition toward democratic
governance for both theological and political reasons. The national-conservative German
Protestant worldview might be best described as a mixture of Metternichian pessimism with
Mazzinian messianic nationalism. Their pessimistic interpretation of human nature in
conjunction with a strong belief in the divine authority of the nation conflated authoritarianism
with moral order (Obrigkeit), conceptualized in what they referred to as the “Christian State.”
This contrasted greatly with the vision of Weimar Republic and the creation of a Kulturstaat.
Discrimination against Left liberal values and Catholicism would disappear in favor of a new
pluralistic society.236 In stark contrast to their American compatriots, the end of the Kaiserreich
and the creation of the Weimar Republic therefore marked a distinct shift away from Christian
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principles.
Theologically, Protestantism in Germany traditionally saw the monarchy as the desired
medium for societal order. Stemming in part from the Lutheran Doctrine of Two Kingdoms
which separated the spiritual from the temporal realm, German Protestants conceptualized the
role of the state to be that of a divine order mandated by God. The proper Christian ruler was
bound by God to uphold Christian morality and social order. The church in this constellation
offered suggestions and warnings, but never compelled the state toward any direct action or
policy. The central premise buttressing this arrangement was the omnipresence of sin; no matter
what the church nor the ruler did, sin could not be erased from the world only contained. The
church likewise encouraged the ruler’s subjects to offer loyalty and service in recognition of this
reality. National-conservative Protestants, who by far made up the majority of Protestants
leading up toward the Weimar Republic, connected revolutionary tendencies with the usurpation
of God’s Will. If God’s grace sanctified the State via the monarchy they reasoned, then majority
rule could never reflect God’s desired order. During the 19th century, Protestants would
increasingly associate revolution and democratic aspirations as fundamentally selfish, arrogant
and sinful because revolutionaries erroneously believed they could reform and better society
without God through the secular state.237 Messianic nationalism also reinforced the alignment of
“Throne and Altar.” Protestant preaching during the First World War consistently articulated the
war as an expression of Germany’s mission in the world as defined by God.238 The
internalization of the national mission led German Protestants to see their traditional state as a
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desirable alternative to western democracy which they assumed made “egoism normative for
statecraft.”239
Politically, the Protestant alignment with the monarchy placed them in opposition to
Social Democrats and Catholics throughout the 19th century. The rising communist party and its
atheistic materialism and occasionally virulent anti-clericalism naturally also raised the ire of
Protestants. They therefore often aligned almost entirely with bourgeois middle-class society as
well as the landed aristocracy against radical reform. The very premise of the Republic therefore
only gave more political power to the opponents of national-conservative Protestants.
The fall of the monarchy and German defeat at the end of 1918 therefore reverberated in
crippling shockwaves for many Protestants. Most positioned themselves in complete opposition
to the Weimar Republic, which they described as ultimately “religion-less” and an affront to
moral authority. That the church itself undoubtedly lost credibility and prestige both for their
unyielding support of the war and the Republic’s emphasis on secularism only compounded their
concerns. Moreover, scientific rational criticism in conjunction with the loss of traditional
structural authority challenged the very heart of Christian claims about the world. The substance
of the war, rising and changing socio-economic conditions brought about by industrial capitalism
accentuated traditional materialist and rationalist critiques of Christianity but also gave rise to
new critiques related to the irrational.240 Protestants therefore entered the Weimar Republic in a
state of unprecedented crisis. Without the royal family situated as the head of the regional and
national churches, questions abounded as to what the proper role, value or even purpose of the
Church was in the newly formed Weimar Republic.
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The Weimar Republic therefore met with almost instant opposition from the German
Protestant Church,241 though Protestants rarely moved toward against the Republic directly.
Instead, the Church’s role during Weimar might be best understood through Otto Dibelius’s
remark that “the church is politically neutral- but it votes German-national.”242 Because church
leaders still tended to interpret their role in society as “neutral” in reference to the belief that the
church ought not to occupy or articulate firm political positions, yet still could not avoid their
overwhelming preference for a “Christian-State” which would once again renew the nation and
provide proper temporal authority, the Protestant Church often moved toward a reluctant
political activism that shied away from direct action on major political questions.243 Church
leaders openly lamented the loss of the monarchy and territory in the East while perpetuating
nationalist critiques and myths such as the Dolchstosslegende.244 Still others expressed serious
concerns about declining church membership and continuing Christian education without the
monarchy and Protestantism’s privileged position within it.245 While church leaders did not
universally or consistently articulate these critiques with some even reluctantly moving toward
begrudging acceptance in the mid-1920s,246 Protestants on the whole undoubtedly welcomed the
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fall of the Republic in the 1930s and Hitler’s rise to power in 1933.247
Therefore, while both Americans and Germans tended to agree that the emergence of
totalitarian "materialist" ideology largely stemmed from secularization and declension, German
church leaders also tended to understand Nazism as a consequence of liberal values, in some
instances even pinning blame on the French Revolution.248 In this respect Germans differed
considerably from American Protestants. One pastor wishing to remain anonymous stated that
democracy cannot take root in Germany because "it is a foreign ideology; because of Germany's
experience with the weak Weimar Republic, democracy is associated in the German mind with
unemployment and ineffective foreign policy."249 Hans Asmussen suggested that "...the whole
world obviously does not think of the question, whether, maybe, even democracy is already
affected by deadly bacilli, which first in Germany succeeded in bringing the organism of
democracy into dissolution."250 Both of these quotes generally reflected Protestant attitudes on
democracy. A clear majority of German Protestants considered parliamentary politics to be too
fragmented, and therefore susceptible to manipulation. Lutheran church leaders often put
considerable stock in hierarchy, owing in part to their understanding of the Two Kingdoms
doctrine, and consequently considered democracy too weak and subject to the will of the
uneducated masses.
Some German Protestants, especially those who joined the CDU, often saw the question
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of political order as secondary to the more pressing issue of ideology. Democracy, they reasoned,
might or might not overcome communism as a political form of government, but only
Christianity could truly oppose Bolshevism at its core.251 This facilitated their alliance with
German Catholics, who also believed that only a Christian democracy could overcome
communism.252 With this view in mind, the churches often felt themselves ill-treated by the
Western Allies, who in their minds ought to have treated them as kindred spirits, rather than
enemies. Many pastors, having prayed for the defeat of their own nation (or at least so they
claimed), felt they should have been offered some degree of partnership with the occupying
forces to mold a new Germany, this despite the immense institutional freedom already granted
by Allied forces.
Prominent American churchmen, undoubtedly aware of the anti-democratic proclivities
of their German colleagues, often recommended to military officers that they might consult with
"experts" on the German churches (i.e. themselves), so as not to "misunderstand" their position.
To some degree their requests did have merit. It would have been unfair to ask military
commanders to mediate the theological infighting of the EKD.253 Nonetheless, American pastors
defended German church leaders unequivocally despite their often dubious comments toward
democracy or questionable record of resistance against the Nazis despite the resistance of
military officials.254255
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In fact, the American Committee to Aid Survivors of German Resistance, formed in 1947,
specifically attempted to help members of the Confessing Church and their families after the
war. The Committee, which included both Reinhold Niebuhr and Allen Dulles, brother of John
Foster and eventual head of the CIA under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy,256 also
described Christian resistance within the confines of the Dichotomy. A pamphlet entitled “Our
Allies inside Germany” penned by Helmut Kuhn spoke glowingly of the role of Christianity in
the July 20th conspiracy to assassinate Hitler. Kuhn wrote:
Please tell all your friends and like-minded people in the United States that what
they do to help the German people…is not done in vain. The black shadow so
painfully cast over the last fifteen years of German history must be the intimation
of a great hidden source of light. This light…we Germans of today must make
visible once more. So we may contribute our share towards the illumination of the
human family on earth in the spirt of Christ.257
Kuhn’s plea corresponded with the general theme of rebirth through Christian values emphasized
in The Six Pillars. In this way, postwar planning for peace emphasized the need of Christianity
both in its previous struggle against Nazism and its potential for rebirth at war’s end.
Yet as tensions with the Soviet Union increased, the concerns of military leaders were
pushed aside. In the minds of many American officials, the outlook of both American and
German Protestantism lent itself quite easily to the Cold War.258 The Germans certainly still held
fierce animosity towards the Soviets and communism. Take for example Hans Asmussen's
comments in 1947: "It is impossible for a Christian...to wage war with Adolf Hitler to the death,
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and to make peace with Stalin."259 American civilian church leaders certainly made the loudest
and strongest arguments for their German colleagues by framing the Cold War as a spiritual
battle upon which all of Western Civilization depended. Germans were only too quick to take
what was offered.

Stewart Herman and the World Council of Churches

Just as American churchmen lobbied for permission to enter Germany at war's end, so too did the
World Council of Churches. It too received permission to have a permanent liaison to the
Protestant Churches in 1947, but had already sponsored several conferences and delegations
prior, had numerous representatives in and out of Germany and had previously provided the
Allies with intelligence and contacts during the War.
Likely the most influential American Protestant in occupied Germany was Stewart W.
Herman. In many ways, Herman was unique. As the former pastor of the American Church in
Berlin from 1936-1939, a Foreign Representative of the American Embassy in Germany from
1939-1941 and a member of the OSS from 1943-1945, Herman had the distinct experience of a
foreign pastor in Germany during the Third Reich. He would return to occupied Germany as a
member of the World Council of Churches in the summer of 1945, and in 1946, became the head
of the Division of Material Aid of the Department of Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid for
the WCC, guiding tours through occupied Germany and submitting official reports to Allied
command. From the Allies’ perspective, Herman's experience with the German churches and his
previous employment for the US State Department and the OSS made him an excellent liaison in
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Germany.
But Herman's familiarity with the churches also meant that he had personal stakes and
biases. Indeed, Herman betrayed as much in August 1945 in a letter to Donald Heath at USCGG
Berlin. Here, Herman admitted that the WCC was operating "in the conviction that the German
churches constitute the only agency which has not succumbed, despite a Nazified minority of
pastors and priests, to Hitler's blandishments and persecution." Herman also went as far as to say
that German Protestantism needed no encouragement to root out all Nazi sympathizers, which he
defined exclusively as the Deutsche Christen, stating "...very little outside pressure, if any, is
needed to encourage the anti-Nazi churchmen to clean house. The process is virtually
complete."260 Clearly from these statements Herman considered the Confessing Church to be a
firm ally in the fight against Nazism. He also intimated, being an official representative of the
WCC, that the entirety of the WCC supported his stance.
On this matter, Herman was certainly not unusual. His worldview and understanding of
Nazi Germany largely mirrored that of ecumenical Protestantism. His 1943 publication It's Your
Souls We Want, argued Christianity and Nazism were inherently incompatible, stating, "one of
them must be destroyed if the other is to exist."261 By the 1940s, almost all of Mainline
Protestantism believed "totalitarian" ideologies fundamentally threatened all of Christendom and
Western culture. For Protestants such as Herman, only Christianity (implicitly Protestantism) had
the spiritual capacity to resist the "materialistic" ideologies of communism and Nazism. I suggest
that Herman, as an example of an American preacher with the ear of the State Department,
noticeably influenced discourses addressing German "rehabilitation" by severely criticizing the
Allied policies of German resettlement and denazification, misrepresenting the record of the
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Confessing Church and emphasizing a motif of German suffering. This rhetoric fostered an
either-or political scenario in which Christian morality and totalitarian barbarity fought for the
soul of Germany and set the terms in many ways for public discourse in the United States and
Germany on Nazism, Communism and Christianity.
Herman's 1946 publication The Rebirth of the German Church denotes a clear example of
his attempt to glorify the Confessing Church at the expense of the Deutsche Christen. His first
chapter outlined the Kirchenkampf in considerable detail, even offering a level of nuance in his
discussion of the neutral faction. Still, Herman treated the "neutrals" quite generously, slightly
rebuking them for being unwilling to speak out more boisterously, while also praising their
"passive resistance" and their ability to "preserve the integrity of provincial church
organizations."262 But unlike the OSS report, Herman failed to note that the Confessing Church’s
principle basis for resistance was Nazi church policy, not its political platform. Herman also
perpetuated the narrative that the Confessing Church from the very onset was in mortal peril and
resisted Nazism at great personal cost.263 For instance, Herman highlighted Confessing Church
opposition to the Aryan Paragraph in 1933 (which bared of ‘racial’ Jews from the pulpit) while
failing to note that such opposition stemmed almost entirely from their theological interpretation
of the law rather than a political opposition to discriminatory practice.264
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Through his critique of Allied occupation, Herman framed the situation in Germany as a
simple binary, Christian or non-Christian. In this respect, anything purportedly seen as antiChristian was also by extension totalitarian, and vice-versa. This binary not only readily lent
itself toward Cold War discourse, it also necessitated either-or zero sum political and historical
solutions and interpretations. Under this structure, any suggestion that an individual could have
both been Christian and a Nazi threatened the entire framework, and therefore could not have
been accurate. Therefore, Herman needed to either make excuses for or explain away, the limited
resistance of the 'neutral' churches. To do so he argued that they had resisted Nazism “in their
own way”. Their “passive resistance” he reasoned, emerged because the neutral churches had not
been "Christian" enough to stand witness. Herman’s argument rested upon biblical metaphors
about moral and spiritual foundations.265
Overall, Herman's book portrayed conflicting messages which roughly corresponded to
the views of German and International Protestantism. While Herman's efforts to claim victim
status for Germans aligned precisely with his understanding of the Kirchenkampf and his
interpretation of totalitarianism, his simultaneous pleas to both honor and respect the members of
the Confessing Church while emphasizing present misdeeds over past atrocities showed a
selective prioritization of historical memory. This worldview explains Herman’s analysis of the
Potsdam Conference. For him, the sanctioned population transfer of Germans undermined both
the credibility of the Allies and the credibility of Christianity. Given the narrative of both the
American churches and the German churches allowed for only two possible political outcomes,
from Herman's perspective any action on the part of the Allies that betrayed his understanding of
Christianity by extension gave credence to the totalitarian enemy. But Herman's harsh rebuke of
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German resettlement sanctioned by Potsdam also exposed his close intellectual affinity to the
members of the German church. His rhetoric, especially his support of Bishop Wurm’s rebuttal
to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s criticism of German guilt,266 matched that of the German
churches almost verbatim.
The hypocrisy of US policy designed to uphold basic principles of moral and legal justice
that ignored the crimes of its Allies undermined both the credibility of the Allies, as perceived
representatives of the Christian West, and by extension weakened the credibility of democracy
and Christianity. This line of thinking explains in large part why German Protestants and their
sympathizers found a receptive audience amongst US religious leaders. These sorts of critiques
would prove effective at engendering a response from the average mainline Protestant
parishioner,267 and especially effective at convincing high-ranking Protestant officials to question
the moral validity and proceedings of denazification and war crimes trials.

The Paradox of Guilt: Ecumenical Protestants and The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt

The most telling example of Herman's effort to shape the public image of the German Churches
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came from his analysis of the EKD’s famous Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt (Stuttgarter
Schuldbekenntnis), which, as its name suggests, broadly and vaguely acknowledged communal
responsibility for Nazism. The Declaration, issued in October of 1945, emerged out of
Ecumenical Allies’ desire to reestablish connections with the German churches despite concerns
over the political and theological ramifications of doing so. The previously-mentioned Willem
Visser 't Hooft, a Dutch theologian and general secretary of the WCC,268 had been preparing for
such a statement long before the end of the War and began pitching the idea to several German
Church leaders almost immediately after the War ended. In fact, this seems to be Stewart
Herman’s primary function in Germany in 1945 for the WCC, to reestablish contacts and pave
the way for an ecumenical delegation from the WCC to enter Germany. Herman delivered a
series of letters from ‘t Hooft to leading German church leaders regarding the idea of some sort
of declaration of guilt. ‘T Hooft first pitched the idea to Bishop Otto Dibelius, who had already
discussed the idea informally with Hans Asmussen, Karl Barth and Martin Niemöller.269
Upon arriving from Switzerland, Visser 't Hooft, Swiss Church President Alphons
Koechlin and leading members of the FCC Samuel Calvert and Sylvester Michelfelder (who
officially represented the Lutheran World Council) received military escort from Colonel Sturm
and lodged with General Koenig in Baden-Baden. The delegation then discussed with the
General the need to restore relations with the German churches. The group concluded that for
foreign churches to attain "full confidence" in the German churches, the delegation would need
some sort of announcement speaking to the crimes committed by their nation. The delegation
and the General also agreed that such a declaration must not be forced so as to undermine all
credibility. Thus, the delegation decided that first the WCC must meet with leaders of the
268
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German Church to re-establish "fraternal relationships" before requesting the declaration.270 The
delegation was particularly concerned that without reestablishing some form of unity with
Germany the entire ecumenical movement would lose traction and falter, as it had, from their
perspective, after the First World War.271
The leadership of the EKD, eager for contact and assistance from abroad, agreed to write
the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt despite misgivings about the ways in which the document
might be used for political purposes. They especially feared the document being a sort of
"second Versailles," in which the church, and by extension Germany, was made to take blame
for the entirety of the war. To be sure, some members of the EKD likely welcomed the
opportunity to make such a declaration, especially Martin Niemöller, but many were leery.
Nonetheless, the EKD found themselves in a rather difficult position. Desperate for material aid
and international support, leadership had little choice but to acquiesce to the delegation’s request.
Dr. Koechlin brought requests from Karl Barth for a unified statement from the churches so that
he could in turn rehabilitate the image of Germany abroad.
Nonetheless, drafting the statement proved quite difficult for a newly formed EKD beset
with internal rivalries and theological disputes. Members disagreed over whether the document
need mention German atrocities in the East and argued over the proper theological form a public
declaration of wrongdoing might take. Lutheran members especially worried that any sort of
condemnation or fierce critique of the State or reassertion of the Barmen Declaration would be
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seen as an affirmative support for Barthian Reformed Calvinism.272 Because many Confessing
Church Lutherans felt the 1934 Statement was principally a product of Reformed theologian Karl
Barth, in the postwar period they feared upholding the document would signify a theological
shift away from Lutheranism and toward Reformed Calvinism, despite their earlier endorsement
for the purposes of unity during the Kirchenkampf and the theological struggle against the
Deutsche Christen.
Thus, the Stuttgart Declaration spoke only of the Church's failings and made no mention
of Jews or the Holocaust. The document’s most important lines, such as “…we know ourselves
to be with our people in a great community of suffering, but also a great solidarity of guilt,”
foreground any conversation about German responsibility in a sense of shared suffering.
Moreover, while the Declaration made mention of the church's failure for "not witnessing more
courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously and for not loving
more ardently,"273 it prefaced that acknowledgement with a statement of Christian resistance,
“We have for many years struggled in the name of Jesus Christ against…the National Socialist
regime of tyranny.” Despite this, the Declaration met with severe criticism on the part of the
German public, with local pastors and parishioners alike condemning the declaration.274 The
delegation even went through considerable lengths to limit the publication and distribution
within Germany, which certainly suggests they did not support the declaration.275 Interestingly,
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Visser 't Hooft's report made no mention of any disagreement on the part of the Germans, and
instead spoke glowingly of their willingness to write the declaration and their general contrition.
It also made mention of the difficulties experienced in the East under Russian jurisdiction in a
rather obvious attempt to encourage the Western Allies to support the church against the
Soviets.276
Stewart Herman's report on the Declaration and its aftermath proceeded along similar
lines. While Herman did report that the Declaration had been met with resistance, he, and the
EKD in general, attributed such resistance to the non-Christian German youth and/or nonChristians. Herman reported that Bishop Meiser noted that "good Christians" accepted their guilt
while non-Christians asked, "why other nations...have not expressed a sense of guilt.," 277 a
peculiar statement given that just two months later Bishop Wurm would ask that very question in
response to a radio address from the Archbishop of Canterbury. Moreover, in February of 1946
Hans Asmussen, one of the principal authors of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, circulated a
pamphlet entitled Die Schuld der Andern (The Guilt of Others), addressing perceived Allied
injustices.278 Asmussen particularly blamed the German press for the negative outcry, insisting
that the document was solely ecumenical in nature and that all Germans should love their
Fatherland just as the law of God commands one to honor his or her parents.279 Herman’s report
however, concluded that "Despite all opposition the church leaders are nevertheless pressing the
matter of repentance and will continue to do so even though it may mean a temporary
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estrangement on the part of fairly large segments of the population." Continuing, Herman
remarked that "The reaction of the German church leadership to the Archbishop of Canterbury's
recent radio broadcast...is extremely significant, because it reveals how sensitive the German
nation is to any...rapprochement being motivated by unchristian political considerations.”
(emphasis mine)280 In this case Herman again portrayed the Church as good soldiers supporting
the Allied cause, despite the distinctly unjust and "unchristian" hypocrisy of the Allies.
The reports from both Visser 't Hooft and Stewart Herman therefore must be considered
an attempt to whitewash the record of the Confessing Church and to paint the EKD as good
Christians.281 This inherently meant that as "good Christians" they were aggrieved over the past,
but it also meant that they, as opponents of Nazism and representatives of the "good people" still
in Germany, were allies of the forces of good striving for "justice." Such rhetoric again fostered
this dynamic of good versus evil, Christendom against totalitarianism, and attempted to provide
the church with a moral high ground with which they could rightfully rebuke the Allies for not
being "Christian" enough. If, as Herman and Visser 't Hooft claimed, the leadership of the
German churches honestly sought to make amends for the Nazi past, then surely their critiques of
Allied policy warranted further consideration. Herman took this argument a step further positing
that the Allies themselves were hindering the rejuvenation of the German soul by instilling a
draconian, "unchristian" victor's justice.282
Nonetheless, the Declaration did accomplish the aims of the ecumenical contingent, and
by extension lent itself toward factions of the EKD who were critical of the traditional Lutheran
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national-conservative worldview. It allowed institutions such as the WCC and FCC to promote
the “contrition” of German Protestants and defend their inclusion in the Church body, thereby
providing the first real tangible link between the German churches and the international
ecumenical movement.283 In this sense, the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt did function as a
building block for democracy within the German churches, even if, as Karl Barth would put it in
a letter to Martin Niemöller, “…despite Stuttgart, the church remains obdurate and
unrepentant.”284 The Declaration provided both a theological foundation for attending the
question of German war guilt by building upon the political unity forged at Barmen by once
again repudiating the national-conservative mindset, even if indirectly.285 Moreover, the
whitewashing of the church response by ecumenical proponents like Herman similarly
constrained national-conservatives into fully supporting the ecumenical significance of the
Declaration,286 and by extension ensuring that such conservatives would be a part of any
attempts to build a Christian world order, even if it came at the expense of historical accuracy
and obfuscated church attitudes on democratization.
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“We Hold That Criminal Offenses Should Be Punished,” German Pastors, War Crimes
and the Ecumenical Relationship

In the Summer of 1947, the US Military Tribunal indicted twenty-three individuals in the
Nuremburg Einsatzgruppen Trial (case 9). One such defendant was Willy Seibert,
Standartenführer (colonel) in the SS, member of the SD, and Deputy Chief of Einsatzgruppe D.
The task force operated in southern Ukraine and Crimea, especially in Nikolayev, Kherson,
Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosiya, and in the Krasnodar region, and was directly responsible for
murdering over 91,728 people over the course of the war. 287 Seibert, along with thirteen of his
co-defendants, would be sentenced to death on April 10th, 1948.
After his sentence, Seibert received multiple letters of support from Protestant church
leaders, including the Bishop of Hannover Hans Lilje.288 In pleading for mercy for her husband,
Seibert’s wife Elly specifically emphasized her husband’s strong Christian faith and insistence he
had maintain a “Christian home” for their children,289 a comment worthy of further analysis and
consideration.
Current scholarship has conclusively demonstrated the lengths to which German
churchmen to undermine denazification and war crimes trials. This included the writing of
glowing character references known as Persilscheine or "Soap Certificates," which intended to
wipe clean the record of the accused. They also consistently publicly criticized the proceedings
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as unjust, immoral and nothing short of victor's justice.290 Their criticism of the trials and their
support of numerous defendants went a long way toward the acquittal or lessening of charges of
a great many former Nazis. Their critiques proved so effective that American authorities refused
to open any new denazification cases in the US occupation zone by 1948.291 However, existing
scholarship has overlooked the role American churchmen played in reinforcing German critiques
of denazification in their attempt to control the narrative about German resistance to Nazism.
Ericksen and Eric Johnson both describe incidents in which Church leaders deliberately
misled Allied courts in their defense of various Sonderkommando, SS leadership and Gestapo
members. Eduard Strauch for instance, commander of Einsatzgruppe IB deployed in the Baltic
States and sentenced to death at Nuremburg, received a glowing defense from Heinrich Held,
president of the Protestant Church in the Rhineland, after his guilty verdict.292 Not only did such
prominent Protestant and former Confessing Church figures such as Hans Meiser, Otto Dibelius
and Theophil Wurm deceive Allied courts, they actually instructed their colleagues as to how to
best craft their testimonies in order to assist those brought up on charges. 293
Bishop Wurm in particular sought to discredit denazification. His public criticisms, as
seen in his response to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s radio address in 1945, attacked the
290
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immorality and hypocrisy of the Allies for blaming all Germans for the actions of the Nazi elite
while ignoring their own war crimes.294 His private critiques, similar to many of his colleagues,
demonstrated a complete contempt for essentially any Allied attempt to prosecute Nazi war
criminals. In a letter to General Clay the EKD council attacked the International Military
Tribunal on numerous grounds, including evidentiary claims, the use and procuring of witnesses,
technical difficulties for the defense, witness coercion, false accusations, an inability to appeal
proceedings to an independent court and the use of new standards of law that had not existed
previously. The council concluded with:
The above mentioned facts...have a detrimental influence on the recovery of
sound public opinion and prevent the return of confidence in law and justice. The
love of our Lord Jesus Christ urges us to make every effort that the desperate,
skeptical and nihilistic humanity regains confidence in public order. We hold that
criminal offenses should be punished. 295
Such criticism by the church led in large part to the hastening of denazification proceedings, the
lessening of charges and the whitewashing of the Nazi war crimes.296 Yet by framing
denazification and war crimes trials as an instrument of revenge likely to decrease public opinion
of Christianity and renew sympathy for “nihilism”, German church leaders would find
sympathetic ears amongst their ecumenical colleagues.
After Willy Seibert was found guilty, the bishop of Hannover Hans Lilje wrote to his
colleague and friend in America John Bodensieck, a former liaison to Religious Affairs and
professor at Wartburg Theological Seminary in Iowa. Bodensieck appealed to Clay on a personal
level to commute Seibert's death sentence, even after admitting he knew nothing of the case and
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was acting only on Lilje's insistence that Seibert was a man with "integrity."297 While Clay
would refuse, the sentence would be delayed under John McCloy and eventually lessened to
fifteen years in prison. All surviving defendants in the trial would be released in 1958.298
Bodensieck’s response, as well as Lilje’s appeal to his ecumenical colleagues, was hardly
unique.
Reinhold Niebuhr, Samuel Calvert, Paul Tillich, Roland H. Bainton, Steven Fry, Stewart
Herman and L.W. Goebel all raised similar concerns about the fairness of trial proceedings and
the moral justification of denazification. Some, like Stewart Herman, would go so far as to
condemn denazification in its entirety, siding completely with German Church leadership. Apart
from Tillich, all were prominent American Churchmen placed in positions of significant
authority within ecumenical and public institutions. Some, particularly Niebuhr, were respectable
figures well known to the American public. This made their criticism of court proceedings of
particular concern to both the American public and US officials.
Like Bodensieck, most of these leaders seemed to have little firsthand knowledge of court
proceedings upon first receiving the concerns of their German colleagues. Their introduction to
the specifics of the Dachau Trials, denazification proceedings or other International tribunals
came almost exclusively from prejudiced sources seeking to both publicize challenge and
overturn the judgments handed down by such courts. Like Bodensieck, they nonetheless took
their German colleagues at their word, channeling and broadening their critiques.
On January 17th, 1949, Samuel Calvert received a letter from his colleague L.W. Goebel,
president of the Evangelical and Reformed Church in Chicago, concerning material submitted to

297

Letter from Bodensieck to Clay, March 25th, 1949. OMGUS, AG/49/76/1. ZA 46, BAK.
This was the case for 9 of the 14 defendants sentenced to death. See Michael Wildt, An Uncompromising
Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office. (University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 372377. See Also, Frei, Adenauer’s Germany, 106.
298

W o l t e r i n g | 108
Roland Bainton (Yale Divinity) by German Professor Gerhard Ritter.299 Goebel noted that
incredibly similar material had recently been published in TIME magazine.300 In addition,
Ritter’s material had been published in the Protestant periodical called Christ und Welt edited by
future president of the Bundestag and director of the Evangelische Hilfswerk Eugen
Gerstenmeier. A similar document quite had also been published in Hans Lilje’s Sontagsblatt.301
Ritter’s letter to Bainton spoke out against the “immoral” conduct of the American forces who
extorted confessions from German officers in relation to the Malmedy Trial via a combination of
extortion, mock-executions and violence.302
Calvert was already long since aware of these critiques, having received word from
Bainton directly (who expressed concerns) and the original letter from Ritter along with some
supporting materials.303 Indeed, Calvert had already been in contact with Reinhold Niebuhr over
the matter,304 who had received similar supports, and arranged a meeting with the US attorney
general Thomas Clark, incredibly within just three weeks after writing him.305
The meeting, which took place January 19th, included Clark, Calvert, president of the
United Lutheran Church Steven Fry and assistant solicitor general George Washington. In
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preparation for the meeting, Calvert had received follow up letters from Bishop Wurm, and
spoke with John Foster Dulles.306 The meeting ultimately produced minimal results. The
Attorney General had no jurisdiction over Army courts, and in any case the trials had already
been concluded. In addition, a special commission had already reviewed the case and
recommended that of the twenty-nine defendants sentenced to death they had already
recommended life in prison or shorter sentences (five had already been executed). However, the
attorney general did offer to make further inquiries with the secretary of the army and appoint a
special committee consisting of Calvert, Fry, Barnes, Foster Dulles and Goebel to review the
case files and offer recommendations.307 While the Federal Council of Churches would
eventually turn down the request because the trials had already been concluded, Calvert
nonetheless followed up with US Army Major General Thomas Green confirming that the
Federal Council’s concerns had been expressed to General Clay. In addition, the council
expressly recommended that any defendant whose right to a fair trial was in question.308
Steven P. Remy similarly argues that German Protestants deliberately publicized their
defense of German war criminals in his analysis of the Malmedy Massacre.309 For Remy, the
EKD’s appeals to sympathetic ears (both domestic and international) significantly undermined
Allied attempts to eradicate Nazism from German society by portraying both denazification and
the war crimes trials as corrupt proceedings designed solely to bring about a form of victor’s
justice. American Church leaders with ties to Germany proved to be particularly receptive to
these types of critiques. 310 Records of the FCC confirm his analysis. In a private letter to Visser
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‘t Hooft of the WCC, Sam Calvert wrote that he thought there was a “grave question as to
whether they [the defendants of the Malmedy case] had received a fair trial.” While Calvert
would not assume this meant they were innocent, the very possibility of a biased trial troubled
him considerably since it weakened the relationship with American occupying forces and the
German people.311
While the Federal Council’s inquiries and concerns did not directly affect the outcome of
the Malmedy case, the proceeding circumstances tell us much about the ways in which German
church leadership attempted to oppose Allied policy. The three-pronged attack against the
Nuremburg Trials, denazification and the Dachau Trials included direct protest to the authorities
involved, deliberate politicization of the trials in public forums and the enlistment of favorable
allies abroad. In this sense, the response of the FCC to the Malmedy case represented a pattern,
one which over time significantly shaped postwar rhetoric about war guilt and allied attempts to
find justice for Nazi victims.
For instance, Bishop Wurm's criticism of denazification and the war crimes trials was
public, well known and covered by major newspapers in both Britain and the United States. The
fervor over his critique of Allied war crimes was so great, that as early as 1946 the State
Department requested the RAO office have Stewart Herman talk to Wurm in order to have him
tone down his nationalist rhetoric.312
A few months later though, Herman supported Bishop Wurm on denazification. Herman
again argued that punitive measures on the part of the Allies simply painted them as "unChristian,” which not only hindered the rejuvenation of the German moral soul but also
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undermined Allied rhetoric about law and justice.313 Herman also described the denazification
trials as "indiscriminate" and complained that in the eyes of many Germans it meant that
"democracy was equated with inefficiency."314 For Herman, the difficulty with denazification
was it meant a "hard peace," for Germany, which resulted only in despondency on the part of the
Germans. This implicitly set the stage for a return to nihilistic doctrines and a rejection of moral
(i.e. Christian) principles. Yet again, Herman used a zero-sum argument in his opposition to
denazification. Unless the Allies stopped these needless trials he argued, Germans would turn
from God a second time in favor of totalitarian ideologies.
The World Council of Churches took a more diplomatic approach toward German
critiques of denazification, but nonetheless support their ecumenical colleagues. A statement by
the WCC in response to the EKD’s Treysa Denazification Statement315 cautioned the Allied
Control Council not to misinterpret the EKD’s position as “political.” Instead, they insisted that
the “spiritual motivation of the statement in question [was] unimpeachable.” As such, the WCC
urged the allies to consider the spiritual position from which the EKD operated, especially in
relation to the “heroic obedience” of certain pastors and in light of the Stuttgart Declaration of
Guilt.316 Here the WCC clearly recognized the political fallout likely to emerge from the EKD’s
actions, yet nonetheless supported their brethren’s spiritual right to make such claims.
Existing scholarship has recorded similar instances. Robert Ericksen demonstrates that in
the so called “Soap Certificates,” (Persilscheine), Protestant leaders argued that Christianity had
served as a "natural counterweight" to Nazism during the Third Reich. Church leaders reasoned,
as seen in the support of Bishop Lilje for Willy Seibert, that those who observed Christian
313
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practices could not have been Nazi sympathizers. Ericksen rightly dismisses this assumption
outright, stating "Clear-eyed honesty would have shown otherwise."317
Ericksen’s point reveals the central problem with the war crimes trials for the clear
majority of Protestants and Catholics, including Americans. Because denazification and the war
crimes trials threatened to expose the fact that Christianity had overwhelmingly failed to prevent
the rise of Nazism, the entire argument of postwar ecumenical Protestantism (and Catholicism)
was in jeopardy. Moreover, denazification especially blurred the stark categories of Christian and
Nazi, imperiling the assertions of Ecumenical Protestantism that Nazism and Christianity were
fundamentally incompatible. A true reckoning with the crimes of the Third Reich would have
revealed that many Protestants supported the Nazis in 1933.318 If one takes Seibert’s wife and
Hans Lilje’s testimony at face value, then some Christians committed terrible war crimes. Still
others found their faith to be compatible with the Nazi political platform despite its “church
policy.”319 A fair portion even made up portions of the Nazi elite, even if they practiced an
unorthodox and certainly non-canonical form of Christianity that the Confessing Church and
their ecumenical allies considered non-Christian.320 Taken together, one would have had to admit
that “re-Christianizing” Germany would by no means guarantee a democratic Germany, let alone
prevent the rise of a totalitarian regime.
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This helps explain in part why international Protestants were willing to substantiate the
claims of their German colleagues. Because international ecumenists subscribed to the ChristianTotalitarian dichotomy, they were more than willing to listen when German pastors spoke of the
religious sincerity of the accused. Moreover, from the perspective of many Americans,
guaranteeing German war criminals a fair trial upheld their notion of both Christianity and
democratic governance, regardless of the crimes committed.321 Others, like Sam Calvert and
Visser ‘t Hooft, worried that overwhelming German dissention would threaten their position
within the ecumenical movement.322
Nonetheless, one must say that the German church’s campaign to assert public and
internal pressure on the Allied government proved enormously successful. Their three-pronged
attack of public criticism, enlisting the aid of powerful ecumenical allies and formally airing
grievances quickly turned public opinion against the Allied tribunals. Moreover, it solidified, for
a time, the Christian-Totalitarian dichotomy in the minds of the majority of the public, both in
Germany and abroad. That this facilitated the reintegration of many of their more ‘compromised’
colleagues only furthered their ends.323

Conclusion: The Question of Democratization

One must say that the Religious Affairs Branch ultimately failed in its attempts to
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democratize the German churches. German Church leaders proved reluctant to embrace
democratic governance, and indeed often assumed democracy would collapse shortly after the
Western Allies no longer controlled Germany. This failure occurred for three reasons. First, the
US military government simply gave church authorities too much power and influence over the
spiritual and institutional reconstruction of the church. This had much to do with the problem of
instilling democracy in anti-democratic societies, as doing so would have ironically required
more "totalitarian" measures on the part of the Americans. But even more so, Americans’
assumptions about proper separation of church and state and their undeniable sympathies toward
Christianity guaranteed that German church leadership would have considerable control its their
own affairs, thus limiting the effectiveness of any sort of cultural transformation programs. In
addition, the Americans’ willingness to maintain the church as a state financed entity and their
refusal to treat pastors as state representatives ensured that any sort of drastic institutional
remaking could not take place unless the Germans did so themselves.
Secondly, five years simply did not constitute enough time to truly remake German
society or the German churches. Perhaps the more hands-off approach taken by US leadership
might have been more successful if occupation lasted another ten to fifteen years. But given only
four years of occupation, such an approach was doomed to fail. Even seizing a more direct role
in the formation of the Protestant churches would have likely only resulted in increased hostility
and tension between Americans and Germans given the timeline. Religious Affairs did make
some progress encouraging Jewish and Christian dialogue, but such talks largely took place on
the margins of the Protestant church.324 Indeed, as the Protestant response to denazification and
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the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt indicate, the RAO ultimately achieved only minor progress in
forcing the church to face up to its actions under National Socialism. Indeed, most such public
statements were carefully constructed under the watchful eye of the WCC.
Therefore, under American occupation the German Protestant church did not seriously
change its outlook toward democracy or Jews, nor did it experience any major institutional
reforms or extensively consider its relationship to National Socialism. As such, one must
conclude Religious Affairs did not achieve its goal in instilling western democratic values within
the German churches.
However, this is not to say US occupation failed entirely in relation to the Protestant
churches, but rather that the building of democratic principles within German Protestantism
emerged primarily from other origins. The crucial decision to allow representatives from both the
United States and the World Council of Churches to enter occupied Germany would have greater
effect than any other Allied policy, if for no other reason than these representatives brought the
German churches into their own international war against totalitarianism. That this course of
action continued with funded exchange programs solidified transnational and international
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networks.325 WCC and FCC representatives such as Stewart Hermann, significantly altered the
rhetoric of German church leaders to great effect, thereby improving the image of German
Protestantism both in the eyes of occupation officials and, perhaps more importantly,
international public opinion. Of course, these non-government employees also significantly
affected Allied interpretations of the German churches under the Third Reich as well. By
solidifying the authority of members of the former Confessing Church through their binary
interpretation of Totalitarian and Christian incompatibility, such representatives obscured the
anti-democratic attitudes of the EKD, drowned out military officers who held reservations about
church leaders and undermined Allied efforts to identify and persecute Nazis.
However, the need for international aid and support brought Protestant leaders into close
dialogue with religious leaders from all over the world. German discourse (one might also argue
theology) therefore had to shift in some ways from nationalistic self-aggrandizement toward
internationalist Christian unity and its war against materialism. This transition was made
considerably easier given the strong anti-communist sentiments within the WCC and FCC.326
Since both German Protestants and their ecumenical allies tended to see the world on the edge of
a great conflict with materialistic ideologies, the ideological shift toward internationalism
corresponded in large part with what drove German Protestantism toward Nazism in the first
place, its strong anti-communist rhetoric. The emergence of international Protestant
organizations determined to influence world politics demonstrated to German Protestants that
others found the communist threat to be just as pressing as they themselves had in 1933. This
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new international dynamic influenced even the most conservative of German church leaders,
binding them to a global system which inherently required a degree of democratic participation
and a softening of nationalist rhetoric.327 This left very little room for maneuver for German
Protestants who, despite their serious reservations toward democracy, had strong ideological,
political and material reasons to support their ecumenical compatriots in the fight against
nihilism and materialism.
The positioning of Lutheran national conservatives in their opposition to denazification
only furthered the church’s need to at least ostensibly accept democracy. Because a true
accounting of German conduct during the Third Reich would undoubtedly challenge the
assertions of both American and German church leaders that Christianity would serve as a
bulwark against totalitarianism, the church had little choice but to challenge the overall aims and
assumptions of denazification. Such arguments required German Protestants to not only
challenge the American assumption that a majority of Germans had in fact been Nazis, but also
that denazifying Germany in the manner proposed would not result in democratization. Only reChristianizing Germany, which denazification, as a policy of revenge and victor’s justice
inherently impeded via the prosecution of “Christian” family men, could build a longstanding
democratic German society. Such positioning naturally buttressed international and American
Protestant rhetoric that linked Western democratic values with a Christian identity within
Germany. Thus, the biggest shifts within the church took place in part from external pressure and
in part from an internal desire to defeat communism and Christianize Germany, not through
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directed Allied rehabilitation programs. In fact, the Allied reluctance to overhaul the German
Churches in many respects reinforced the postwar narrative of Confessing Church members and
their Allies in the WCC and FCC. Despite intelligence to the contrary, American occupation
authorities not only went along with the myth of the heralded resistance of the Confessing
Church, but, as Cold War tensions increased, promoted it themselves.
In totality, the actions of the Protestant clergy reinforced the image of Germans as war
victims, and indeed often simultaneously recast Germany as a "feminized nation" in the eyes of
Americans.328 While this interpretation was met with some resistance on the part of American
and World Protestantism, it also largely matched up with their understandings of totalitarianism.
In this way, the postwar narrative of German Protestants directly correlated with the narrative of
postwar Protestantism, namely that totalitarian ideologies inherently controlled all aspects of
private and public life and directly threatened Western Civilization as whole.
One also cannot discount the importance of American clergymen whose lobbying on
behalf of German church leaders often produced meaningful results, whether by rehabilitating
the image of an individual clergy member or simply by granting travel permits to attend a
conference. Their influence explains more so than any other factor why the RAO tolerated and in
many cases accepted the rhetoric of the German clergy, proving significant enough to override
the justifiable concerns of military officers who questioned Protestant church leaders'
commitment to democracy. Such representatives however, also provided much needed stability.
By encouraging Germans to tone down their rhetoric while also encouraging occupation
authorities to assist church leaders, these private representatives fostered good will and
cooperation between Germans and American authorities and solidified a mutually beneficial
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alliance, even if they themselves often felt Allied command hindered church aims.329
Ultimately, the Religious Affairs Office had little option other than to foster goodwill
amongst Confessing Church members. The stories of Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer
were well known to the American public and taking on such figures directly would have had
significant domestic backlash in the United States. Certainly, American church leaders who
clearly wielded considerable influence in the State Department would have been outraged.
Furthermore, the complicity of the Deutsche Christen left OMGUS with little option other than
to work with their political opponents who were certainly less morally compromised.330
Nonetheless, whether through refused action, ideological sympathy, the lobbying of International
Protestantism or a lack of political alternatives, the hands-off approach of American occupation
authorities allowed German leaders to determine the course of the German churches and
dominate postwar discourse. This often meant that efforts to truly instill liberal democratic
values fell on deaf ears. Only by binding the German Church to international Protestantism did
American occupation authorities succeed in creating a long-standing pull toward democracy.
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Chapter 3: Martin Niemöller in America and the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy

On June 5th, 1945 in Naples Italy, numerous British and American reporters interviewed
the heralded Protestant Pastor Martin Niemöller. Undoubtedly, Niemöller had endured
significant hardship during the Third Reich. His vocal opposition to Hitler’s church policy, his
efforts in forming the Pastors’ Emergency League and his lengthy imprisonment in
Sachsenhausen and Dachau concentration camps had left Niemöller physically and emotionally
drained.331 Seven years of internment, often in solitary confinement, coupled with the death of
one of his sons on the Eastern Front, the internment of another as a Russian POW (who would
eventually return home to Germany) and the loss of his daughter to diphtheria only deepened the
spiritual crisis Niemöller experienced as Hitler’s “personal prisoner” from 1937-1945. His
existential turmoil reached such a point that during his imprisonment in Dachau he considered
converting to Catholicism, in part due to discussions with fellow prominent Catholic prisoners
Johannes Neuhäusler, Karl Kunkel und Michael Höck.332 Taken to Northern Italy by an SS
execution squad only to be rescued from certain death by American troops in May 1945,333
Niemöller was understandably anxious to return to his remaining family in Germany.
The interview, resembling more of a press conference than a one on one discussion,
consisted of a particularly strained pastor not exactly well known for his even-temperament,334 a
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handful of American chaplains and a series of non-specialized reporters anxious to get news of
the famous pastor.335 There is evidence that Niemöller in fact considered the session to be a
religious service for American chaplains, though this seems unlikely given the presence of the
press at the event.336 The press’s interest in Niemöller was hardly surprising. His resistance to
Hitler and Nazism had been sensationalized by American media, pastors and books such as Leo
Stein’s embellished novel I Was in Hell with Martin Niemoeller (1942) and Basil Miller’s
biography Martin Niemoeller: Hero of the Concentration Camp (1942), which both dramatized
Niemöller’s disputes with Hitler. Films like Pastor Hall and plays such as God is my Fuehrer
similarly aggrandized the pastor’s stand against Nazism.337 TIME magazine’s 1940 cover issue
also featured Niemöller’s resistance to Hitler, boldly titling the issue “Only the Cross has not
Bowed to Hitler.”338 The popularity and ubiquitousness of Niemöller’s plight was such that
Matthew Hockenos claims Niemöller was likely the most well-known German figure in the
United States outside of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi elite.339 His popularity also conformed in large
part to the overall propaganda efforts of Judeo-Christian leaders of multiple denominations, as
well as the US Government, in positioning America as the defender of Judeo-Christian morality
during the Second World War.340 Unsurprisingly perhaps, Niemöller’s usual candor at the Naples
interview challenged this simplistic portrayal of his person and actions.
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German Navy in 1939 despite his imprisonment,341 had nourished hopes that Nazism might have
been a good thing for the German people and, most sensationally, stated that democracy and
Germany were incompatible. Niemöller claimed to have “…nourished the hope that National
Socialism, if it had gone the right way, might have developed into a system for creating good for
the German people,” further continuing that he had “been deceived” by Hitler and his Nazi
thugs.342 Moreover, Niemöller said that the German people “like to be governed and live under
some authority,” and that he believed Germans were “incapable of living under a democracy.”343
Moreover, he (quite honestly) claimed that his resistance to Nazism had been religious not
political.344 The response to Niemöller’s comments, both by the general press, American church
leadership and Niemöller himself, illuminate the ways in which the conflicting American and
German interpretations of the Dichotomy played out in the early postwar moment. Niemöller’s
honest self-reflection departed from the American narrative of the Dichotomy by openly
admitting he did not equate democratic values with Christian morality. Thus, Niemöller’s
comments diametrically refuted the very principles of the Dichotomy that American Protestants
had been using him to construct.
This chapter charts Martin Niemöller’s trip to the United States in late 1946 and early
1947, the first time a non-military sponsored German civilian entered the United States after the
War.345 I suggest that the purpose of the trip, press coverage surrounding it and Niemöller’s

341

Interestingly, Karl Barth wrote an article explaining why Niemöller had offered to fight in 1940, essentially
saying precisely that his national-conservative Lutheran worldview would only require as much. This was seemingly
not picked up upon by mainstream press, despite its publication in the Swiss paper La Semanine Religieuse and the
Watchman Examiner. See Watchman Examiner issue February 22nd, 1940. WWII Era Records of the WCC.
Microform No. 249. YDS-4,
342
"For What I Am." Time. June 18th, 1945, Vol. 45, Issue 25.
343
“GERMANS UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY: Pastor Foe of Nazis Tells Dispute with Hitler.” Chicago Daily
Tribune. June 6th, 1945.
344
Ibid.
345
Undated Data Sheet concerning Niemöller’s visit to America. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No.
246. YDS-4.

W o l t e r i n g | 123
actions, illustrate the ways in which both Americans and Germans sought to utilize Niemöller’s
reputation toward political ends. American Protestants carefully cultivated Niemöller’s resistance
record to strengthen the Dichotomy and to argue for the necessity of Christian aid to Germany.
German Protestants, eager to rebuild their reputation abroad in hopes of material and emotional
assistance, likewise attempted to utilize Niemöller’s record to strengthen the joint AmericanGerman claim that Christianity had, and would continue, to function as a form of protection
against totalitarian ideology. However, as Niemöller’s candid comments in Naples demonstrate,
Niemöller himself often refused to abide by or be utilized as a tool for strengthening the
Dichotomy. Instead, his paradoxical acceptance and refutation of the Dichotomy revealed the
ways in which both hardline anti-communists, American ecumenists and German nationalconservatives sought to utilize his person for political agendas.
After the interview, American press outlets made a meal of his comments with histrionic
headlines like that from Sam Pope Brewer of the New York Times: “Niemoeller asks [for] Iron
Rule of Reich.346” To a certain extent, the press reaction to the reality of Niemöller’s character
was inevitable given wartime propaganda and its portrayal of Niemöller as a paragon of
Christian opposition to National Socialism. Certainly, there had been ample evidence that
Niemöller was not everything his most ardent supporters claimed he was, given the fierce
nationalism he had demonstrated during and after the First World War in his popular
autobiography From U-boat to Pulpit (1934),347 his participation in the Freikorps and his support
for the failed Kapp Putsch in 1920.348
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Still, the pastor’s record of resistance was among the strongest of any surviving
Protestant church leader, and his turbulent confrontation with Hitler in 1934 has rightly become a
key moment in the Confessing Church lore.349 He was one of the few pastors to recognize the
threat the Aryan Paragraph presented to the Christian rite of Baptism, even if he harbored antiSemitic sentiments of his own.350 His open declarations of remorse in conjunction with his
comparatively positive wartime record of resistance made him an incredibly useful ally in the
ecumenical movement and a potentially powerful figure in German postwar politics. Perhaps
more so than any other national-conservative German church leader, Niemöller would transition
away from German-Lutheran orthodoxy and toward a more ecumenically, politically and racially
inclusive form of Christianity. But his paradoxical and seemingly contradictory statements, seen,
for example, in his open admissions of guilt and repentance yet fierce criticism of denazification,
make it incredibly difficulty to place Niemöller into almost any delineation of Protestant postwar
factions.351
Upon his return to Germany, Niemöller quickly established himself as somewhat of a
maverick within the Protestant Church. His open engagement with and acknowledgement of the
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Holocaust separated him from virtually all of his Lutheran peers. In 1946, he wrote “I think we
Christians belonging to the Confessional Church have all the reasons for saying; ‘My fault, my
own grievous fault.’352 Niemöller also urged all Germans to come forth in a public declaration of
faults and wrongdoings by rejecting the absolution of guilt for the individual who had “just
followed orders.” In his eyes, every German had something to feel guilty about: “The guilt exists
there is no doubt about it. Even if there were no other guilt than that of the six million clay urns,
containing the ashes of burnt Jews from all over Europe.”353 Such comments stand in rather stark
contrast to the passive admittance of guilt issued in the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt.354
Niemöller in many ways became the symbol of German guilt and repentance, or at least
Protestant guilt and repentance, enshrined in his now ubiquitous poem inscribed at the
Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand (Memorial Site of German Resistance) in Berlin :
When the Nazis came for the communists, I remained silent; I was not a
communist. When the Nazis came for the Social Democrats, I remained silent; I
was not a Social Democrat. When the Nazis came for the trade unionists, I
remained silent; I was not a trade unionist. When the Nazis came for the Jews, I
remained silent; I was not a Jew. When they came for me, there was no one left
who could protest.355
The postwar era also marked the beginnings of Niemöller’s shift away from the rigidity
of Prussian obedience and national-conservative interpretations of Luther’s Two Kingdoms
Doctrine.356 For Niemöller, Christianity’s failure to prevent Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust
demonstrated the veracity of Karl Barth’s scathing charges of idolatry during the Kirchenkampf.
While it would take considerable time for Niemöller to develop into the staunch pacifist he
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would eventually become in the late 1950s and 1960s,357 he nonetheless began to distance
himself from the national-conservative milieu of German Lutheranism, adopting a position of
Cold War neutrality that roughly corresponded with Karl Barth and his prominent German
supporters like Helmut Gollwitzer as well as reform oriented Lutherans such as Gustav
Heinemann, Hans Joachim Iwand and Hermann Diem.358 His refusal to accept the title of Bishop
(opting instead for President) when elected the head of the Hesse-Nassau Bishopric in 1947 and
his challenge of Bishop Wurm’s leadership at the Treysa conference on the basis of institutional
reform in 1945 both signified his retreat from national-conservative orthodoxy.359
Still, it would be a mistake to say that Niemöller departed entirely from nationalconservative German Lutheranism in the postwar years. While it is true that the Hesse-Nassau
Bishopric emphasized an ecumenical form of Protestantism and therefore Niemöller in some
ways unofficially departed from the Lutheran church, many of the foundational teachings of
Lutheranism were still present in his political and theological worldview, most especially his
emphasis on man’s sinfulness and his need for grace.360 Furthermore, Niemöller’s emergence as
the head of Hesse-Nassau transpired in part because of the EKD’s desire to promote the former
pastor to the rank of Bishop so as to utilize Niemöller’s political record to their advantage.
Hesse-Nassau was also a newly created bishopric born in part out from the general institutional
reshuffling required at the end of the War with the redrawing of German borders.361 One might
also add that Niemöller’s postwar blueprint for a community-based Church (seen in opposition to
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the restoration of the old structures of the Kaiserreich) seems to have been influenced by some of
Luther’s ideas, and suggests Niemöller consulted some of Luther’s writings for guidance.362
Moreover, Niemöller certainly did not abandon nationalism during occupation or even
the early years of the Federal Republic. His attacks on the division of Germany in 1949 revealed
a degree of continuity in his nationalist rhetoric, especially his assertion that the West German
State was “conceived by the Vatican and born in Washington. The continuation of the West
German State signifies the death of continental Protestantism.”363 Allied occupation authorities,
well aware of the potential influence Niemöller wielded, kept their distance from his political
statements and tread carefully in their dealings with the man. Marshall Knappen, head of the
American Religious Affairs Office until 1947, noted as early as July 19th, 1945 that American
officials must distinguish between “Niemöller the…Confessional martyr…[and] Niemöller the
politically-minded retired naval officer.” Knappen argued that while the former should be
“accorded the freedom and respect” due, the latter, “who says he will serve his people
‘politically, if necessary’ and then launches a campaign which tends to turn us against our
Russian allies and to discredit current Anglo-American policy…is to be carefully watched.”364
Knappen had good reason to be cautious, as Niemöller’s critiques of US policy (especially
denazification) demonstrated. Even General Clay, who largely supported church activities during
his tenure as American military governor, expressed concerns about Niemöller in September of
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1945 stating “While permitting Niemöller to take active leadership in religious affairs, we have
not felt it is advisable to utilize his services in other fields as yet. While his anti-Nazi stand was
demonstrated fully by his own actions, it is still too early to predict as to his wholehearted
rejection of the militaristic and nationalistic concepts of the former German state.”365
Considering Niemöller from an historical perspective requires a great deal of caution. On
one hand, one can and must say that Niemöller’s experiences during the war greatly affected his
political and theological outlook, facilitating his break from the enduring spirit of Prussian
Lutheran conservatism. But on the other hand, one must be careful not to presume that
Niemöller’s transition into the broader ecumenical pro-democratic consensus was inevitable.366
He himself consistently iterated as much in relations to questions about democracy and the
political future of Germany. In 1947, when asked to choose between the Weimar Republic or the
Kaiserreich he answered unequivocally in favor of the latter.367 In late 1947, Niemöller reiterated
to a certain extent his controversial comments from 1945, that he could not be certain democracy
would work in Germany.368 In 1981, when asked why he had volunteered to join the German
navy, Niemöller admitted that patriotism drove him, and he had brooded over another possible
German defeat like that of 1918.369 Ultimately, Niemöller, like many German pastors,
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reexamined his faith and its implications for public and private life in the postwar period. While
Niemöller’s experiences in prison likely caused him to reevaluate his values more critically than
many of his peers, his position during occupation and the early years of the Federal Republic,
especially toward democracy, was in flux. Ultimately though, both the EKD and international
ecumenical leaders needed Niemöller, precisely because he had a reputation that supported
claims that Nazism and Christianity were incompatible. Furthermore, his notoriety similarly
purchased credit with Allied occupation forces and international audiences. This meant that even
his EKD opponents sought to utilize the image of a heroic Niemöller to further the EKD’s
position in German society and its privileged position during occupation. Moreover, Niemöller’s
ecumenical allies, especially Americans who equated Christianity with democracy, likewise
needed to gloss over Niemöller’s anti-democratic attitudes to reinforce and propagate their own
understandings of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, especially in their efforts to raise
support and awareness for the German Churches abroad.

“That Unfortunate Incident in Naples”: Rehabilitating Niemöller’s Image

Upon Niemöller’s return to Germany, American religious liaisons and visitors were quick to seek
out Niemöller to begin damage control for his comments in Naples. Being acutely aware of the
firestorm of negative press coverage Niemöller’s comments caused, and concerned about the
effect this might have on incorporating the Confessing Church into the World Council of
Churches and the broader ecumenical movement as well as Allied authorities, ecumenical allies
in Germany all sought to minimize the damage, insisting Niemöller’s comments were “taken out
of context,” and did not fully represent Niemöller’s values or his potential usefulness to the
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Allied cause.
Ecumenical leaders in the United States also desired Niemöller to tour the United States
almost immediately upon making contact with him in 1945.370 Niemöller himself desired to visit
both England and America to personally thank friends and colleagues for their support,371 but
upon becoming vice-president of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and the
head of its department for relations with foreign churches, Niemöller’s status, reputation, the
great material need of the German churches and the evolving postwar relationship between
Germany and the United States meant that any sort of visit was bound to take on significant
meaning both politically and religiously.
However, gaining State Department and military approval for Niemöller to enter the
United States meant proving to Allied authorities that his visit would be purely “religious.”
American Protestants also presented themselves as supporters of the occupation agenda (as
indeed they certainly desired democracy in Germany) by encouraging Niemöller to tone down
his nationalist rhetoric. S.C. Michelfelder sought out Niemöller along with Stewart Herman and
Visser ‘t Hooft during the WCC’s Department of Reconstruction and Inner-Church Aid tour of
Germany and Alsace in October of 1945. Michelfelder said he wanted to speak with Niemöller to
explicitly have him explain “that unfortunate incident in Naples.” According to Michelfelder,
Niemöller claimed to have offered to serve only to overthrow Hitler and then negotiate a separate
peace for Germany. He claims to have put the issue directly to Niemöller, asking: “If you had
known at the time that your own enlistment would have given victory to Hitler’s armies, would
you have enlisted?” He looked at me in astonishment…and answered: “No! No! Never!””
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Michelfelder, completely taken with Niemöller, reported that he was convinced that the
press had not told the full story during the interview in Naples. Concluding with “My sympathies
are with Pastor Niemöller,” and a glowing character reference:
This is the explanation of a man…who loved his God more than he loved his
country or his own life and who is ready to lay down his life rather than deny his
Christ or see another dictator come to Germany who shall enslave the people and
the Church. You cannot be in the presence of such a great personality as Martin
Niemöller without realizing that here is a man like a re-incarnated Jeremiah or
John the Baptist...He also did say that he objected to the Nazi regime for religious
reasons, because Niemöller considers every question whether political or
economical, a religious question. Since the national socialist regime ran counter to
God’s command by killing the weak and helpless it posed a religious question….
And so Dr. Niemöller explained his position that he objected to Hitler on religious
grounds. And who would not?372
There seems little reason to consider Michelfelder’s account disingenuous, or his enthusiasm for
Niemöller artificial, even if his fawning over Niemöller may seem excessive. After all, Niemöller
was known for his charismatic and passionate sermons in the late 1930s which inspired a
substantial number of supporters.373 If his comments in Naples demonstrated nothing else,
Niemöller never shied away from what he saw as the truth, regardless of the consequences
involved. Undoubtedly, this tendency is what brought his differences with Hitler to the forefront
and likely captured the attention of the American press and wartime propaganda machine as
well. Certainly, the legend of his character during the Kirchenkampf centered around his bold
confrontational manner.374 One may however, raise doubts about his desire to join in the war to
overthrow Hitler, as his later comments suggested a second German defeat had weighed on his
mind considerably at the time.375
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Nonetheless, Michelfelder’s report tells us much about how ecumenical Protestants
attempted to control the narrative of German church leaders with Allied leaders and the oftencontradictory way in which they attempted to separate and parse out religious issues from
politics. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, American authorities attempted to rigidly enforce
an American style separation of Church and State in occupied Germany in part to avoid entering
inter-Nicene debates. However, this attempt to partition religion and politics gave German
pastors significant maneuverability in conducting their own affairs, which included to a lesser
degree freedom to make political statements as well. American Protestants often claimed in
reference to political statements made by German Church leaders that the issue at hand was often
spiritual, or, at a minimum, that a particular political statement was made because of a religious
or theological position.376 Here, interestingly, Michelfelder seemingly acknowledges that there
IS no separation between religious and spiritual issues (at least in Niemöller’s case), because he
interpreted political scenarios as a religious matter, thereby, again, explaining away Niemöller’s
political stance. However, Michelfelder also conflates Niemöller’s religious and moral objection
to Hitler and Nazism with Niemöller’s political beliefs. As we have seen, and as his own
comments in Naples illustrated, Niemöller had little objection to the political platform of
National Socialism. He certainly did not oppose Nazism based on liberal individualism, but
rather welcomed aspects of its virulent anti-Semitism and anti-communism.
Michelfelder’s report on his meeting with Niemöller therefore illustrates some of the
inconsistencies with the Christian-Totalitarian narrative, and most especially with differences
between the German and American interpretations of postwar Christian ethics. Michelfelder
seems to suggest here that because Niemöller is “ready to lay down his life” for Christ, then he
against Hitler, to say nothing of his reaction or the stipulation of terms attached to any potential release from prison.
376
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therefore cannot possibly be anti-democratic. This fact alone for Michelfelder proves that
Niemöller is and was opposed to dictatorship in all forms. However, Niemöller’s own comments
suggest otherwise, and indeed Michelfelder’s presumed knowledge of German theology and the
Kirchenkampf demonstrates the lengths to which he goes to equate Christianity with democracy,
even when he surely knows differently. To this extent then Michelfelder’s report obscures
Niemöller’s political beliefs to portray him as a noble resistor fighting for the same goals of
occupation, brushing aside the “unfortunate incident in Naples” as nothing more than poor or
biased reporting.
Stewart Herman’s reports on Niemöller proceed along similar lines. He noted that
Niemöller informed him he tried to explain why he offered his services to the German navy, but
the press was apparently “forbidden to print his comments." Furthermore, Niemöller further
stated that he was acting on advice from his lawyer, who was attempting to save his life at the
outbreak of war. He also felt moved to stand by his sons, both of whom served on the Eastern
Front during the War.377
Both reports clearly demonstrate an attempt to rehabilitate Niemöller’s image for US
authorities. To be sure, Allied command was likely only too pleased to have American Church
leaders warn Niemöller about the effects his comments had on the press at large,378 especially
since they likely presumed further contact from American church leaders would encourage
Niemöller to tend to church issues over political issues.379 The Holocaust and Nazism, however,
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had blurred the separation between “political” and “religious” issues even more so than they
already were. Michelfelder rightly pointed this out regarding Niemöller, even if his interpretation
of Niemöller’s actions obscured the concept of the Two Kingdoms doctrine and its role in
German religious life.380 Surely the murder of innocents fell into the “religious” sphere to some
extent? Thus paradoxically, American Protestants claimed Niemöller’s religious worldview
necessitated political action, while also simultaneously claiming his political statements were in
fact religious in nature and therefore within the realms of “proper” conduct for a church official.
Evidence exists that Protestant representatives not only succeeded in convincing
Niemöller to change his tone, but also in convincing Allied command and the public at large that
Niemöller in fact, was a supporter of democracy, and the “unfortunate incident in Naples” was
predominately a misunderstanding and by extension misrepresentation of the true Niemöller.
Indeed, John Conway notes that as late as 1963, some were still positioning Niemöller as a
defender of liberal-democratic values.381 John J. Muccio of the American Religious Affairs
Office after observing Niemöller speak at Treysa (the site of the foundational meeting of the
EKD by members of the former Confessing Church) noted that Niemöller’s “true” feelings on
democracy were in fact positive. Niemöller, he insisted, believed that the church must foster
democracy because Christianity alone could foster law and liberty.
The FCC employed similar tactics in its efforts to petition for Niemöller and his wife to
visit the United States in 1946. Ostensibly, the stated purpose of the trip was to thank the
American churches for their support during Hitler’s reign in Germany,382 but in practice
Niemöller’s speeches sought to reinforce the ecumenical relationship between German and
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American Protestants, express German guilt, reinforce Niemöller’s understanding of ChristianTotalitarian Dichotomy and to ask American churches for material aid.383 It also seems likely at
least certain portions of American military command was aware of this, since Lucius Clay
himself offered suggestions to Sam Calvert so as to help pass through some of the State
Department red tape.384 Overall, the trip strengthened ties between the transnational churches,
and improved the image of Germany in the eyes of many Americans.

“That Was the Fight, that was the War!” Niemöller in America and Hitler’s War against
Christ

Niemöller’s speeches to American listeners continually reiterated the incompatibility of
Christianity and Nazism in his descriptions of the “totalitarian” Nazi state. Speaking in Phoenix
on December 15th, 1946, Niemöller stated, “There was no place on earth for both Jesus Christ
and Adolf Hitler at the same time…because Jesus Christ was raised from the dead and He is
living, not only in heaven, but on earth, so Hitler…had to try to fight Jesus Christ…” While
Niemöller did acknowledge that part of the church had succumbed to Nazi pressure, he further
claimed that no matter how many pastors Hitler threw into prison, another simply took their
place, declaring “the Word of God could not be bound.” 385 At Davidson College in North
Carolina, he also emphatically declared “Hitler and Jesus Christ—these two were competitors,
from the beginning, and rivals; and there was no place in the world, and not in Germany, for both
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of them!386 Essentially Niemöller’s entire tour followed this rhetorical tract: “Not even the
prisons and the camps and the totalitarian authority of Adolf Hitler was able to get the better of
the church of Jesus Christ.”387
In this sense, Niemöller’s interpretation of totalitarianism mostly matched that of other
German Protestant leaders, with some exceptions. Much like his American counterparts,
Niemöller understood “the real war” in Germany to be between Hitler and Christ.388 He
underlined this point repeatedly with his interpretation of totalitarianism, stating:
Adolf Hitler couldn’t help persecuting Jesus Christ because this Jesus Christ is not
just the founder and representative of a new religion…Why? Because…Jesus
Christ has claimed [a] totalitarian regime for all the world, and for the world of
our present times. He claims that his commands and his rules shall govern
mankind…That is the word that couldn’t be heard well by Adolf Hitler, who
claimed all this, not in heaven but on earth for himself…Therefore he went out
from the beginning of 1933 to do away with Jesus Christ, first, in the German
nation and afterward in all those territories he got into his hands.389
Niemöller’s use of the word totalitarian in conjunction with Jesus Christ warrants further
scrutiny and offers considerable insight into how German Protestants understood and used the
word. First, it seems clear that “Totalitarianism,” for Niemöller, represented the complete
permeation of an ideology into all facets of society. Because of this absolute encroachment into
society, Niemöller argues no two totalitarian ideologies can exist side by side. Even more
importantly, Christianity qualifies as a totalitarian ideology because true Christianity could not
ever accept a form of law above God’s own. Therefore, we can understand the theological
framework of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Any ideology that sought to supersede
God’s Law threatened the entirety of Christianity.
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Thomas Stafford, in an interview with Niemöller, wrote that Niemöller understood
Christianity as a counter to Statist doctrines, and it’s here one must say that Niemöller stood
apart from his German colleagues. Because Christ is the only one who can be granted
“totalitarian authority,” Niemöller distanced himself from a denominational identity in favor of
ecumenical Christianity.390 In so doing Niemöller theologically shifted away from a nationalist
identity, even if at times his comments still reflected a strong adherence to German nationalism
because Christian identity took priority over nationalist identity.
Niemöller, in contrast to American Protestants, largely discounted a Nazi resurgence in
Germany.391 Instead, he saw communism as the central threat to a Christian order, though in
comparison to other German Protestants Niemöller’s anti-communism was considerably less
pronounced. Still, Niemöller argued that Eastern life constituted something fundamentally
different from Western Life. “The Russian will never be a democrat—The same sort of human
animal as is today (sic) and will be 2000 years since.” Germany’s fate, according to Niemöller,
rested not necessarily on a communist take-over of Europe but rather the spiritual fortitude to
survive the clash of East and West. For Niemöller, “The question of whether this or that can be
done in Europe is a question of the meeting of those two types of life.” Christianity, he
contended, was the only hope for Germany because only Christianity can exist within both the
East and West.392 Niemöller’s categorization of Russians and Americans as “types” bears
similarities to his insistence that Germany was unsuited for democracy. Both reflected the sort of
racial and nationalist thinking that dominated late 19th century and early 20th century European
thought. For Niemöller, only Christianity could solve the classic question of community versus
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individual by allowing for individual faith but binding the individual to a larger faith-based
community.
Without a common goal to work toward, without hope for the future, “nihilism” would
overtake the German people. The German trapped between these two types, neither of which
particularly suited his needs, leads to despondency and aimlessness. Germans, Niemöller said,
“live, but they live without faith, and therefore without any conscious plan of life.”393 Because
the threat of nihilism was still grave, Niemöller argued Protestants must forget their
denominational differences and recognize their commonalities under Christ.394

“His lights are not the lights of the American people.” Eleanor Roosevelt and Critiques of
the Niemöllers’ Visit

Just as American Protestant leaders attempted to improve Niemöller’s reputation in the eyes of
American authorities, so too did they try to promote Niemöller as a paragon of Christian
faithfulness, contrition and anti-Nazi resistance to the American public. Leading up to his visit in
December of 1946, several prominent newspapers published excerpts from Niemöller depicting
the sort of contrition he would become best known for predominately in an effort to garner
sympathy for Germans. Still, public criticism of both the visit and Niemöller the individual
countered the public image presented by the FCCoC and their allies. Such criticism drew harsh
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rebukes from Niemöller’s supporters. Their defense of Niemöller from public criticism
corresponded precisely with attempts to rehabilitate his image, often through the confines of
Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.
Press coverage leading up the Niemöller’s visit focused on explaining the “Naples
incident” while also emphasizing Niemöller’s, and by extension German Protestantism,
repentance and contrition for the Holocaust and their blindness and inability to prevent Hitler’s
conquest of Germany. For instance, just a month and a half prior to their arrival the New York
Times published Niemöller’s comments in the Berlin Tagesspiegel: “We were dreaming when
we thought guilt belonged to the past. When, however, in the midst of a Christian people
6,000,000 persons are deliberately murdered only because they belonged to another race, no one
can maintain that that guilt is not a fearful reality.”395 Announcements of the Niemöllers’ visit
often came accompanied with pleas for mercy and sympathy for Germans and their material
conditions, establishing a theme for the tour’s tone and emphasis.396
However, the Niemöllers’ visit certainly did not go without criticism. Dean Acheson in
fact rejected their visa applications in late 1945 despite earlier approval, at least until John Foster
Dulles and Bishop Oxnam stepped in to convince him otherwise.397 Eleanor Roosevelt, a vocal
critic of Niemöller after the Naples Incident,398 also opposed the couple’s visit. In an excerpt
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from her syndicated column “My Day,” published shortly after their arrival, Roosevelt argued
that “We must try to prevent easy forgetfulness of where responsibility really lies for the coming
to power of the Hitlers and Mussolinis of the world.” Niemöller, she argued, not only bore
responsibility for Hitler’s rise to power, but also sought to whitewash Germany’s record. She
continued stating “Anyone who comes to this country and…makes us forget this…even
temporarily, does harm to the policy which must prevail if everywhere we are going to watch out
for another rise of fascism.”399 In an earlier piece prior to his arrival, Roosevelt said that “while
one may applaud his devotion to his church, one can hardly applaud his attitude on the Nazi
politics, and I cannot quite see why we should be asked to listen to his lectures. I am sure he is a
good man according to his lights, but his lights are not those of the people of the United States
who did not like the Hitler political doctrines.”400
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, an accomplished scholar, a leading member of JewishChristian relations and a staunch Zionist, likewise critiqued the narrative of Niemöller as a
leading anti-Nazi. In a public address in New York on February 2nd, 1947 (during Niemöller’s
tour), Hillel claimed Niemöller was “unfit” to serve as a “prophet or spiritual leader” in post-war
Germany because he was “opposed to Hitler and Nazism not because of its humanity-destroying
racism but because of its persecution of the German Christian Church.” Like Roosevelt he
worried about the agenda of the press tour stating, “What we are most afraid of in this visit of
Pastor Niemoeller is that his utterances may be used to allay the fears held by many American
people that Germany will be rebuilt without a real moral regeneration of the people.”401
While Roosevelt’s criticism of Niemöller tended to reflect American assumptions that
399
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every German was a Nazi or complicit with Nazism, she and Rabbi Silver in many ways astutely
anticipated the tour’s agenda. While often expressing guilt and responsibility for failing to
prevent Hitler’s rise to power, the tour tended to center on Niemöller’s experiences in prison and
Nazi oppression of the Christian churches. This, in combination with his descriptions of material
conditions in Germany and his insistence on Christian unity against totalitarianism, did much to
do just what Roosevelt feared: Make Americans forget the role Germans, and especially German
Protestants, played in Hitler’s rise to power. Moreover, Roosevelt’s criticism of Niemöller
decoupled American democratic liberalism from Christianity, obviously challenging one of the
core concepts of Dichotomy for American Protestants. Both comments accurately deduced that
the values of German Protestants did not correspond with those of American liberalism, and
therefore its leaders at minimum ought to be treated with caution if not disregarded entirely.
Such critiques therefore also threatened to undermine the Protestant instance that Christianity
had, and would continue, to operate in direct opposition to totalitarian regimes.
Well aware of the criticism against Niemöller and having learned from the Naples
incident, the FCCoC sought to carefully control press coverage by limited ad hoc speeches,
refusing all unscheduled interviews,402 and having an FCCoC representative (the former
Methodist pastor of the American Church in Berlin and longtime friend of the Niemöllers) Ewart
E. Turner.403 General Secretary of the FCCoC Sam Calvert even included a templated letter to all
relevant potential hosts that they would be required to “protect the Niemöllers from the press,”
signifying the seriousness of the FCCoC’s concerns. They also responded in force to the
accusations levied by Eleanor Roosevelt and other critiques of Niemöller.
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Niemöller’s supporters continuously defended the pastor against his critics, especially
Eleanor Roosevelt. In response to her comments, the FCCoC called Roosevelt’s critiques a
“smear” and demanded she retract the statements immediately. They accused Roosevelt of
perpetuating “misinformation,” and stated emphatically that “The record clearly shows that he
[Niemöller] repeatedly spoke against the political aims of the nazis (sic).” They further requested
she “correct the erroneous impression created by [her] column and give recognition to the fact
that Niemoeller took a courageous stand against nazi polices long before our own country was
alert to their danger.” Moreover, they argued her critiques of Niemöller stemmed from an earlier,
likewise erroneous, smear campaign orchestrated by “fellow travelers” and “leftists.”404
Niemöller’s campaign also attended to the critiques by emphasizing his experience in
prison. Press coverage similarly accentuated his resistance to Nazism. For example, during
Niemöller’s visit to Seattle in December of 1946, press coverage directly refuted Roosevelt’s
critiques by squaring them up with Niemöller’s retelling of his confrontation with Hitler in 1934
as proof of his political opposition to Nazism.405 The famous conservative journalist Westbrook
Pegler criticized Roosevelt’s “hypocrisy” for defending the free speech rights of communists but
refusing to allow Niemöller the “chance to tell his story.”406 Some published letters from readers
also condemned Roosevelt’s stance. For instance, Katherine T. Lowery of Elmhurst, New York
complained that Roosevelt was “short on memory.” Surely, she exclaimed, Niemöller “did all he
could to make his people see where brown communism would lead them!...Mrs. Roosevelt is
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always pleading with us to understand the Russians. Would it not be a good thing for her now to
try and understand a German’s love of country too?”407
The FCCoC and other Protestants came Niemöller’s defense continuously leading up to
and over the course of his tour in the United States. Estelle Sternberger, the leftist Jewish activist
and political commentator, likewise experienced the full force of the FCCoC’s influence after
criticizing Niemöller in a series of columns in early 1947. After raising questions about
Niemöller’s record in the First World War (particularly his participation in unrestricted
submarine warfare and his decision to volunteer for military service despite being imprisoned at
the outbreak of the Second World War), Sternberger retracted her statements and “clarified the
record” in a radio address over WLIB Brooklyn after being “challenged” by Henry Smith Leiper
and Samuel Calvert of the FCCoC. In response, she issued a lengthy statement depicting
Niemöller as a defender of Jews, and a contrite Christian openly repentant for past errors. She
also thanked Dr. Leiper, Dr Calvert and General Eisenhower for challenging her, exclaiming
“None of us wants to perpetuate stories that can be denied by reliable evidence.” 408
The cases of Sternberger and Roosevelt reveal two important aspects of how Niemöller’s
person was used and interpreted. First, American Protestants clearly made every possible effort
to utilize his person to uphold the tenants of the Dichotomy. Not only did they consistently
defend Niemöller’s conduct during the war, they also often interpreted critiques against him to
have originated from “communist” or other “totalitarian” forces. The careful attention given to
control Niemöller’s access to the press and immediate and forceful refutation of any and all
criticism made against Niemöller’s person likewise indicates that the narrative of Protestant
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resistance did not emerge accidentally within American political and religious rhetoric. The
fundamental refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Roosevelt’s nuanced critique of
Niemöller’s political effort outlines the ways in which the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
dictated rhetorical and political positions.

Niemöller and “The Call for Mercy:” Press Coverage and Sympathy for Germany

Coverage of the Niemöllers’ tour continued to promote and highlight Niemöller’s speeches,
while also continuing to emphasize his personal story and resistance.409 The FCCoC and
Niemöller’s allies also continuously published documents explaining Niemöller’s decisions and
his “easily distorted” anti-democratic statements.410 Yet in addition to highlighting Niemöller’s
understanding of totalitarianism and his religious justification for resistance, the tour emphasized
a need for understanding, mercy and unity between Christians and nations.
While Niemöller’s speeches usually centered on his personal experiences and Nazi
persecution of Christians, he did at times address current circumstances in Germany. While he
did not directly ask for assistance from American churches,411 he occasionally told stories
detailing the poverty, violence and despondence many Germans were experiencing. Many of his
speeches included anecdotal evidence of German despondence and fears of starvation.
Niemöller’s descriptions of the “East” best demonstrate this tendency. In one speech, he
exclaimed:
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The sense of this cutting off of the East has remained incomprehensible even to
those who accepted, without opposition albeit with a heavy heard, the succession
of whole German provinces to the Polish State. But why…now that the war has
ended…is starvation on a gigantic scale being allowed to rear its head, starvation
to which must fall victims hundreds of thousands (sic), who for the most part bear
no personal guilt for the events of the past…412
Niemöller also described the refugee situation as exacerbating Germans’ existential despair and
material circumstances. After being asked to officiate the funeral of a fifty-year old refugee
weighing a meagre fifty-eight pounds who perished just one day after reuniting with her family
in “the West,” Niemöller asked rhetorically whether “with a little good will, all this confusion
and want could have been avoided.” He argued that “such cases [of the refugee] are by no means
isolated…[and] they leave deep and abiding scars on the souls of the people…and at the same
time they lend support to the current rumors, which maintain that the occupied Powers are
determined further to decimate what remains of the depleted German population.”413
Such stories from Niemöller were not unusual,414 and reveal that Roosevelt’s concerns
about the tour generating sympathy for Germans were by no means unfounded. They likewise
indicate, especially Niemöller’s understandable lamentation at the loss of the East, that he
certainly still held nationalist impulses and concerns. But most importantly, and in conjunction
with more overt appeals by the FCCoC and other Protestant congregations, they reveal a joint
Protestant opposition to the conditions imposed by Potsdam and a clear campaign to politicize
the material conditions in Germany through the confines of the Dichotomy. The implications
were clear: Americans Christians, through their brotherhood in faith, had the capacity to prevent
the rise of despair, injustice and totalitarianism in Germany through financial, spiritual and
412
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emotional support of the German Churches. This clearly therefore reinforced Fousek’s concept
of global nationalism within American Protestantism by detailing America’s messianic role in
the world.
Niemöller also undoubtedly intended to further strengthen the link between American
and German churches, who had already begun to send aid to Germany. He continually thanked
the American people for their prayers during his imprisonment, and even wrote a special
Christmas message to “Our Christian Friends in America” circulated by the FCCoC. The
statement directly thanked Americans for demonstrating:
New evidence of the real and deep-rooted unity of the one ecumenical church of
Jesus Christ, our Lord…your churches…have become a great blessing to us and
you have helped us in our hour of need by sending food, clothing and medical
supplies. In this way, you have helped in saving lives, and have testified to the
spirit of Christian brotherhood and reconciliation.415
Moreover, most of Niemöller’s speeches also included the collection of some sort of
donation (usually clothing), with some even calling for a donation in their
advertisements.416 Thus, while neither Niemöller solicited gifts or donations, their very
presence in the context of Protestant rhetoric encouraged such donations—especially as
Niemöller consistently detailed Nazi oppression of Christians and emphasized Protestant
ecumenism. Furthermore, the FCCoC authorized and announced the creation of Church
World Service, a conglomerate of Protestant worldwide relief agencies in December of
1946, just as the Niemöllers arrived in America. Thus, FCCoC promotions for the tour
often included the announcement in conjunction with promotions for the tour.417
On his return home to Germany in late Spring of 1947, with his rhetorical restraints
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seemingly lifted, Niemöller wrote a letter to Reverend Frederick Forell, secretary of the
Emergency Committee for German Protestantism, urging the sending of food stuffs to Germany
in great haste. He lamented that “people who are suffering today and who are facing the death of
starvation…are being convinced that the whole propaganda for democracy has been an illusion,
worse even than Hitler’s propaganda.” Continuing, he remarked their faith in Western Powers
purported Christianity “has been utterly shattered…the result is Nihilism, and the dying people
today cursing God and man.” He went on to question both Western and Soviet reports, stating
“since the end of hostilities, 6,000,000 Germans have disappeared…people who know these facts
and are facing now the general starvation in the Western Zones can’t help thinking that this
whole development is nothing else than the Morgenthau plan put into action, with the tendency
to exterminate a whole nation to its very roots.” The letter, subsequently summarized in part by
the New York Times,418 conclusively indicates Niemöller’s aim to influence Western policy in
Germany as well as acquire relief for Germans. He would reiterate such critiques and concerns
throughout the late 1940s.419
But just as Niemöller’s critiques of Western policy contain hints of anti-Western belief,
his subsequent statements and actions reveal a firm mistrust of the American understanding of
the Christian World Order and a refusal to abide by the anti-communist aspect of the ChristianTotalitarian Dichotomy. If Niemöller’s assertion that the partitioning of Germany had been
“conceived by the Vatican and born in Washington,” did not demonstrate this clearly enough, his
critiques of German rearmament, his outbursts against western “propaganda,” his unsanctioned
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and impromptu visit to the USSR in 1951420 and his refusal to adopt a strong anti-communist
position surely do. It would be fundamentally inaccurate to see Niemöller as a quick convert to
the American understanding of the Dichotomy.

Conclusion: Niemöller, Ecumenism and the Implications of the Christian-Totalitarian
Dichotomy

While Martin Niemöller’s shift toward ecumenism over a nationalist-based religion was more
pronounced than that of the majority of his colleagues, his prioritizing of Christian identity as a
response to totalitarianism was not. In this respect, his trip did much to solidify the ecumenical
movement in Europe and the United States and furthered the push for a “Christian World Order”
centered around biblical teaching. Conservative Protestants such as Hans Asmussen, Hans Lilje
and even arch conservative Hans Meiser would support international Protestant movements in
one form or another following Niemöller’s lead after 1946. The resounding success of his trip
confirmed, at least in the minds of the FCCoC and the WCC, that a broader proselytizing of
Europe was in fact possible.421
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore served two distinct purposes. On one
hand, it allowed Americans and Germans to find common ground after the War. For Americans,
this “proved” that all Germans were in fact not Nazis, and in fact could be counted upon to
420
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uphold biblical values in the future if given proper support. For Germans, it paved a path forward
after Nazism that did not involve a complete break from German tradition. By claiming
Christianity was the antithesis of Nazism, German pastors and parishioners alike could
simultaneously repent for not believing or praying ardently enough, while also claiming
membership in a group that could not possibly be Nazi and was in fact a principal opponent of
Nazi totalitarianism. That this identity also carried with it varying degrees of anti-communism
and an international support network (and European as well), further meant that membership also
included a place in the new Christian world.
Because of the flexibility of this concept, individuals could maintain existing ideological
and/or racial assumptions without threatening its coherency. In this way, it allowed for a diverse
set of Christians to buy into the concept and work toward similar goals. For Americans, this
often meant reinforcing the connection between American’s Wilsonian promise to spread
democracy.422 For Germans, this meant continuing racial prejudices/
like those uttered by Niemöller in relation to Russian and German capacities for democracy.
That Niemöller contradicted his own emphasis on Christian identity over nationalist identity
demonstrates both his individual transition away from conservative-nationalism and also the
ways in which the identities often conflicted in the postwar period.
The Niemöllers’ trip therefore reinforced key rhetorical and theological points of
ecumenical Protestantism: First, that Christian principles could provide both international peace
and prevent the return of “totalitarian” ideologies. Second, that the example of German history
and the Third Reich demonstrated the effects of a societal abandonment of God and his
commandments. To a certain extent, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy blamed Hitler’s rise
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on a lack of true faith. Finally, that America was uniquely poised to help show Germany the
proper path once more. Central Europe, Niemöller said, had “somehow gotten a new faith, a new
soul, a new life” in response to Nazi persecution. When Christians congregate, it fosters a peace
that is “higher than all human understanding…and [more] durable and…stronger even than
persecution and suffering.”423 His implication was clear: A Christian World Order required
German and American cooperation toward peace.
The tour however, also demonstrated that American and German understandings of the
Dichotomy were strained, especially regarding politics. Roosevelt’s critiques of Niemöller’s
political ethics demanded a response from sympathetic Protestants eager to change the tide of
American public opinion and influence American occupation and foreign policy in Europe. Their
insistence on coupling theological and political ethics best demonstrates this point. Efforts to
organize Niemöller’s speaking points, limit press interaction and otherwise “control” the
narrative similarly indicated that the tour was in many ways a continuation of American wartime
propaganda. The FCCoC used Niemöller as a symbol of Christian resistance toward
totalitarianism, a mantle Niemöller was happy enough to take up provided it did not bind
Germany indefinitely to Western democratic-liberalism and did not include an uncompromising
stance toward the Soviet Union. Still, the Niemöllers’ American tour succeeded in eliciting an
emotional response from American Protestants by reinforcing the Christian-Totalitarian
Dichotomy and facilitated Germany’s transition from enemy to victim in the eyes of many
Americans. But the tour also in some ways subtly revealed the ways in which the concept might
be interpreted differently between Germans and Americans.424
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Chapter 4: “The Wilderness of Want:” American Protestant Aid to Germany and the Marshall
Plan

On March 11th, 1948, some eighteen-hundred Protestant pastors and politicians crowded the
Episcopal Cathedral in Washington D.C., to hear addresses from Secretary of State George C.
Marshall and John Foster Dulles [Figure 12].425 Intently focused in the front pew, was President
Harry Truman and his wife Bess. The service, presided by the vice president of the Federal
Council of Churches of Christ and bishop of the evangelical United Brethren Church John S.
Stamm, was for many the culmination of years of preparation and lobbying. Angus Dun, bishop
of the Washington Cathedral remarked in the opening sermon:
We meet as Americans, proudly and penitently, grateful for the faith of our
fathers, accepting in fear and trembling the vast responsibilities that follow on the
power which has been granted us. But even more we meet together as Christian
people seeking to discover the purpose of God for ourselves and our nation. By
the faith we share we are constrained to acknowledge that before God English
men and French men and Greek men and Chinese men, yes German men and
Russian men, are as important to God as we are.426
Marshall, discussing the upcoming congressional vote on the European Recovery Program, had
in mind an answer to Dun’s search for God’s purpose: “At no time has it been so important for
cool judgement. For an appeal to one’s self for a proper sense of justice. For a realization of
conditions; material, political and spiritual, in other parts of the World.”427 Foster Dulles echoed
his sentiments, “The European Recovery Plan can and will be an American Recovery Plan if it
evokes vision and sacrificial effort such as enabled our founders to make our nation great.”428
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The fact that all three speakers embraced the massive foreign aid package to Europe likely came
as no surprise to attendees. After all, leading American churchmen had been calling for greater
American aid to Europe since the end of the Second World War. In their minds, the 13-billiondollar European Recovery Plan served as the instrument of the divine providence for which they
had been praying.

Figure 12: March 11th, 1948. Episcopal Cathedral, Washington D.C.

The majority of mainline Protestant leaders viewed the situation in postwar Europe, and

W o l t e r i n g | 153
in particular Germany, as dire. Europeans, they believed, had turned away from God and
embraced a secular materialist lifestyle which had led to the disasters of the First and Second
World Wars. America too, in their eyes, had sinned by failing to espouse Christian principles in
state building and foreign policy. For them, communism and Nazism were the logical
manifestations of a State which had tried to supersede God. These radical ideologies could only
be countered by Christianity, with America uniquely poised as the biblical “city upon a hill” in
this epic spiritual battle for the soul of the world.
Questions surrounding postwar Europe tended to center on Germany. Advocates
of a “hard” peace tended to emphasize severely punishing the German people, either via
territorial loss, reparations, economic and military restrictions or all of the above. The infamous
Morgenthau Plan called for an almost complete de-industrialization of Germany, particularly in
the Ruhr region. Even though the Plan had fallen out of favor before the end of the war, many
American Protestants still feared the sentiments behind its conception.429 They believed that such
“vindictive” policies would lead to nihilism and rampant materialism, which in turn would
facilitate the birth of another totalitarian regime in Germany. By equating the spiritual and moral
crisis in Germany with the prospect of building democracy, Protestants positioned America as
God’s ordained nation, capable of remaking the world in His image. Drawing upon long standing
Protestant traditions of American exceptionalism and the New Deal, Protestant organizations and
individuals lobbied the Federal government for access to Germany, the right to send material
relief, and firm government action in favor of humanitarian aid. This chapter traces the evolution
of Protestant critiques of US occupation policy, the postwar German refugee crisis and private
aid sent by American churches to Germany in the immediate postwar era. By implementing what
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they described as a “Christian” peace in Germany, America could rebuild the world in Christ’s
image, ushering in a more “Just and Durable Peace.”
John Fousek argues the American postwar emphasis on globalism and international order
emerged as a mechanism to reinforce American nationalism. This new nationalism strove to
spread American freedom and prosperity to the rest of the world in direct competition with the
Soviet Union. The “developing ideology of nationalist globalism” he argues “was based on
increasingly intertwined notions of national greatness and global responsibility.”430 I suggest
these notions of intertwined greatness and responsibility emerged in part from the imagined
construction of a Christian World Order. The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore must be
understood in part as an attempt to reconfigure America’s divine responsibility in relation to the
creation of radical totalitarian adversaries. Like Fousek, I too see this construction as a
mechanism through which Americans understood and justified their political position in the Cold
War. By emphasizing America as the only possible savior of German suffering, American
Protestants sacralized giving as both a Christian and national mission necessary for lasting peace.
Many scholars address the relationship between American Protestantism and what
Jackson Lears calls “The impulse to conduct a world crusade.” Lears argues late 19th and early
20th century Americans, drawing on traditions within American Protestantism, sought to translate
reform into public policy and in doing so purify the entire country.431 Wilsonian progressives
similarly expanded this impulse to “make the world safe for democracy.” Gary Gerstle makes
similar claims amount the relationship between Anglo-American Protestantism and racial politics
of the early 20th century, linking together Protestantism, masculinity, and white racial identity
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with American imperialism.432 Barry Hankins traces the theology of Woodrow Wilson, linking
his belief in Reformed predestination and election with that of American national identity.433
This emphasis on global responsibility often also reinforced understandings of American identity
as distinctly white and Protestant. 434 Such scholarship demonstrates that Protestants’ discursive
production of American global responsibility had long-standing pulls within both American
political culture and American Protestant self-identification. While some scholars such as Kevin
Kruse argue the “Christian America” of the 1950s began in business and conservative Christian
circles in opposition to the sermonizing of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal,435 I suggest
instead that the identification of American Cold War policy began in part with the more
politically liberal Federal Council of Churches and the interventionist ideals of Christian
Realists.436 Through their support of American aid to Germany and by extension the Marshall
Plan, these Protestants positioned and defended the spread of American liberal democracy as a
crucial weapon against totalitarian aggression.437
While Marshall Plan funds greatly surpassed Protestant aid sent to Germany, 438 the
extent of Protestant support for Germans citizens should not be easily dismissed. Protestant Aid
to Germany likely totaled over 200 million dollars during the peak years of late 1946 to early
1948.439 Church World Services, the postwar umbrella relief agency created by the FCCoC,
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provided approximately eighty-percent of licensed private foreign relief to Europe and Asia in
1946.440 In just six months from April to October 1946, American Christian aid amounted to
7,114,833 tons of supplies to Germany alone.441 More personalized aid also arrived in record
numbers from the newly formed CARE organization (Cooperative Association for Remittances
to Europe). That such an incredible volume of foodstuffs, clothing and other supplies went to a
former and much hated enemy after four years of rationing and war, not to mention the Great
Depression, emphasizes the effectiveness of church campaigns to raise funds.
Yet for as much as humanitarian aid alleviated the food and housing crisis of Germans,
the political agenda of postwar Christianity altered Germany’s social and political reconstruction.
The fact that German Catholic and Protestant church organizations distributed approximately
ninety percent of humanitarian aid442 placed German churches in an enormously advantageous
position, if for no other reason than it sanctioned the expansion of church infrastructure and
fostered institutional loyalty during a time of scarcity. Moreover, because ecumenical American
Protestants linked re-Christianization into relief efforts, refugees and aid recipients often also
received copies of the New Testament and other proselytizing documents. The gendered
Germany during the initial years of occupation. An estimated 1.2 billion dollars of CARE packages were sent to
Europe from July 1946-1947, with roughly half to Germany. Religious organizations tended to give approximately
3/5ths of all total CARE packages, with Protestants estimated at approximately half of the total religious
contributions. In total this would equal roughly 182 million dollars. Additional direct private Protestant church aid
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World Relief can be found at the Evangelical Lutheran Church Archive of America, specifically NLC 2/3/2 and
ULCA 4/2 Box 16. For a complete breakdown of aid sent into Germany via CRALOG see Beryl R. MacClasky, The
History of U.S. Policy and Program in the Field of Religious Affairs Under the Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany. (Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division, Office of the
Executive Secretary, 1951). 24-30. In relation to CARE packages see Kevin M. Henry, “CARE International:
Evolving to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly December 1, 1999
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distribution of aid also served to accentuate the traditional Breadwinner-Homemaker economy
by creating specific packages for women with children and male laborers. [see Figures 13, 14]443
In addition, a sizable portion of Protestant aid focused on rebuilding church communities and
churches themselves, often by shipping material to build makeshift Notkirchen (emergency
churches). [see figures 15, 16]444 Pastors and congregations received everything from bibles to
deaconess robes, as ecumenical Protestants sought to rebuild the German churches both literally
and spiritually.

Figure 13: In 1947, The Lutheran Churches of America provided 48,300 Children extra meals
every day for 3-7 Months in all four occupation zones
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Figure 14:
Kiddie Kits, Lutheran World Relief 1949
Kits contained: washcloth, soap, toothpaste with brush, note book, pencils and a bar of candy

Figure 15: Lutheran Church in Dresden, 1945
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Figure 16: Lutheran Church in Dresden today

Figure 17: Barracks Church, Nuremburg 1945 (Before-Left and After-Right)
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Although the postwar material crisis forced a degree of confessional cooperation between
Protestants and Catholics, competition and theological maneuvering between the various
American and German factions also colored the politics of refugee and foreign aid. Moreover,
many Protestants had limited patience for Jewish suffering or the needs of Jewish communities,
and rarely cooperated with other relief organizations such as UNRRA (United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration) and JOINT (American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee). In
fact, CRALOG (Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany), which organized
in 1946 to distribute private aid in Occupied Germany, consisted almost exclusively of Christian
organizations and did not include a single Jewish organization.445 Anti-semitism colored both
German and American Protestant arguments against “hard” peace policies, especially from
American Lutherans. Such discourse often reflected indifference toward Jewish suffering, or at
minimum, a limited interest in providing restitution for Jewish victims.
As the humanitarian crisis in Germany continued through 1947, church leaders began to
call more broadly for federal assistance to Germany, eventually resulting in a full-fledged
promotion campaign for the European Recovery Program, more commonly known as the
Marshall Plan.446 Scholarship on the Marshall Plan is unsurprisingly diverse, with debates over
its effectiveness,447 association with American business leaders448 and relationship to the Cold

445

Beryl R. MacClasky, The History of U.S. Policy and Program. 24-30.
The official title of the legislation was the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, but most press (and church sources)
referred to the European Recovery Program or simply the Marshall Plan.
447
John Gimbel’s in depth reading of the Marshall Plan tends to be the predominant interpretation in favor of the
Marshall Plan’s economic effects. He argues the Marshall Plan grew predominantly out of a struggle between the
army and American bureaucrats over the costs and aims of German reconstruction. See John Gimbel, The Origins of
the Marshall Plan. (Stanford, 1976). Greg Behrman in particular argued the Marshall Plan essentially “saved”
Europe by allowing European economies to focus on investment and growth without sacrificing social funding. See
Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe. (Free
Press, 2008). Behrman described Marshall as a selfless leader only interested in serving America’s best interests. He
somewhat similarly describes Republican senator and ex-isolationist Richard Vandenberg as a key ally who
transcended party politics in support of the plan. Nicolaus Mills tries to take a larger view of the conceptual and
psychological effects of the Marshall Plan without being as full of praise as the above cited authors, in his book
Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower, (Hoboken: John Wiley and
446

W o l t e r i n g | 161
War.449 More recent scholarship deals with the politics of hunger in occupied Germany, yet
makes no mention of church groups.450 Despite a burgeoning body of scholarship attending to
the relationship between religion and the Cold War,451 no scholar to date has attended to the
religious arguments for the Marshall Plan, nor connected it to Christian humanitarian aid in
Germany.452 Even German church scholarship hardly mentions American aid to ethnic German
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refugees.453
I do not intend to claim that the Marshall Plan was born entirely out of Christian aid to
Germany, but instead argue that it significantly contributed to anti-isolationist rhetoric and the
formulation of a Christian national-identity during the early stages of the Cold War within the
United States. Linking together hunger, victimhood and nation-building would produce lasting
trends in both German political memory454 and American foreign policy.455 Certainly there were
many political and economic reasons to support the Marshall Plan beyond religious
justifications. However, the centrality of the German question to postwar American foreign
Bacque’s text routine offers some rather dubious statistics, including the fact that Hoover’s humanitarian hunger
plan saved over 800,000,000 million lives or that over 1,000,000 Germans perished because of resettlement clauses
in the Potsdam Agreement. Bacque, no stranger to controversy over his accusations against Eisenhower’s treatment
of POW’s, levels incredibly harsh critiques against key military officials, relies far too much on published primary
documents for his source base, and similarly treats sources like George Chichester (and German church leaders for
that matter), far too uncritically and with little historiographical knowledge. Still, his text is the only document that
references foreign church aid to German civilians.
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policy and the way in which key Protestant church leaders and laymen like Reinhold Niebuhr,
John Foster Dulles and Samuel Calvert politicized the condition of Germans, significantly
altered American occupation policy by portraying Germans not as violent Nazi savages, but as
the pacified suffering victims of Adolf Hitler. This portrayal eventually gained more credence
with both American policy makers and the general public, resulting in victories for key
Protestant lobbying positions, including the right to offer Germans humanitarian aid, changes to
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 to allow Germans to claim asylum and enter into the United
States and the inclusion of Germany into the Marshall Plan.456

“The Christian World in Peril” Protestant Politicization of the Refugee Crisis

Church leaders’ tours of Germany in the summer of 1945 emphasized the terrible condition of
the country and its residents.457 With millions homeless, hundreds of thousands of Displaced
Persons pouring into the country on a weekly basis, and the displacement of approximately 11.7
million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, early church reports spoke of widespread
destitution, failing nutrition, disease and poor health care.458 Pastors feared the political and
cultural environment created by such difficult conditions would lead to a second totalitarian
regime and possible war.
Refugees topped the concerns of church leaders. Even as late as 1949, reports from
church groups warned that “the reorientation of Germany [was being] critically hampered by the
456
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refugee issue.” Because of the dire material circumstances, American pastors believed refugees
were vulnerable to totalitarian propaganda. “Unless some effective solution is found…” the
report warned “…the expellee group will be ripe for picking my extremist leaders of the right or
left.” The solution, they argued, was to notify the American public by any means necessary,
including both church and secular presses.459 In truth, by 1949 American Protestants and
Catholics had already been politicizing the refugee crisis for some time as part of their campaign
to raise funds for the German churches.460 Still, the quote demonstrates the seriousness of the
issue for ecumenical Protestants. Even after the passage of the Marshall Plan, the repatriation or
emigration of the majority of DP’s and improving health and living standards in Germany,
Protestants still saw the displacement of refugees as the central obstacle to a favorable
rehabilitation of Germany.
Protestant leadership certainly internalized the call to action. Articles featuring or written
by prominent Protestant leaders emphasized the prolonged negative effects of reduced caloric
intake in Germany,461 pastor homelessness462 and severe shortages of clothing.463 Their rhetoric
emphasized extreme hardship, most especially for children. One report noted that millions of
children were now doing the “dance of death” in relation to food shortages. Quoting German
bishop Otto Dibelius, the same report warned it was “impossible to save the children born in the
years 1944 and 1945…” due to “tremendous scarcity of milk and other food products.”464 Still
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others remarked that diseases such as tuberculous and continued weight loss were chronic
problems resulting from the minimal caloric allotment for Germans.465 Another article described
Germany as a “Wilderness of Want,” desperate and sure to fail without serious action. The
article described the poor state of German health, food supplies and “degenerating morality.”
The report included estimates that suggested the population of Germany would decline by over
25 million people if the current food shortage continued.466 Such alarmist articles did much to
foster sympathy and raise aid for German Churches and featured prominently in efforts to raise
funds for refugees.
Protestants’ rhetoric tended to connect the material crisis with spiritual failing and
advocated Protestant unity as the only viable solution. Because of the gravity of the refugee
crisis, ecumenical Protestants argued that only denominational unity could mobilize the
necessary response to the underlying decline in moral values.467 One particular speech argued
there was “…no other answer to confusion, political, economic and moral, but the Christian
Church.”468
In a notable article titled “The Fight for Germany,” published in Life magazine in
October of 1946, Reinhold Niebuhr outlined why Russian actions in Germany demanded an
American and Christian response. Niebuhr’s multifaceted argument clearly reflected rising Cold
War tensions. He insisted that Soviet policy designed to spread communism signified that
“Russia recognized the crucial character of the German questions long before we did,” and that
only the united Catholic and Protestant forces of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have
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thus far staved off a “Russian ideological conquest” through the German Socialist Party
(SPD).469 Moreover, Niebuhr specifically blamed Russians for the economic division of
Germany, arguing “Russia will not permit it [economic unification] so long as she has hopes of
conquering Germany ideologically through the economic misery created or accentuated by this
disunity.”470 Given this reality, Niebuhr, like his colleagues, argued that building democracy and
staving off Russian totalitarianism depended upon American humanitarian aid to Germany.
Citing occupation welfare officers, Niebuhr estimated that some 20 million dollars would be
needed just to provide elementary school children with a supplementary meal in the American
zone alone.471 Niebuhr therefore dismissed both conservative and liberal American objections to
American support for German reconstruction, arguing “A little more justice now would obviate
the necessity of charity later.” While conservatives might object to the importance of free
enterprise, Niebuhr countered some form of social constructivism was necessary to rehabilitate
Europe and to reaffirm democracy. He contended a firm insistence on free market principles with
democratic governance would not have much support in Europe. Niebuhr also opposed
“misguided” liberals who might think such American action would provoke war through
needless antagonism, by suggesting their position ignored the reality of Russian aims.472 In a
direct comparison to Nazism, Niebuhr argued:
Our tyrannical opponent is as unscrupulous as tyrannies always are. I am sure
there were once more creative elements in Communism than in Nazism…But the
actual tyranny which has emerged and the fanatic fury which has been
generated…[is] not distinguishable from the practices derived from the purer
paganism and cynicism…Since this new tyranny is not only unscrupulous but
possesses the guile to exploit our moral and political weaknesses, it must be the
business of a genuine liberalism not to relax our outer defense but to make our
political and economic life more worth of our faith and therefore more
469
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impregnable.473
Niebuhr’s comments stand out for several reasons. First, he positioned Germany as the
central focus of the American dispute with Russia not only because of its economic capacity, but
also because of the tremendous squalor in place. This indicates he subscribed to the popularly
held belief that totalitarianism and communism relied upon economic squalor to spread. Second,
his vilification of Stalinist Russia continued to affirm the need for the Dichotomy. His framing of
the struggle as primarily ideological again concluded that what was needed to win the fight more
so than anything else was an “impregnable” faith, capable of withstanding an ideological assault
on Western (Christian) values. Third, his support for the CDU again served to bolster the
Dichotomy’s claim that Christianity alone held back Soviet totalitarianism, this time by seeing
through Soviet propaganda. Finally, his prescribed solution to the ordeal inevitably meant
solving the terrible humanitarian and economic crisis in occupied Germany.
The liberal Protestant journal the Christian Century also continually attacked Harry
Truman’s initial refusal to allow relief from Church agencies to Germans. Lutheran Sylvester
Michelfelder published a moving piece in January 1946 titled “O Come, Sweet Death”474
detailing the rape of German women and children, the murder of innocent babies and extreme
poverty of homeless Germans bemoaning his own incapacity to help given Allied Military
Control policies.475 Robbins W. Barstow, director of European relief for the WCC, also appealed
to the American public to beseech Washington to revisit their restrictive policies on Christian
relief agencies noting complaining that “If Christian charity is not to be allowed to obey the
scriptural injunction to go to the help of our late enemies, then that fact needs to be made explicit
and the reasons for that decision should be explained…” Continuing, he remarked that
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“ordinarily it would not be necessary more than has already be done to register the rejection of
the Potsdam folly…But it is now evident that…the time has come for a united expression of all
the churches of America to break through the indifference and timidity of Washington (emphasis
in original).476 The journal’s complaints at times even came paired next to articles describing the
“crucible” faced by the German churches in the fight against paganism. 477 Even after restrictions
were lifted the journals criticism continued, with one article boldly asking if the president was
“callous” for not moving quick enough to delineate rules and extend aid.478
In light of this evidence, it seems clear that church leaders politicized the refugee crisis
from the standpoint of American foreign policy aims and humanitarian ethics. For Protestants,
these issues were intrinsically linked together. The material squalor encouraged totalitarianism,
which fundamentally threatened Christianity and by extension democracy and America’s hope in
building a peaceful world order. Moreover, ignoring the material crisis deepened the spiritual
crisis in the eyes of many Protestants. The human costs of German rehabilitation, Protestants
likewise warned, not only encouraged communists and fascists, but also associated America with
such ideologies. Only democratic governance based on Christian morality could solve the
spiritual and structural crisis of Europe. The Protestant interpretation of the refugee crisis was
therefore but a logical extension of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.

“With Malice Toward None, with Charity Toward All.” Aid Programs to Germany

Most American aid to Germany arrived in one of three different ways. The most common form
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of aid came directly from personal sources via CARE Packages. Unlike church directed forms of
aid, CARE Packages could be sent directly to specific individuals, although a good majority of
donations did not have a direct recipient in mind. The typical package included five pounds of
milk powder, seven pounds of cheese, five pounds of rice and five pounds of beans.479 CARE
packages made up the largest portion of humanitarian aid sent to Germany by far, with an
estimated 600 million dollars reaching Germany between 1946-1947. With religious groups
giving approximately 60% of all total care packages,480 CARE became the primary way
Protestants offered Germans material support. The distribution of these packages was far less
overtly political and proselytizing insofar as the packages did not contain any sort of religious
pamphlets or, often, even return addresses. The aid also consisted almost entirely of foodstuffs,
and therefore was far more limited than other forms of institutional based aid.

Figure 18
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The second way church groups sent aid was through specific church organizations.481
Organizations such as Church World Services, the collective charity arm of the Federal Council
of Churches designed solely to raise funds for Europe after the war, gathered different materials
specifically to suit the needs of particular congregations or localities. Aid sent through these
institutions varied from construction materials for barracks churches to communion wine,
although these charities also provided many tons of food stuffs and clothing as well. Still, such
organizations tended to directly bolster the resumption of religious services. They often also sent
religious reading material (the Bible being the most common gift) to ensure church services and
missionary work could resume as soon as humanly possible. While monetarily direct institutional
aid to German churches paled in comparison to that of CARE packages, the speed at which
congregations received such material speaks to the effectiveness of organizations such as Church
World Services. In many instances, it seems the local parish was the first structure rebuilt after
wars end.482
Finally, Protestants also organized specific campaigns designed to raise both awareness
and support for Germany. Likely the most successful fundraising campaigns came from the
“Christian Rural Overseas Program” or “CROP,” which collected over 3,555 railway freight
carloads full of food for distribution in Europe in 1948. To this effect, CROP marked one of the
most successful examples of confessional cooperation between Catholics and Protestants. Others,
such as the “Million Dollar Sermon” by Reverend Henry Knox Sherrill of the Presbyterian
Church of America, also proved tremendously successful within individual denominations.483
CROP itself came into being as a joint program between Lutheran World Relief, Church World
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Services and Catholic Relief Services. The program emphasized the importance of foodstuffs for
the spiritual and material peace of all mankind. Inspired by the Abraham Lincoln Friendship
Train, an idea developed by Quaker muckraking journalist Drew Pearson which toured the
country collecting food for Europe to prevent the spread of communism, CROP similarly sought
to transport food to Europe (specifically Germany) to “spread peace amongst nations.”

Figure 19: Abraham Lincoln Friendship Train, 1947

The CROP program typified the way in which church leadership sought to develop
international harmony after the war. At a sendoff ceremony in Chicago on United Nations Day
(October 24th) 1948, President of Lutheran World Relief Franklin Clark Fry remarked “The food
which is represented by these bills of lading is blessed food, because it will contribute so many
things that are good to the lives of those who eat it.”484 For church leaders, charity marked a way
through which Christian America could promote its image of a postwar order. It represented not
only the generosity and goodwill of man toward fellow man of Christianity, but also the
abundance and freedom of the United States. Because CROP Freedom Trains came specifically
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from the Heartland America, they encapsulated the superior morality of the American yeoman
farmer, a fact not lost on organizers. As Fry put it “All honors, therefore, are due to the good
sound common sense and good will of the farmers of America.”485
For Fry, charity epitomized the political potential of the universality of the Christian
postwar order:
…I see in these gifts the evidence of faith…It is because men have had faith in a
good and living God that they have given their gifts and the gifts will be
distributed in the name of that same love and of that same faith. They will be
given to the people of every creed and of no creed at all. No one will attempt to
use the gifts as a means of compelling others to any convictions. But in receiving
these gifts, men will know that these things come from men who believe in God
and who worship His Son.486
His emphasis on sending food to all peoples of all creeds reveals the quiet political emphasis
promoted by Christian Foreign Aid campaigns. Its implicit rejection of fierce nationalism,
especially racialized nationalism, demonstrates how Church leaders believed they might win
over hearts and minds through inclusion in a Universal Church.
The campaigns set out to demonstrate the potential power of Christian charity in building
world peace. That the campaigns emphasized both the centrality of Christian faith as the impetus
for giving and the universal nature of recipients shows that American Protestants attempted to
identify America with Christianity while also demonstrating the potential benefits Christianity
might bring to the world. Giving through the church therefore became a way in which
individuals could both practice their faith in practical terms while also heralding the benefits of
faith and the concept of America and American democracy.
While Germans who received American aid tended not to associate Christian charity with
democracy, the aid did ease the transition from enemy to ally significantly. Instead, American
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charity demonstrated to Germans the generous and forgiving spirit of the American people,
which they had assumed viewed them as bitter enemies.487 Report after report spoke of Germans
greatly relieved to hear how much American congregations cared about their needs. A pastor in
Hannover reported that the actual value of American giving was less important than the effect of
CROP on Germans; They “had their faith in God and the Brotherhood of Man restored.”488
Fundamentally, the universality of ecumenical Protestantism (indeed even ecumenical
Christianity) promoted by aid programs offered Germans a path toward a new identity that
emphasized forgiveness and peace. Both concepts appealed to Germans greatly after 1945, since
years of hardship during the war and Allied accusations about universal guilt fostered feelings of
intransigence amongst many Germans. That ecumenical Protestantism also shared with it a place
for Germany in a new international world order and carried with it undercurrents of antiSemitism and traditional bourgeois values about sex and gender likely also appealed to German
conservatives looking for a way forward after the Third Reich.489

Vengeful Jews and The Christian Man

Because ecumenical Protestantism required German participation both in terms of political and
spiritual unity, many American church leaders viciously condemned Allied policies they saw as
antagonistic toward the Christian World Order. From this perspective, any policy that attempted
to single out German barbarism during the war threatened to deepen the divide between German
and non-German churches. Moreover, any policy that threatened a resurgence of totalitarianism
487
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in Germany similarly threatened the ecumenical postwar order via the confines of the ChristianTotalitarian Dichotomy. In this vein, ecumenical Protestants naturally lined up against “hard”
peace policies such as the Morgenthau Plan and certain aspects of the Potsdam Agreement,
which emphasized German war crimes and German militarism in their arguments for greatly
restricting German economic output and territorial loss. For many church leaders, however,
Jewish ‘vengeance’ clouded the judgement of those supporting a “hard peace.” For them, a hard
peace not only represented the “unchristian” principle of revenge, but also reinforced a form of
savage and barbaric masculinity in opposition to the idealized benevolent Christian father.
The reasons American Protestants associated vengeance with Jews are not immediately
clear. It may relate to Henry Morgenthau, Roosevelt’s Secretary of Treasury from 1934-1945
and architect of the proposed “Morgenthau Plan” which considered deindustrializing Germany in
its entirety prior to the end of the Second World War, being Jewish. It may relate to the role of
Jewish petitioning for international and federal aid in response to the Holocaust, aid which was
subsequently denied to Germans. Likely too, their association with German pastors influenced
their judgement, particularly concerning disputes with German clergy and Allied prosecutors
with Jewish ancestry during war crimes and denazification trials.490 The prevalence of Jews
amongst communist leadership in Poland and Hungry during the hijacking of Eastern European
democracy could have also factored into play.491 Undoubtedly, such an association would not
have been possible without pre-exiting prejudices on the part of American Protestants. While
their writings never mention specific Jewish actors or organizations, many American Protestants
conflated German suffering with Jewish suffering and believed “Jewish” forces to be arrayed
490
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against them. The most egregious examples of anti-Semitism also tended to come from
American Lutherans, and often those of German descent with time spent living abroad in
Germany.
American Lutheran Stewart W. Herman typified Protestant attitudes toward Jews. His
published works and reports to Allied command sought to exculpate German Protestants by
misrepresenting the Confessing Church's record toward Jews during the Third Reich.492493 In his
1946 publication The Rebirth of the German Churches, Herman compared the persecution of
Jews during the Third Reich and Germans in the postwar period. He quoted Pastor Heinrich
Grüber (whom Herman rightly described as a courageous supporter of Jews and non-Aryans)494
uncritically: "I know what the Jews suffered. I shared the tortures of the concentration camps, but
that which is now taking place before our own eyes far exceeds all that has hitherto been known,
in extent or kind,"495 and even went so far as to compare the Polish treatment of Germans to that
of the Nazis, stating that "not even the Jews in Germany had been so badly treated, at least
until...Hitler discovered that there was no where else to drive them except into the death camps
of Poland..."496
Herman's relative disregard for Jewish suffering and his willingness to condemn Polish,
French and Russian atrocities reveal his great sympathy toward the German people and his lack
of compassion for their victims. To a degree, Herman at least acknowledged the treatment of
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Jews, but his quick dismissal of their suffering likely reflected his Protestant upbringing,
especially since he spent a good part of the 1930s and the entirety of the war in Europe where he
would likely have not have been exposed to the new alliance between American Catholics, Jews
and Protestants during the war at home.497
Herman's primary objection to Allied policy was its vindictiveness. For him, every such
policy, varying from Potsdam, to the use of the Atomic bomb in Japan to denazification,
betrayed Christian principles.498 Such policies he argued, only increased "despair" and ended any
"hope" Germans had for the future. While the German churches attempted to alleviate the despair
as best they could, Allied policy greatly hampered their efforts to restore "morality" and "joy" in
Germany.
His comparison of German and Jewish suffering capped off a campaign to claim German
victimhood. Indeed, virtually every chapter of The Rebirth of the German Church emphasized
the suffering of Germans, with his last two chapters especially portraying Germany as a broken
and desperate nation in need of Christian mercy. This worldview explains Herman’s analysis of
the Potsdam Agreements. For him, the sanctioned population transfer of Germans undermined
both the credibility of the Allies and the credibility of Christianity. Given the narrative of both
the American churches and the German churches allowed for only two possible political
outcomes, from Herman's perspective any action on the part of the Allies that betrayed his
understanding of Christianity by extension gave credence to the totalitarian enemy. His harsh
critiques of the Allies as "unchristian" and his strong condemnation of Russian and Polish
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actions towards Germans in Eastern Europe likely raised a few eyebrows. His introduction for
example, argued that "The Potsdam Policy...seems to be no less detrimental to the Christian
cause than Hitler's Nuremberg decrees."499 In this respect Herman specifically referred to the
forced expulsion of Germans from Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. He continually
castigated the Allies for allowing the Poles to forcibly remove the Germans from their homes,
leaving millions of people destitute and homeless. He even suggested that to some degree the
Allies themselves were committing mass murder, since "...there was no area in Germany, or in
Europe for that matter, where they [German refugees] could go with some assurance of finding
food and lodging."500
Herman’s arguments, while perhaps more extreme than many of his colleagues, were not
especially unique. German-emigre Professor Otto A. Piper, a notable biblical scholar at
Princeton Theological Seminary and German veteran of the Western Front during the First
World War, wrote a scathing letter to the World Council of Churches condemning the hypocrisy
of Allied statements of moral law and justice at the Nuremburg trials with the blatant disregard
for atrocities committed against ethnic Germans. He too used the Holocaust as a frame of
reference stating, “But the same [concentration] camps are now used by Czechs, Poles and
Russians; and the interned Germans die at the same speedy rate in the Stadium in Prague, in
Auschwitz and Myslewicze as did the Jews and the opponents of the Nazis until a year ago.”501
The Protestant effort to push this narrative made similar claims denouncing American
initiatives in Germany as “starve[ation] policy.” Joined by Catholics and members of the
Missouri Synod, the Federal Council of Churches denounced restrictions on religious
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humanitarian aid entering Germany.502 In preparation for a joint meeting between the three
groups, executive director of the Missouri Synod Lawrence Meyer stated, “I do not think the
Christians of this country, nor millions of other Americans, would want democracy to sentence
people of other nations to slow death by starvation.”503
Sylvester C. Michelfelder, an American Lutheran of German descent who served as a
representative in the World Council of Churches, similarly rejected the “Jewish” position of
“vengeance” against Germans. While sympathetic to the Jews, Michelfelder nonetheless
condemned Jewish actions as “shortsighted.” In a letter to his friend and eventual director of
Lutheran World Action, Paul C. Empie, Michelfelder wrote, “Now I do not underestimate the
injustice which the Germans have perpetrated against the Jews…if however, the spirit of these
vengeance loving Jews can influence the politics of the world, then Hitler really won the war…”
The problem with such “vengeful Jews,” Michelfelder warned, was that the Soviets were sure to
take advantage of the situation. “Bolshevism,” he noted, “has always prospered in an atmosphere
of confusion.”504
Michelfelder’s opposition to the “Jewish” position bordered on the conspiratorial. He
warned Empie in 1945 that the “[The Jews] have their noses in everything,”505 and proposed that
Ralph Long make a poster out of an anti-Semitic painting from a deceased friend of Swiss
painter Max Huber which depicted the parable of the good Samaritan. The painting Michelfelder
noted, “The picture of the Levite is there in full length, looking down his nose with his huge
moneybag in his hand…The jackass that looks around the tree has more love and sympathy in
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the eyes than there is in the eyes of the Levite.”506 Michelfelder’s vivid description of the
painting and the broader context of his letters to America strongly suggests he found the painting
applicable to the current political situation in Germany. This is significant for multiple reasons.
First, his description and use of “Jewish noses” represents a continuation of existing anti-Semitic
stereotypes somewhat surprising considering Michelfelder’s awareness of the Holocaust. The
anti-Semitic depiction of the Levite as both wealthy and selfish was likewise a familiar trope
amongst anti-Semites. Most importantly though, the depiction of Germans as beaten and halfdead again reinforced the motif of German victimhood. Michelfelder’s depiction of Germans as
the victims of the war emerged ironically in direct contrast to the Jewish Levite, whose wealth
and indifference to the victim’s plight was an affront to Christian morality.
Robert E. van Deusen, the main representative of the Evangelical Lutheran Churches of
America in Washington D.C., similarly observed the negative effects of “Jewish influence” in
relation to Lutheran attempts to reform the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 to include ethnic
Germans. Jews and their allies he complained, sought to unfairly prohibit any person who had
registered with the Nazi Party from entering the country, regardless of individual
circumstances.507
Protestant opposition to these so called Jewish influences related to their understanding of
Christian masculinity. Professor Otto A. Piper framed his critique of the brutal sexual violence
committed by Soviet soldiers during the conquest of Berlin from the perspective of the ideal
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biblical patriarch, asking “Do we have so little regard for the honor of our wives that we can
keep silence when we see how any stranger in uniform is allowed to soil the pure bodies of
mothers and faithful wives and to infect their system with the poison of venereal disease?”508
Piper’s response to the violent resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the crimes of
Soviet soldiers against German women typified that of American Protestants. They saw, perhaps
justifiably, a willingness on the part of American leadership to turn a blind eye toward the
violent realization of the Potsdam agreement and the end of the War. Moreover, they would
interpret this “indifference” as a threat to the moral postwar order they hoped to create. The rape
of “pure” German mothers threatened their understanding of the ideal male who protected the
honor and modesty of his wife and daughters, while also indirectly threatening the health of “our
boys” who were likely to encounter German women during occupation. In this sense, the rape of
German women threatened to poison both the US soldier who had served with honor and the
traditional German family which most Christians tended to see as the foundation of a moral
society.509
Some Protestant pastors, concerned about the “staggering immorality” in American
occupied Germany, even advocated for a “cooling off period” between perspective American
service men and German or Austrian women before permitting marriage. The plan encouraged
sending troops back stateside for “a few months,” to determine if they “really want a German or
Austrian bride.” The same article also advocated not stationing “boys” under the age of 21 in
Germany or Austria because of how “relatively easily such…boys get into trouble.”510
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American Church leaders also took ques from their German counterparts. Hans
Asmussen argued the average German sought a “father, a mother…and brothers and sisters.” He
needed “…a unity fathered around the family table for a family life.” If the Allied powers could
not grant Germans that much, then “…nothing remains for us, the lowest of all men, the most
despised, the nation at whom one points.”511 Asmussen’s emphasis on restoring family life
relates to Piper’s condemnation of Soviet aggression. For Piper, the hypocrisy of an American
policy designed to uphold basic principles of moral and legal justice that ignored the crimes of its
Allies undermined both the credibility of the Allies, as perceived representatives of the Christian
West, and by extension weakened the credibility of democracy and Christianity. Any policy not
in full agreement with church leaders’ interpretation of Christian morality implicitly encouraged
the sort of degenerate morals that church leaders believed facilitated the rise of nihilism in
Europe.
American and German concerns for the family stemmed in part from the disruptive
nature of the occupation. Because German women far outnumbered German men (160 to 100
from ages 20-40 in 1946)512 and often lived and worked with American soldiers they depended
for foodstuffs and everyday materials, social conservatives continually expressed anxiety about
the status of the German family. Black market trading and the great the material gap between
American soldiers and German women often resulted in de-facto prostitution and sexual
exchanges for status, comfort, entertainment.513 Many of these relationships also turned
marriages, especially as American soldiers continued to be stationed in Germany in large
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numbers throughout the Cold War.514 These conditions led many to see the occupation period as
one of intense sexual promiscuity and immorality.515
Vengeful policies therefore threatened every aspect of ecumenical Protestants’ vision for
the post world order. Much like many postwar German historians, American Protestants believed
vengeful impulses clouded Jewish judgement.516 Such policies threatened their visions for the
future on three separate fronts. First and foremost, "vengeful” policy presented unchristian
values as American values. This fundamentally challenged American Protestants’ conceptions
national identity, but also threatened to give Germans a negative impression of American justice
and democracy. Relatedly, these unchristian policies encouraged radical materialist and nihilist
sentiment amongst Germans. Communism and Fascism, they believed, relied upon disorder and
the sort of moral depravity that accompanied material shortages. By severely punishing Germans
America encouraged communism.
Third, “hard peace” policies disrupted German families, dishonored German women and
encouraged conduct in men that undermined the moral integrity of the ideal Christian man. By
displacing German families in Poland, raping German women in Berlin and starving or
imprisoning German men, Allied authorities fostered a depraved environment ripe for a return of
extremism. That this environment threatened to erode the morals of American soldiers through
fraternization with single, widowed or lonely German women doubled their anxiety. As the
bedrock of the postwar Christian world order, the ideal Christian family could restore stability in
Germany by ordering the “aimless” German youth through patriarchal authority and proper
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feminine child-rearing.
Finally, ecumenical Protestants feared a return of theological isolationism and
nationalism which, along with the war, had shattered the unity of the ecumenical movement in
the interwar years.517 Because of the moral questions raised by Nazism and the political
consequences of the Second World War, Germany would function as the battleground for the
spiritual soul of Europe. Moreover, as the birthplace of Protestantism, Germany held symbolic
value for Lutherans in both America and the rest of Europe. The moral superiority of the
Christian World Order could therefore be proven in the struggle to rehabilitate Germany, and
therefore depended upon its success.

“That is not Christian!” The Churches and the Moral Imperative of the Marshall Plan

As American policy makers began to consider broader aid packages to Europe in 1947 and
tensions with the Soviet Union likewise increased, American Church leaders voiced their
wholehearted support of the Marshall Plan. In 1948, the Federal Council of Churches petitioned
Congress directly, stating “We believe that the motives and objectives behind the Program
should be essentially moral and spiritual…We appeal to the Congress of the United States to
adopt such legislation…” The Program, the FCCoC argued, had the potential to represent the
generous Christian nature of America which could “stand above politics.” 518
The Marshall Plan, as ecumenical Christians understood it, demonstrated the way in
which Christian ethics might be applied to foreign policy decisions. Stewart Herman, in a
missive in the New York Times, claimed the Marshall Plan was “nearer to being Christian than
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anything offered to Europe by a single government or by a group of governments for more than a
generation.”519 The New York Episcopal Bishop Charles Gilbert claimed the proposal for
European recovery “should have support of Christians everywhere…” and was opposed only by
“those whose concern [was] limited to selfish partisan and political ambitions.”520 For them, the
Marshall Plan revealed the potentials of a foreign policy constructed on Christian principles.
Protestant leadership therefore understood and politicized the Marshall Plan less as an
attempt to foster free market capitalism in Europe and more as a vital piece of humanitarian
legislation similar to their original call for European aid.521 The Human Relations Commission of
the Protestant Council of New York City recorded itself “as supporting in full measure the
purposes embodied in the constructive approach of Secretary Marshall…because Europe is in
increasingly desperate emergency.”522 Everett Clinchy, President of the National Council for
Christians and Jews and an ordained Presbyterian Minister, argued the Marshall Plan could only
be successful if the reconstruction of Germany also implemented a “spiritual” solution to the
feeling of “hopelessness” prevalent amongst many Germans. If “the disease of materialism,” he
warned, “was not cured soon…she [Europe] will go down and in all probability carry with her
the whole of Western civilization.”523 Both Clinchy and the Council’s statements demonstrate
that Protestants continued to understand aid packages to Europe, even massive government
packages like the Marshall Plan, as a source of humanitarian aid. Moreover, leaders such as
519
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Clinchy understood and interpreted the origins of the Second World War within the context of
the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.
In fact, support for the Program amongst the upper echelons of mainline Protestantism
was so common that one Wisconsin pastor complained that just because his denomination had
approved of the Plan he had been urged to become its “propagandist,” after having received a
directive encouraging clergymen and congregations to vote and pray in favor of the Marshall
Plan. The directive, he complained, encouraged pastors to not only personally “write, wire or
interview their senators and congressmen to put pressure on them to support the plan,” but also
encourage their congregations to do the same.524
Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles and eventual head of the CIA, likewise
conceptualized the Marshall Plan as something larger than material aid. Dulles, in a statement
supporting Stewart Herman’s affirmation of the Christian reconstruction of Germany, argued for
a “Marshall Plan of the Spirit” for all of Europe. Dulles said “Appropriation of money or grants
of food, fuel and the tools for material rehabilitation are not enough.” Such a plan he continued,
“could only be provided by the people of the United States, not by Congress. The churches
should be one of the main vehicles in helping make this plan concrete, and then in carrying it
out.”525 Dulles’ argument here demonstrates the saliency of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
amongst leading American church figures and key political figures they associated with. The
emphasis on spiritual rehabilitation as a crucial supplement to material aid corresponded
precisely with the arguments church leadership had espoused throughout the War and certainly
in its immediate aftermath. Moreover, Dulles’s logic presumed the effectiveness of Christianity
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as a mechanism for restoring Europe’s moral center.
By the time the Plan reached the floor of Congress, Protestant church groups had already
succeeded in associating the Marshall Plan with Christian charity. In a speech on the floor of the
Senate in 1948, Senator Clive Hoey of North Carolina emboldened Congress not to abandon
Europe a second time:
In an all-out effort to win the war and preserve our liberty and freedom…we gave
prodigally of men and money…Now, while the sweet incense of that sacrifice is
still ascending to high heaven, shall we abandon the altar, quench the fire,
extinguish the flame, and walk away to our own complacent selves, muttering that
we have done all that we intend to do…? That is not American, that is not
humanitarian, that is not Christian!”526
Hoey’s sacralizing rhetoric not only described the American effort in the Second World War as a
holy act, but also linked together American national identity with Christianity. The portrayal of
the Marshall Plan as selfless Christian charity demonstrated the effectiveness of church
campaigns to politicize and prioritize the material squalor of Europe.
The proximity of the debate over the Marshall Plan with the Berlin Airlift, which began
just a few short months after Hoey’s speech, reinforced the Protestant mission in Germany. In
response to both the Allied intention to establish a separate West German State in June of 1948
and the issuing of a new currency (Deutsche Mark,) Soviet officials responded with a new
currency of their own and the cutting of rail lines and roadways into Western Berlin. The
American response to airlift their own provisions into the now isolated city resulted in the
shipping over 2.3 million tons of food over 277,500 flights over eleven months.527 Cold War
propaganda quickly celebrated the Airlift’s success in ending the Soviet blockade, praising
American and British ingenuity for “saving” 2.5 million “starving” Berliners, even though Soviet
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officials repeatedly offered West Berlin coal and food. While the airlift undoubtedly solidified
the importance of humanitarian aid in the fight against communism and strengthened American
nationalistic-globalism, it came as a logical conclusion of the longstanding Protestant insistence
that communism and nihilism had to be fought with Christian compassion.

Conclusion

In summation, private Protestant aid to Germany politicized the treatment of ethnic
Germans under occupation by portraying American policies as “unchristian” and “vengeful.”
Such “Jewish influences,” they feared, would deepen the spiritual and material crisis of Europe,
opening the door for a second “totalitarian” regime. In lobbying on behalf of Germans, American
Protestants sought to challenge American isolationism by arguing for the necessity of a
“Christian” outlook on foreign policy. In so doing, they sacralized American democratic state
building in Germany by portraying American efforts as part of God’s purpose.
Furthermore, both Protestant critiques of the forced resettlement of ethnic Germans and
their strong opposition to “hard” peace proposals, eased Germany’s transition from enemy to ally
in the eyes of the many Americans. By portraying Germans as victims of Nazism and draconian
Allied policy, Protestant leaders effectively built up sympathy and support for Germans in
America, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of their various fundraising activities. Such
arguments made room for the Marshall Plan within the scope of American politics, and certainly
facilitated the inclusion of Germany into such programs. After all, the Marshall Plan, in some
ways, built upon the foundation of private aid started overwhelmingly by church organizations.
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Chapter 5: Save Mankind! Building an Imagined Protestant Political Community at the German
Kirchentag, 1949-1961

On a warm afternoon in July 1951, over two-hundred and fifty-thousand congregants packed the
Berlin Olympic Stadium beyond capacity, chanting and singing in a dramatic mass rally.
Germans from far and wide came to hear speeches, participate in group study sessions and enjoy
entertainment from a large chorus with a supporting brass band. Towering high above the main
entrance of the stadium stood a massive wooden cross.528 This was the closing ceremony of third
annual Protestant Kirchentag.529 As participants departed the stadium, they passed by numerous
signs declaring: Wir Sind Doch Brüder! (We Are Still Brothers!), an obvious attempt to foster
emotions of Christian and German unity despite Germany's (and Berlin's) divided status. Even
after the end of formal proceedings, people lined the still war-damaged streets of Berlin, singing
in unison the refrain to Martin Luther's "A Mighty Fortress is Our God," which just over a
decade earlier had served as the rallying hymn of their heroes the Confessing Church.530
Yet, the Protestant Kirchentag was much more than an annual rally531 and display of
Christian faith. By 1951, it had grown into the signature public event of German Protestantism.
The tremendous mass rallies, while easily the most visible and recognizable feature of the
Kirchentage, only represented the program's final component, the closing ceremony.532 The full
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event entailed a five-day series of speeches, conferences, study sessions, open public discourse,
public prayers and music. Throughout the 1950s, the Kirchentage brought together clergy and
lay-Protestants from all across divided Germany, including a considerable number of attendees
from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) who crossed into the West to attend.
These participants held a range of political and theological positions, which made the
Kirchentag’s stated principle of ‘political neutrality’ progressively more difficult to maintain as
the decade wore on. Nonetheless, because of the program's lack of an ostensible political
message, it offered open political space for an engagement with several burning issues in the
early history of the Federal Republic, namely the Nazi Past, sexual politics, rearmament, and the
Cold War. The Kirchentag therefore represented an attempt to negotiate the practical realities of
the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, now that direct Western oversight of German affairs had
ended and the immediate material crisis of the postwar years had abated.
Above all, the Kirchentag movement attempted to control the perceived instability of
democracy through the creation of an imagined Protestant political community characterized by
strong leadership, idealized gender roles and a commitment to Christian morality. This attempt
resembles what Dagmar Herzog has called a “normalization strategy,” specifically aimed at “the
construction of a wholly new version of the Third Reich.”533 Organizers theorized that by
mobilizing lay Protestants into a unified and active community in both the church and politics at
large, the church could confront directly the "totalitarian” forces that threatened Germany, and
by extension, Christianity and the World at large. Only Christianity, which ecumenical
Protestants positioned as the antithesis of materialism, secularism and nihilism, could “Save
history, bringing together 650,000 and 600,000 Germans, respectively. It is also worth mentioning that the
Kirchentag also attracted a number of international and ecumenical participants, although in relatively small
numbers in the 1950s, Frankfurt saw the highest turnout of 1,700 such persons. See Meet the Church: The Growth of
the Kirchentag Idea in Europe. (World Council of Churches, 1959), 7.
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Mankind” from powers.534 While Protestantism's internal divisions prohibited this imagined
community from ever fully materializing, certain themes such as family politics and the
reunification of East and West Germany did produce moments of unity. As the 1950's progressed
the Kirchentag functioned unintentionally as a sort of laboratory for democracy, encouraging
participation and the acceptance of differing political opinions for the sake of Protestant unity.
While initially the Kirchentag reinforced authoritarian qualities of the Adenauer regime by
emphasizing the importance of powerful executive authority and a rejection of political
compromise, by the end of the 1950s Kirchentag participants had largely come to accept political
pluralism, somewhat reluctantly, as a natural part of democratic society.
This chapter considers the origins of the Kirchentag idea and its relationship to West
German politics during the 1950's. I argue that the Kirchentag program's attempt to build an
imagined Protestant political community reflected Protestants' underlying attitudes about the
inadequacy of democracy and a firm desire to restore order, which they conceived as the
reconstruction of the paternal family and the reunification of Germany. This desired community
never fully materialized and instead unintentionally fostered political pluralism through a set of
mutually reinforcing actions. The more Protestants attempted to build a coherent platform, the
more pronounced their internal political divisions became. The more they attempted to influence
politics and restore 'order,' the more often they resorted to political compromise. The more they
attempted to tame the forces of democracy, the more they participated in the democratic process,
thereby strengthening its extra-institutional support and undergirding its values. Herbert
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Butterfield’s interpretation of the Protestant Reformation in his important book The Whig
Interpretation of History, might make an apt comparison. Just as Butterfield argues the
Reformation attempted to reassert religious authority but instead brought about pluralism, so too
did the Kirchentag through its attempted re-forging of a German national community through the
rehabilitation of German conservativism.535
Ironically, Protestants' acceptance of democracy emerged not from a desire to foster
political coalitions or promote diversity, but rather through an attempt to dominate and
commandeer the political process to safeguard German society from what they saw as an
inherently weak state and moral decay brought about by parliamentary governance and its
presumably inevitable degeneration into totalitarianism. In this way, the Kirchentag sought to
construct a German identity posited as an antithesis of National Socialist “totalitarianism,”
thereby creating a “useable past” for a new postwar Germany based upon Christianity.536 This
identity clashed considerably with Catholic inclusion in the Dichotomy, just as its begrudging
acceptance of democracy conflicted with Protestant understandings of State’s role in society.
The Kirchentag, with its emphasis on national unity, confessional identity, massive
crowds and grand spectacles, was an attempt by moderate national-conservative Protestants to
utilize the effective political mobilization of the Nazis for their own benefit. In this respect, the
Kirchentag represented a continuation of certain aspects of Nazi political mechanisms and values
535
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during the 1950s, including an emphasis on community, anti-communism, centralized state
authority, public spectacle and nationalism.537 This likely brought an air of familiarity to the
program for the average attendee and increased its drawing power. As such, the Kirchentag
facilitated the transition toward democracy by espousing a common spiritual-national identity by
means of familiar political mechanisms through which Germans could reorient themselves to
new political realities and norms. Unlike church leaders such as Martin Niemöller and future
Bundespräsident and prominent Protestant politician Gustav Heinemann, who emphasized a
need to engage with the Nazi past and to examine the crimes of the Church, the Kirchentag
movement focused on the here and now, something that resonated with most Germans who had
suffered tremendously under Hitler (once the war tipped unarguably against Germany). Such
rhetoric distanced Germans from their own complicity in Nazi war crimes, often by positioning
themselves as victims of Nazism.538
The Kirchentag therefore deviated from and carried over Nazi community-building
practices. It clearly altered the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft by replacing racial identity with
Christian identity as the primary mechanism for defining the nation. By extension, it also
retreated from virulent anti-Semitism and violence. However, like the Volksgemeinschaft, the
Kirchentage affirmed national unity through a singular superseding identity, emphasized
community through shared suffering and attempted to mobilize the people against shared
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enemies. 539 To some degree this mirrored earlier Protestant attempts at fostering community in
the Weimar Republic, especially in its hostility toward a “secular” or “pluralist” State, by
merging German communal-nationalism with the American concept of a Christian World
Order.540
But the Kirchentag also differed significantly from these earlier attempts because it had
to contend with the National Socialist past and the discredited idea of a national community.
Here, it relied firmly on the either-or of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy to facilitate the
needed ideological distance. Mimicking the Dichotomy, the Kirchentage reframed the national
German community by positioning Christian values directly against both communism and
Nazism. But because this rehabilitation relied upon the confines of the internationally
ecumenical construction of the Dichotomy, it also necessitated a repudiation of overt racism and
anti-Catholicism despite existing prejudices. This transition came slowly, through selective
memory, paradoxical rhetoric, surface level gestures and the obfuscation of historical record.
The establishment of East and West German States in 1949 created an opportune political
moment for Kirchentag program on three levels. First, its emphasis on unity and ability to attract
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participants from both states appealed greatly to Protestants who found themselves separated for
the foreseeable future. Second, it reinforced the Dichotomy in that it confirmed the
incompatibility of communism and Christianity in the eyes of its proponents. By 1949, the
Stalinization of the German churches in East Germany was also clearly discernable to those
involved.541 These factors created the necessary political and cultural immediacy to attract
attention. The outbreak of the Korean War also encouraged German Protestant’s look westward,
reaffirming the association of Christianity and democracy through martial combat against
totalitarianism.
Certainly though, rapidly improving living standards, Germany’s divided status and the
geo-politics of European Integration also greatly influenced and dictated the Kirchentag. Indeed,
one of the Kirchentag's principal features was its ability to draw participants from both halves of
the newly divided nation. In this respect, the Kirchentag program represents an excellent case
study not only because of its public nature, but also because it offers a glimpse into the minds of
both men and women parishioners as opposed to high church leadership, which naturally allows
for a broader understanding of cultural transformation within the church and the Federal
Republic.
Recent historiography suggests that Germans’ fierce desire to 'normalize' at the onset of
the Federal Republic fostered a probing for political consensus. This desire to normalize
primarily emerged from the horrors of the Second World War, but also from the uncertainty
surrounding the partition of East and West Germany, the tensions of the Cold War and the
Weimar, the brutal sexuality of Occupation and the Nazi past. As a result, many West Germans
deliberately turned to conservative political and social positions directed by the Adenauer
administration. This conservative turn occurred for a myriad of reasons, most notably the
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German rejection of Allied definitions of guilt, a reaction to the perceived breakdown of social
order in the occupation period, and an effort to manage and reinterpret and the Nazi past.542
Because of its accessibility to both political and church leadership and the general public, the
Kirchentag functioned as an important forum for negotiating these processes.
There has been relatively little historiography discussing the Kirchentag; most of what
there is has been published in the past decade. Dirk Palm’s Wir Sind Doch Brüder is the only
major publication on the topic, although Benjamin Carl Pearson has also written a dissertation
and published an article on the subject.543 Palm's argument focuses on high politics and the
interplay between the two divided German states and does not directly address the movement’s
domestic importance.544 Pearson’s focuses on the theological and institutional importance of the
Kirchentage. In many ways, this essay supports Pearson’s claim that Kirchentag debates
inadvertently led to the acceptance of a pluralistic democracy by the late 1950s. He too sees the
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open political space made available at Kirchentag forums as crucial to understanding the
movement’s success, and charts similar shifts from conservatism in the 1950s to a more liberal
brand of politics in the 1960s.545 But Pearson does not frame the Kirchentag as a production of
postwar ecumenical Protestantism nor examine its relationship to Nazi and earlier Protestant
National-Conservative attempts to construct political community, thereby missing its broader
purpose in creating a unified Protestant political block.546 Furthermore, Pearson does not
evaluate its role in establishing conservative gender norms, a process which undoubtedly
fostered political stability and political consensus.547 While Pearson is correct in arguing that the
Kirchentage “inadvertently” drove Protestants toward political pluralism by the end of the 1950s,
he overlooks the ways in which it attempted to rehabilitate Christianity and German
conservatism in the aftermath of Nazism. Because organizers positioned this new community,
and Christianity more broadly, as the antithesis of National Socialism, the Kirchentage
simultaneously refurbished German anti-Semitism, anti-communism and nationalism while also
repudiating some of the more radical aspects of National Socialism, most especially its racialized
gender values and occultist secularism.548 Christianity, as posited by Kirchentag organizers,

545

Pearson, “The Pluralization of Protestant Politics."
To be fair to Pearson, he would probably argue that this essay fails to engage sufficiently with changes the
Kirchentag brought about within the Protestant Church. Such criticism would be valid. Nonetheless, this very
criticism reflects the insular nature of the subdivision of church-historiography, which as a whole often fails to
engage with the major "profane" metanarratives of Germany history, much to the detriment of both camps.
547
Much has been written on the topic of masculinity and gender crisis in the postwar years. In general, such
scholarship argues Germans coped with their humiliating defeat by attempting to reconstruct a patriarchal social
order. For example, see Atina Grossman, Jews, Germans and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans. Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism.
Maria Höhn, GI's and Fräuleins. Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference does a Husband Make?:Women and
Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1999) and
Heide Fehrenbach Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2005).
548
Such values included permitting extramarital relations and childbearing outside of marriage for the racial elite
and emphasizing an important political, military and racial position for socially unmarried women. Sexual relations
also took on a racial meaning, as Nazi leadership sought to maintain sexual relationships along racial lines, despite
the large number of prisoners of war and forced laborers brought into Germany during the Third Reich. See Herzog,
Sex After Fascism. Heineman, What Difference a Husband Makes. Birthe Kundrus, “Forbidden Company: Romantic
Relationships between Germans and Foreigners, 1939 to 1945,” in Dagmar Herzog, ed., Sexuality and German
546

W o l t e r i n g | 197
therefore facilitated democratization by promoting a shared religious identity that allowed
Germans to gloss over national-conservatism’s close ideological affinity to Nazism while also
repudiating its political legitimacy.

Founding and Purpose: Contextualizing the Kirchentag

Understanding the Kirchentag movement requires grasping the ideal of ‘neutrality.’ The
Kirchentag came about almost solely through the efforts of Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, the
son of a Prussian Junker and theologian with strong ties to the World Council of Churches. A
career military officer with limited military ambition and a longtime supporter and leader of the
Weimar era Christian Student Movement, von Thadden had a firm background in lay Christian
movements. During the War, he served as Regional Commissioner in the Belgian Louvain
district, where he allegedly countermined SS and Gestapo orders to the benefit of local citizens.
After a car crash during a British air raid in 1944, von Thadden spent the rest of the war
recovering and trying to manage his estate before being captured and imprisoned by the Soviets
and suffering several serious health complications as a result. His eventual release in 1946 saw
him working for the World Council of Churches until 1948. 549 As a proponent of Protestant
ecumenism, von Thadden desired the unification of the bickering factions of the German
Fascism (New York, 2005).
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Protestant Church. Thus, Kirchentag programs did not have an official political or theological
agenda, and in fact insisted upon “neutrality.”550 This emphasis on neutrality defined the entire
basis of the Kirchentag signifying its true function: the creation of a united Protestant community
designed to re-Christianize Germany.551
Institutionally, the Kirchentag functioned in a semi-autonomous space, operating outside
of, and also simultaneously unofficially under, the umbrella of the EKD.552 For von Thadden, the
end of the war demonstrated two things beyond any doubt. First, the entire world faced an acute
spiritual crisis. Clearly the church had failed to properly minister to the spiritual needs of the
people, who turned toward nihilism and materialism as a result. Second, like Karl Barth, von
Thadden theorized that the German churches' inability to resist Nazism stemmed primarily from
a disengaged laity and a hierarchical church structure that encouraged inaction. He created the
Kirchentag to invigorate common parishioners into taking a more active role in the church and
public life, while simultaneously making Christianity more appealing in the 'modern' world.553
Only such a movement, he argued, could both cater to the spiritual needs of the German people
and invigorate them into political action.
Von Thadden’s conception of the Kirchentag, while certainly unique, emerged at a
moment in which Protestant leaders all across Germany sought ways to mobilize lay Protestants
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and influence political agendas directly. The Protestant Academies (Evangelischen Akademien),
founded in many of Germany’s regional churches in the immediate postwar era, functioned as
religious think designed to engage lay-experts in fields such as politics, sociology and
economics.554 New informal political circles also arose to lobby for specific political agendas.555
Thus, the Kirchentag idea formulated around a broader Protestant (and Catholic) postwar
assumption: Without re-Christianizing and mobilizing the faithful, Germany had no basis for a
moral renewal.
Von Thadden believed that for the Kirchentag to succeed, he would need to unite the
various Protestant factions behind it. To curry favor with these factions, he insisted on the
"neutrality" of the Kirchentag within the spectrum of Protestant debate, focusing on the present
instead of the past. This visionary emphasis on the present proved successful. While church
leaders continuously challenged elements of the Kirchentag’s political message, particularly as
debates about rearmament and communism took center stage in the mid-1950s, the movement
remained fixed on attending to present political circumstances instead of past transgressions.
Still, as a public forum dependent upon the participation of the clergy and parishioners, the
overall message of the Kirchentag shifted over time corresponding to the concerns of its
attendees. The Kirchentage therefore functioned as a barometer of Protestant rhetoric, offering
glimpses as to what could and could not be said during the 1950s.

Democracy, Mobilization and the Restoration of "Order"

Undoubtedly, German Protestants harbored attitudes critical of democracy. To be sure,
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categorizing the church as an ardent supporter of Nazism would be an exaggeration, but
nonetheless during the Weimar Republic German Protestants participated in undermining the
authority of the democratic system.556 Most Protestant leaders enthusiastically welcomed Hitler’s
rise to power, sharing his anti-communist, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic attitudes.557 Clemens
Vollnhals and Michael Klein both demonstrate that in the postwar period, Protestants held
ambivalent and apprehensive (if not antagonistic) attitudes toward democracy and political
parties, which they believed to be morally corrupting, ineffective and subject to the will of the
uneducated masses.558
Such reasoning carried well into the 1950s, and indeed took on even greater precedence
as Protestants often saw democracy as a medium through which potential demagogues and
materialism corrupted the masses. However, describing all Protestants, or even the entirety of
conservative Protestants, as firmly anti-democratic would be misleading.559 Postwar politics
brought about significant cultural shifts, and the ambivalence if not hostility directed at the
Weimar Republic by the church shifted toward something more akin to a resigned acceptance of
democratic governance in some conservative Protestant circles. As such, Reinold von Thadden
might best be described as a sort of Vernupfterrepublikaner. He certainly seemed to have
resigned himself to the reality of Western democracy in Germany yet sought to harness the
556
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power of mass politics for the church’s own purposes. In 1949, after the mild success of the first
postwar Kirchentag in Hannover (which attracted around 7,000 registered guests and close to
35,000 for the closing ceremony),560 von Thadden argued in a statement to the EKD council the
necessity of the Kirchentag program. For him, the "New" church must:
Be fully ready to commit itself to witness, to minister, to serve and to sacrifice
to...the duties of church involvement in the parishes, as we so often impressively
encounter in the Catholic Church, and, much to the disgrace of Christianity,
naturally features in political modification to radical communism.561
Such statements reflect Protestant assumptions about democracy. If the church did not willingly
devote itself to mobilizing the masses, its opposition, especially communists, would dominate. In
other words, Protestants must participate in democracy to prevent their own destruction. Implicit
in this line of reasoning was a distrust of the democratic system. If, presumably, a more 'natural'
order were in place, then there would be a limited need for the church to fight communism
directly. However, because such a system no longer existed, (From a Lutheran point of view, the
state was no longer upholding its divine task in maintaining order) the task fell to the church. The
emphasis on Catholicism also speaks to Protestant fears of Catholic dominance, both in the CDU
and in society at large. While certainly Protestant participation in the CDU signified a
meaningful change from the Catholic Centre party of the Weimar Republic, many Protestants
often felt marginalized within the CDU.562 In fact, von Thadden borrowed much of the
Kirchentag program from the Catholic Katholikentag (Catholic Day), which had roots in the 19th
century.563
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Understanding von Thadden's language requires some further explanation of the divisions
within German Protestantism. The majority of postwar German Protestants were nationalconservative Lutherans,564 who, since the Kaiserreich, had maintained fierce loyalties to the state
through their interpretation of Luther's Two Kingdoms doctrine. However, in the postwar period
many German Lutherans began to reconsider the ethical implications of the Two Kingdoms
Doctrine to varying degrees. While many Lutherans observed a strict separation between the two
realms when it came to voicing official political stances,565 Hitler's reign raised earnest questions
for some who argued the state could no longer be relied upon to act justly or morally.566
Members of the German Protestant Reformed Church tended to take their lead from the
towering figure of the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth, who argued that Lutheran
obedience and adulation of the state constituted a form of natural revelation, thereby resulting in
a form of idolatry.567 Barthian theologians allied with reform-oriented Lutherans such as Martin
Niemöller,568 challenging Lutheran national-conservatives politically and theologically,
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specifically regarding anti-communism and rearmament: For them, the difficulties experienced
under Nazism stemmed from the church’s hierarchical submission to the state. As such, they also
attempted to engage with the Nazi past much more critically than conservative Lutherans, which
often earned them the disdain of the public at large.569
Von Thadden's focus on Protestant unity in response to Catholicism and communism
therefore cannot be divorced from these theological stakes. While certainly maintaining his
confessional identity as a Lutheran, von Thadden’s devotion to Protestant ecumenism
overshadowed his confessional identity.570 His argument that the church must ensure that the
state maintains some sort of moral order put him somewhat in line with reform oriented
Protestants, who sought a great reorganizing of the church and a complete departure from the
Two Kingdoms.571 However, from a motivational and theological standpoint, von Thadden’s
argument that only a re-Christianization of Germany would be able to prevent another turn
toward materialism, atheism and nihilism more closely resembled that of national-conservatives.
Von Thadden's insistence on the neutrality of the Kirchentag also takes on additional
meaning when considered in this light. To be sure, the program was anything but politically
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neutral, or even theologically neutral, despite its claims. However, von Thadden likely meant
neutrality within the meaning of the Two Kingdoms idea. The Kirchentag was "neutral"
precisely because it sought to downplay questioning of theological denominational difference, (at
no time during the Kirchentag events in the 1950s did the question of theology emerge) but
rather sought to unite all of Protestantism to greater influence politics.
Claiming neutrality therefore offered von Thadden several key advantages. First, it
facilitated negotiations with both the West and East German governments.572 If von Thadden had
proclaimed any explicit political position, he likely would have faced even more opposition from
East German officials reluctant to be seen endorsing a religious institution. Indeed, this likely
would have prevented any East Germans from participating in the Kirchentage. Furthermore,
claiming neutrality within the context of EKD factionalism allowed von Thadden to court all
segments of the EKD, as well as attract ecumenical participants, including both Catholic and
Orthodox Christians as well as Protestants from other national churches.573 Certainly those who
interpreted the Two Kingdoms doctrine conservatively would have required nothing less than
political neutrality before taking part in the Kirchentag, yet fortunately for von Thadden the
movement's efforts at mobilizing the laity and encouraging political participation convinced the
vast majority of the EKD to participate.
Yet for von Thadden, the restoration of order and the re-Christianization of Germany574
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were one and the same. In an essay published in 1951, von Thadden argued that the German
State of the past had failed because of individual selfishness and desire, which resulted in the
state becoming either “an idol or a devil,” depending on the perspective of the individual and
whether he or she stood to benefit. He attributed enthusiasm for Hitler to “…the primitive desire
for security in the completely private, individual sense…” Von Thadden continued, stating the
construction of “self-government” or the reorientation of Germans toward “democratic
principles” could not succeed unless “our great political need is rooted with our religious need.”
His concluding remarks put it even more bluntly: “Here is a question of either-or: Either the
Christian Church on the basis of its faith will help the German people to a clean and responsible
“yes” to the state, or the German nation will not find this “yes” anymore.575
Protestant rhetoric at the Kirchentag also interpreted the postwar crisis as a symptom of a
declining Christianity. Von Thadden in particular made veiled references to the Nazi past to
emphasize the nation’s present condition. In his opening remarks at the 1950 Kirchentag in
Essen, von Thadden called upon God to "Save the People" (Rettet den Menschen), stating:
After two World Wars countless millions of human lives have perished...an equally
large flock of human beings lives daily without real freedom, without homeland,
without family and without faith, surely sometimes just vegetating. In the detention
camps for displaced persons and refugees, in the cellars of bombed-out cities, upon
the highways of the greatest mass migration of all time...friendless, restless,
loveless--infinitely alone! It is these people today we are concerned with. Not with
the people of past decades and centuries...It is necessary to save “the people” (Den
Menschen) of our generation.576
This passage demonstrates how von Thadden strategically constructed the Kirchentage to
Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik.
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prioritize the present over the past. Such a maneuver alleviated the need to engage with the Nazi
past, instead focusing on contemporary needs and wants. This similarly emphasized the
imperative of Protestant action, for without it surely all of Germany would fall into ruin. This in
some ways corresponded with Nazi rhetoric about the Volksgemeinschaft and the need for
concrete political action.577 Intriguingly, this same quote condemned the Nazis while continuing
their political methodology and simultaneously alleviating the need to address the past. The
emphasis on present day suffering also marked an attempt by church leaders to reestablish their
moral authority after the Third Reich, a task deemed essential for re-Christianization.578
East Germany concerned Kirchentag participants perhaps more so than any other topic.
This occurred for a multitude of reasons, which explain in large part von Thadden's initiatives
and the Kirchentag's success in attracting large crowds. For the first time in modern German
history, West German Protestants found themselves as a religious minority after Catholics, with
large portions of the overwhelmingly Protestant Prussia and Saxony now part of the GDR.579 In
addition, a majority of Protestants perceived their brethren in the East as being oppressed by the
'Godless' communists, and many imagined this to be their own fate should materialism or
nihilism take hold in West Germany.580 The Kirchentag program intended on solving this

577

For more examples of Nazi rhetoric and the need for immediate political action, see Rüdiger Graf, "Either-Or:
The Narrative of "Crisis" in Weimar Germany and Historiography," Central European History 43 (2010), 592-615.
Also, Jörg Echternkamp "At War, Abroad and at Home: The Essential Features of German Society in the Second
World War," in Germany and the Second World War: German Wartime Society 1939-1945: Politicization,
Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival, Ed. Jörg Echternkamp, Volume IX/I (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008). Nachdem in zwei Weltkriegen ungezählte Millionen Menschenleben zugrunde gingen…erleben wire s
jetzt, daβ eine nicht minder groβe Schar von Menschen ohne echte Freiheit, ohne Heimat, ohne Familie und ohne
Glaugen dahinlebt, ja, manchmal nur noch dahinvegetiert. In den Auffanglagern der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge,
in der Kellern der zerbombte Städte, auf den Landstraβen der gröβten Völkerwanderung aller Zeiten…freundlos,
rastlos, liebleer – grenzenlos allein! Mit diesen Menschen haben wir es heute zu tun. Nicht mit den Menschen
vergangener Jahrzehnte und Jahrhunderte… “Den Menschen” unserer Generation gilt es zu retten.
578
Herzog, Sex After Fascism. 103.
579
Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy.
580
See for example, the critiques leveled by Leftist reformer Hans Iwand at Bishops Otto Dibelius, Hans Meiser and
Theophil Wurm for their pro-Western anticommunist stance. Iwand believed the Cold War allowed Church leaders
to slide into a friend-enemy mentality thereby obscuring the threat presented by Western culture. Nonetheless, a vast

W o l t e r i n g | 207
problem not only by binding together Christians of all denominations, but also by reuniting the
East and West. As Bundesminister Jakob Kaiser put it after the 1951 Kirchentag, “…the
experience of those days in Berlin was deep and sustainable, not least because the Western
World, the world of the West and Christianity, presented itself [to the East] without
demonstrations, banners…or propaganda.”581
That Protestants now found themselves on par with Catholics in the Federal Republic
explains in part why participants responded so strongly to von Thadden's rhetoric about
confessional unity. Consider the comments by refugee Minister Pastor Albertz of Hannover, who
stated "We must not limit the question of [saving the homeland] to the Federal Republic and
West Berlin...We must never forget that eighteen million people, mostly Protestant, live in
Mitteldeutschland...It must also remain important to us what is happening beyond the tragic line
of Oder and Neisse..."582 Albertz’s desire to reunite the divided German states and with German
Protestants in parts of former Prussian territory ceded to Poland after the war reveal continuing
nationalist sentiment. Indeed, West Germans often used the term Mitteldeutschland as a
euphemism for the German Democratic Republic, which logically therefore dictates that territory
lost to Poland must be Eastern Germany.583
Dr. Manfred Müller of Stuttgart also called for Protestants to unite in dramatic fashion at
the 1951 Berlin Kirchentag. After affirming that Germans in both East and West must bind
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themselves together, he had participants clasp hands with their neighbors and shout out, "You
belong to us and we belong to you!"584 Similarly, working committees operating under headlines
of "Brothers at work," and "Brothers in Nation (Volk)," promoted Protestants working together
for common cause.585 The 1951 Kirchentag effort to unite Germans was so effective, that CDU
Bundesminister Jakob Kaiser remarked that even the government had not been able to fully
“appreciate” the value of the Protestant Church presentation of the “high unified-German
position” (die hohe gesamtdeutsche Position) to the Soviets. This presentation of the “Western
World and Christendom” to the East without “demonstration” or “propaganda,” can only
encourage those living in the Soviet Zone to grasp freedom for themselves.586
Of course, the Kirchentag movement failed to reunify the two Germanys, despite the
1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig (which marked the first and only time the event met exclusively in
the GDR) attracting over 600,000 participants and considerable press coverage. Continued
disagreements with the GDR would see future attempts to hold a Kirchentag in the East falter,
particularly an attempt to return to Berlin in 1958.587 Indeed, as 1961 demonstrated to all
involved, whatever gains the movement had made in reuniting the German nation, reunification
was a long way off. Nonetheless, the movement undoubtedly succeeded in attracting interest
from both East and West Germans, even if it primarily sought a conservative nationalist agenda.
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Perhaps the most challenging problem in constructing a Protestant political community was
attending to inter-religious relations. Whilst most religious leaders, and indeed German
conservatives more broadly, had little difficulty publicly refuting and distancing themselves from
political Nazism, communism and capitalist materialism, how precisely to conduct themselves
toward Catholics and Jews proved problematic on both theological, political and practical levels.
Protestant-Catholic relations had to be considered carefully at the Kirchentage for
financial reasons since the Kirchentage received significant funding from local, municipal and
federal offices where Catholics wielded considerable influence during the Adenauer Era.588
Moreover, because von Thadden required Adenauer’s direct approval to allow East Berliners to
visit the Kirchentag in 1951, alienating Catholic support for the movement would have
undoubtedly proven problematic, if not fatal.
Some of the most obvious contradictions within the Kirchentag program emerged over
Protestants’ relationship to Catholicism. As we have already seen, Reinold von Thadden clearly
conceptualized the Kirchentage in response to (perceived) Catholic unity. But public Kirchentag
rhetoric, unlike von Thadden’s private correspondence and reports to the World Council of
Churches and the EKD, emphasized the Kirchentag’s support for a State that was “not Protestant
nor Catholic.” In 1950, regarding the Kirchentag meeting in Essen, von Thadden declared
unequivocally that “the unholy times (of the Kulturkampf) were over,” replaced by a new
contract between Catholics and Protestants formed in opposition to National Socialism. “It seems
to me more important,” von Thadden said, “to keep alive in the consciousness of the state” the
faith of Protestants and Catholic “martyrs,” than it does to focus on “confessional statistics.”589
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Here von Thadden’s emphasis relates to the Dichotomy, emphasizing the shared Christian
opposition to national socialism as the overriding characteristic necessary in the “new State.”
Von Thadden also resisted utilizing the Protestant character of the Kirchentag against
Catholicism. Leading up to the 1950 Kirchentag in Essen, Martin Niemöller encouraged von
Thadden to combat the “propaganda” of Catholic politicians and their Protestant allies.590 But
von Thadden refused complaining in a letter to Visser ‘t Hooft that Niemöller’s anti-Catholicism
threatened to undermine the Kirchentag’s efforts to “awaken community consciousness and a
sense of confessional responsibility in our Protestant laity.” Moreover, he charged that “every
attack…against Roman influence in central Europe will have disastrous consequences,
weakening rather than strengthening our cause.”591 Although von Thadden refused to openly
oppose Catholics at the Kirchentag as Niemöller wished, his description of Catholicism as
“Roman influence” nonetheless hinted at stereotypical Protestant critiques of Catholics as antiNationalist and loyal to a “foreign” power. Moreover, his emphasis on awakening Protestant
consciousness likewise demonstrated his ultimate desire to foster Protestant unity. We might
therefore interpret his position toward Catholics to be that of a sort of Vernupfterrepublikaner,
conceptualized fully within the confines of the Dichotomy. Cooperation with Catholics was
possible precisely because of the shared Christian history of resistance toward Nazism. The death
of Christian “martyrs” therefore made possible the creation of a new state, one sufficiently
Christian and therefore anti-totalitarian. Because of this shared history and the greater threat,
Catholics were necessary allies.
Cooperation between Protestants and Catholics at the Kirchentage therefore remained
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high, with prominent Catholic and even Orthodox ecumenical visitors appearing consistently
through the 1950s.592 Still, the conception of the Kirchentage in the early years of the Federal
Republic carried with it an undercurrent of anti-Catholic sentiment on the part of individual
participants and an overriding concern for Protestant unity in the face of both totalitarian
opposition and Catholic unity.
The question of Jews and by extension racism proved much more difficult to contend
with for Protestant leaders. Unlike Catholics, there was never a need to contend with the physical
presence of Jews in Germany nor contend with a mobilized Jewish political block. That the
Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy treated Jews as an afterthought only encouraged intentional
silence.593 Moreover, as Niemöller’s forthrightness during his American tour illustrated,
expressions of guilt and introspection threatened to undermine the narrative of Christian
resistance that facilitated Protestantism’s distancing from totalitarianism. Of course, this
distancing itself obfuscated the continuities of German assumptions about race.594 In this way,
the very topic of Jews raised all sorts of unwanted questions about the composition of
community in the early years of the Kirchentage.
Von Thadden’s emphasis on the present remained a consistent theme throughout the
1950s Kirchentage, with attempts at reconciliation, interfaith dialogue or a thorough examination
of Christian or German responsibility for the Holocaust remaining on the margins of Kirchentag
discussions until the 1959 meeting in Munich. Still, because of Protestantism’s association with
German conservatism (and perhaps also Nazism) a serious need to firmly repudiate any
association with National Socialist racial dynamics emerged. This emerged overwhelmingly as a
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rhetorical refutation of totalitarianism and often within the confines of nationalistic and the motif
of German victimhood. While some, especially left leaning Protestants like Gustav Heinemann
and Martin Niemöller, emphasized and pushed for a greater acknowledgement of German and
Christian responsibility for Nazism and the Holocaust, their efforts failed to attract much
attention until the turn of the decade.
Early Kirchentage tended to repudiate racism by affirming God’s universal love of all
and Man’s inherent sinful condition. For instance, participants at the closing ceremony at the
1951 Berlin Kirchentag declared “We have recognized that the people of God are all over the
world. We have brothers amongst all peoples and in all races. They remain our Brothers despite
borders. He does not want us to lose them. Therefore, say and show with your life that Christ is
Lord of all.”595 While the emphasis of people across borders in this statement cannot be
separated from earlier speeches at the 1951 Kirchentag lamenting the loss of German territory
and Protestant separation, the recognition of God’s creation consisting of all peoples from all
races was a necessary step in a Christian refutation of National Socialism.
Some Kirchentag participants, principally Adolf Freudenberg (a lawyer married to a
Jewish-Protestant convert and Secretary of the Refugee Commission in the World Council of
Churches) and Lothar Kreyssig (a Saxon lawyer and member of the EKD synod) desired to
address the “Jewish Question” from the onset of the Kirchentage, but their interests and requests
rarely progressed beyond initial planning. Reinold von Thadden seemed to acknowledge the
need to address the issue from the onset of the 1949 meeting in Hannover, but the planning
committee seemed to prioritize other issues, failing to even vote on Freudenberg’s proposal for a
drafted statement on German-Jewish relations.596 Freudenberg continued to press for working
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committees on the topic of restitution to Israel and an in depth discussion of the “Word on the
Jewish Question” adopted by the Berlin Weißensee Synod in 1950, at both Stuttgart in 1952 and
Hannover in 1953 respectively, but the former was relegated to a minor small gathering of about
300 held by The German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel and the latter never
proceeded beyond the early planning stages.597 Subsequent events organized by Lothar Kryssig
included the creation of an East West political working group emphasizing reconciliation
between former enemies in Leipzig in 1954, but they scarcely featured at all in Kirchentag
proceedings and were not recorded in the yearly Kirchentag proceeding of events. Freudenberg’s
committee again organized a meeting in 1956 in Hamburg, but turnout remained small.598 Only
in 1959 would the Kirchentag feature a direct engagement with the “Jewish Question” at the
promoted “Israel Evening,” with the subsequent meeting in 1961 including a Jew--Rabbi Robert
Raphael Geis--for the first time.599
The 1959 Kirchentag emphasized the Christian universalism first rhetorically produced at
the 1951 Kirchentag operating under the slogan “Ye, shall be my people,” which official
documents translated into eight different languages to drive home the international meaning of
the slogan.600 The program included a large ecumenical contingent, including Protestant pastors
from Indonesia and Haiti while also prominently featuring “Israel Evening,” which addressed
Jewish-Christian relations and the Holocaust. There, a number of speakers addressed a need to
face the “facts” of the German past. As the moderate conservative lawyer Hans-Adolf Dombois
put it, “The crimes of humanity from our forefather Cain up to the crematoria of Auschwitz
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depend on the fact that humans do not want to face up to the facts…but instead want to sweep
them away.”601
Theologians Walther Zimmerli and Helmut Gollwitzer also addressed Jewish-Christian
relations, with Zimmerli claiming that Christians needed to face the past actions of the church
with humility, especially since the peoples of Christendom (including Russia, Poland and
France), had permitted and encouraged terrible atrocities toward the Jews. As he put it, “We
Christians have no occasion to wash our hands of this responsibility.”602 Gollwitzer’s speech
focused on the need for German Christians to remember their past to overcome present-day and
anti-Semitism.603 Participant interest in “Israel Evening” as well as the emphasis on racial unity
at the 1959 Munich Kirchentag did conform in part to the rhetoric of earlier meetings, but its
emphasis on the past and its shift toward broader racial and interfaith participation represented a
clear departure from the earlier nationalistic emphasis.

“Men and Women Belong Together:” Family and Gender at the Protestant Kirchentag

From the onset of Kirchentag meetings, Protestant leaders perceived the family to be in crisis,
and attempted to reconstruct traditional Christian bourgeois family after displacement and
occupation.604 Years of war and occupation certainly strained German families. Infidelity, the
loss of masculine individuality from both the military and as prisoners of war, women’s immense
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difficulties feeding their children and the intense physical and psychological deterioration for
both men and women all left their marks. Moreover, the unknown fate of many German POW’s,
almost exclusively those who had served on the Eastern Front, fostered uncertainty within
marital relationships.605 Economic planners and labor leaders, eager to reformulate in some way
a “livable wage” and social protections for German families during the early years of the Federal
Republic, ran into opposition from CDU/CSU politicians who refused to classify the large
number of households headed by single women (meaning never married, divorced or widowed)
as families, insisting that “normal families” consisted of a working husband and a wife in the
home.606
For Protestants at the Kirchentage, rehabilitating the family was synonymous with the
restoration of morality and order. Because West German conservatives understood the
establishment of a structured, censored and controlled sexuality as key in the fight against
totalitarianism. Because they assumed permissive sexuality opened the door to political
radicalism, they deliberately attempted to control sexual conduct through state laws such as the
Law on the Dissemination of Youth-Endangering Texts and Images (1953), which deeply
restricted the sale and visibility of sexual-consumer goods. While German conservatives and
liberals argued over whether the state or the individual ought to regulate sexual morality, the
1950s generally promoted and protected the conservative bourgeois family in response to both
Nazi sexual morality and the Occupation’s disruptive familial effects.607
Kirchentag leadership and participants presumed that women participating in the
workforce in large numbers would negatively affect the moral upbringing of German youth and
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create tensions between men and women. For practically every church leader present at the
Kirchentag, women were needed to teach moral values to German children, many of whom had
already been dangerously exposed to "materialistic" or "nihilistic" value systems. Their rhetoric
also postulated that the restoration of marital order served as a rejection of Nazi values, even if,
as with discussions on the nation, church leaders kept the past at arm’s length. Because Nazism
often celebrated the “Aryan” body, associated masculinity with a “healthy” and active sexual
drive, and openly advocated for female sexual liberation and pro-creation provided it stayed
within agreed upon racial parameters, Kirchentag participants and organizers therefore
constructed masculine and feminine ideals to be in direct opposition to Nazi definitions of
femininity and masculinity.608
The 1950 working committee in Essen designated to discuss the family operated under
the heading "Save the Family!" which in and of itself suggested that the West German family
required saving. However, at no point during this committee did participants attempt to address
how or why the family had broken down. Instead, they vaguely addressed concerns for children
raised without a proper Christian education, and somewhat abstractly decided that families
needed balance between an overabundance of work and unemployment, to have basic necessities
yet still have free time to spend with one another. Precisely how to go about such goals went
unsaid. Church leaders were not so naive as to state that women should not work; they
recognized that many families, including those no longer completely whole, needed women to
provide for their families. Nonetheless, the breakdown of the traditional BreadwinnerHomemaker household left them disconcerted. Some of the ideas bandied about included half
work-days for widows or those whose husbands could not work to allow for better child608
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rearing.609 Church leaders were unambiguous; women belong in the home to teach children
proper moral values.
The 1951 Kirchentag made definitive statements regarding such difficulties. Releasing a
statement after their meeting, the working committee on the family stated:
We have recognized that men and women should stay together, as well as parents
and children. God gives us our children and they belong him. He does not want
false gods and tyrants to destroy them. He does not want people to drive our
children to hate and recompense. For that reason, help them to remain His
children.610
The emphasis on "false gods and tyrants," an obvious reference to the "nihilism" of Nazism and
Hitler, represents the ways in which discourse on the family negotiated the Nazi past. Here, the
committee did not engage with the norms of the Nazi past, delineating how and why they went
against Christian values. Instead, they attempted to imagine an idealized version of the martial
relationship, one which would inherently reinforce Christian teachings and values. Furthermore,
the committee posited that reuniting the family, that is the naturally determined Christian family,
would restore societal order. This implicitly suggested that any abstract influence contradicting
this directive, be it the "false gods and tyrants" of the past, present or future, was corrupting and
ungodly. Should evil in the abstract continue to corrupt children, violence and destruction
indisputably followed. From statements such as these, we can conclude that Kirchentag
participants contributed to argumentation that sought to restrict the availability of sexualconsumer goods.611
Similarly, the 1952 Kirchentag in Stuttgart attempted to set right the institution of
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marriage by emphasizing the man's place as head of household and spiritual authority. One
speaker argued:
Marriage is both a gift and a task. Such knowledge has widely disappeared. A major
question of marriage is "What does marriage expect of you?" and not conversely
"What do you expect of marriage?...Marriage calls for conversation. The husband is
especially called here to stamp out silence at home and not use the radio as a
substitute.612
In this instance, men were called upon to be more vocal and expected to assume control of the
home. The emphasis on marriage as a task, as well as the question "what does marriage expect of
you," served as an effort to reinforce gender roles and duties. The implication was clear; a proper
Christian marriage required men and women to fulfill their respective roles as provider and
caregiver. The question was not what the individual desired, but rather what the individual must
do to ensure a marriage succeeded. The emphasis on men breaking silence and leading the
family, and the woman's place responding to that criticism, were understood as key components
to a natural and happy marriage. This fostered an alternative image Christian of masculinity to
the lustful, aggressive Nazi soldier, to that of the caring, loving and respectable father.613
Despite Church leaders' best efforts, the 1956 Kirchentag in Frankfurt demonstrated that
many women found it difficult to accept such conservative gender roles and challenged the
legitimacy of familial constructions in the "modern" world. Changing youth culture and the
growth of West German consumerism clearly left its mark on Kirchentag proceedings. The
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proliferation and success of American movie stars such as Marlon Brando also threatened the
ideal of the controlled father with sexual-conquests and rebellious attire.614 Women frequently
recalled holding deep fears of becoming pregnant, and, despite the illegality of the practice, West
Germany was gripped with a “abortion epidemic.”615
At a session of open discourse addressing the family at the Frankfurt Kirchentag, a
woman from Neustadt called professional life "a great temptation" for the married woman
because the financial burden of raising children was so high. A Professor Ellwein raised the issue
of male dominance, asking what a woman was to do if a man exploited their marriage for his
own gain, despite her best endeavors to remain patient and respectful.616 Both women seemed to
agree that women needed to be in the work force, either to help support the family or to protect
themselves and their children from potential male abuse. These tensions illustrate the difficulties
Protestant women faced in maintaining their idealized role as dictated by church leaders. By
1959, generational tension foreshadowed larger shifts. A Mrs. Charlotte Hoffman-Hege at the
Munich Kirchentag addressed the dangers of "children" (young teenagers), with spending cash
and an overabundance of free time. She argued that while the financial cost of trips to the
movies, a new pair of shoes or a night out on the town with a companion may not add up to
much, the inner cost was considerably higher. She complained that young people were “at risk”
to “damage their souls,” and therefore needed moral guidance.617
Discussions about family and gender remained some of the most conservative working
committees at the Kirchentage even though women often expressed difficulties in accepting,
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enacting and implementing the values professed by church leadership. As the decade wore on,
these working committees provided a sort of haven where Protestant women dissatisfied with
married or working life could freely discuss their difficulties and concerns. This certainly
suggests the difficulties Kirchentag leadership had controlling the conclusions and direction of
open forums.618 Nevertheless, we can conclude that for von Thadden and Kirchentag organizers,
a truly Protestant society would feature the breadwinner-homemaker economy, with the father as
provider and spiritual authority and mother as nurturer and protector of the German youth. In
their minds, as long as these roles were in place the "demonic" forces of materialism could not
permeate within German society and undermine its Christian foundations. Ultimately however,
the practical reality of everyday life in postwar Germany made such an arrangement a fleeting
ideal. Church leaders, therefore, had to continually compromise their ideals and accept both
dissention and moderate "solutions" to the family question. Eventually, this required organizers
to accept alternative family structures and differences as an unalterable reality.

"Should We Affirm the Dangers of Parliamentary Democracy?" The Reluctant Acceptance
of Pluralism

While likely the vast majority of church leaders and Kirchentag participants desired German
unification and yearned for traditional family structures, such agreement over rearmament and
German militarization remained elusive. Despite von Thadden's efforts to build a uniform
"neutral" political community with which all Protestants could identify, sharp divisions between
German Protestants prevented any such consolidation, particularly in discussions over the role of
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the Church in public life.
Lutherans in favor of remodeling the postwar Church often aligned with Reformed
Protestants in opposition to Western integration, particularly because they felt the church's anticommunist stance had blinded them to the true nature of Nazism and feared repeating such an
occurrence. Western capitalism and materialism, according to Barth, hardly represented
Christian values, nor did militarization and continued warfare.619 However, lingering prejudices
and disagreements with the Social-Democrats made a true political alliance between reform
oriented Protestants and the SPD unattainable until the mid-to-late 1950s. Still, the groundwork
for this alliance was laid in both the theological shifts of the initial postwar period and an
aligning of political agendas between reform oriented Protestants and the SPD.620
Protestant attitudes toward parliamentary democracy were considerably convoluted. On
one hand, as early as 1946, Karl Barth suggested that Christian teachings and democracy went
hand in hand. However, Barth qualified that by stating that in challenging times, a monarchy or
even dictatorship might be legitimized if circumstances warranted. Therefore, the Christian
stance toward such issues must be neutrality with conduct dictated by circumstance.621 Martin
Niemöller for his part, at times seemed inclined to favor democratic government, but had
misgivings about the German people's willingness to accept and support such a form of
government.622 Similarly, all church leaders tended to disdain party politics and held doubts
about the stability and effectiveness of parliamentary states.623 The problem, as Bundestag
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President Theodor Heuss so eloquently put it in 1955, was that “Democracy is ruling on a
deadline,” (Demokratie ist Herrschaftsauftrag auf Frist).624 Heuss’s comment reflected the
unease many Protestants felt toward democracy. Because election cycles necessitated political
turnover, democracy not only prohibited lasting centralized authority, but also promoted partisan
politics, as one party could simply stall until the next election cycle.625
National-conservative Lutheranism, given its theological belief in subservience and its
traditional place as an ally of the old aristocratic elite, generally promoted a centralized state
capable of maintaining order, morality and stability. Its rhetoric in large part mirrored that of
conservative parties during the Weimar republic, often bemoaning the unbecoming corrupted
nature of “politics.”626 But even left-leaning Protestant leaders envisioned a unified Protestant
base capable of exerting influence on political matters when needed, and as such, made
theologically exclusive claims to acquire the moral high-ground. Even at Essen in 1950, certainly
one of the least contentious meetings, Niemöller cautioned listeners about straying too close to
Western values reminding them that power comes not from weapons or wealth, but Jesus
Christ.627
Despite such subtle rhetoric in Essen and Berlin, political divisions within the Protestant
community over rearmament and the Soviet Union emerged in 1952, divisions which would mar
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all other Kirchentag meetings in the 1950s. Likely, the unity of the first three Kirchentage
stemmed from the consensus amongst Protestants in relation to reunification, sexual morality and
re-Christianization. Undoubtedly as well, the continuation of the Kirchentag movement was still
in doubt until 1951. Rearmament in particularly took center stage in 1952, as Adenauer had
agreed to the Deutschland Vertrag (Germany Treaty) on May 26th, 1952, and subsequently
signed the European Defense Community Treaty the following day, only three months before the
fourth Kirchentag meeting in Stuttgart, August 27th-31st, 1952.628
The German rearmament controversy lines up interestingly with German interpretations
of the Dichotomy. Because American geopolitics and military logistics greatly favored a
powerful Western Europe following the outbreak of the Korea War (1950-1953), German
rearmament quickly emerged as a key political issue in the early 1950s.629 The strongest
opposition from within German Protestant circles toward rearmament overwhelmingly came
from those who challenged the narrative of church resistance, such as Martin Niemöller, Helmut
Gollwitzer and Gustav Heinemann. Politically this resulted at first in a break from the CDU by
Heinemann through the creation of the short lived All-German People’s Party (Gesamtdeutsche
Volkspartei, GVP) from 1952-1957. The rearmament debate would also form the basis of the
beginnings of Protestant cooperation with the SPD, evidenced by the fact that when the GVP
eventually dissolved many of its members joined the SPD. Not coincidentally, the merger
occurred at the height of the second re-armament debate concerning nuclear weapons. 630 The
national-conservative milieu however, despite its clear preference for peace, nonetheless
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acquiesced to Adenauer’s argument that Germany must rearm both to combat communism and to
maintain a modicum of state power.631 Their concerns would only become magnified following
the Soviet use of force against the East German Workers’ Uprising in 1953.
At the Stuttgart Kirchentag in 1952, organizers actively addressed the issue of politics,
evident in the slogan "Choose Life!" (Wählt das Leben!), a reference to both the physical act of
voting (the German verb wählen can also mean to vote) and the symbolic decision of choosing
salvation through Jesus Christ.632 Hans Puttfarcken, a councilor in the Hessian Justice Ministry,
speaking on the theme of "How does politics concern the Christian," outlined the pessimistic
attitudes many Protestants held toward politics. Puttfarcken stated that many Protestants had
adopted an "Ohne mich" (count me out) attitude, citing the Catholic domination of the CDU, lies
told by both the political right and left and the corrupting effect political life had on one's
character as the reasons for their withdrawal. Nonetheless Puttfarken argued that love for
brothers in Christ forces should force one into political action.633 Many participants seemed to
echo these sentiments, despite their division over rearmament.
In the open discussion following Puttfarken's speech, the theme of rearmament spurred
significant debate. For the most part, even supporters of rearmament did not see the situation as
ideal, but felt as though the Soviet threat demanded action. Friedrich Wuttke, a participant who
claimed to have been forced out of his home in Breslau by the Poles, cautioned against relying
too much on American protection. Russian violence and terror posed a serious threat to Germany
he argued. Even though he had no desire to remilitarize, Wuttke argued that depending upon
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foreign protection was both immoral, as Christians should not ask someone to fight in their stead,
and unwise, as no one knew how long the Americans could be counted upon. Opponents
however, saw war as inevitable with significant remilitarization. One woman asked, "Must not
all the means of violence involving weapons, inevitably lead to war?"634 The Barthian theologian
Helmut Gollwitzer took an even harder stance. Gollwitzer's speech, entitled "Are there
instructions from God for our political action?," argued that God had twice seen fit to disarm the
German nation and its people, and therefore Germans should not defy His will a third time by
allowing the "old spirits" of national egoism and violent militarism to control public policy.635
By asserting that History had revealed God's desire for a demilitarized Germany, Gollwitzer
attested that rearmament would be an act of defiance against God. Gollwitzer's rhetoric
attempted to chart the proper political course for all Christians. A true Christian, he argued, could
never support rearmament because doing so would be a rejection of God's will.
In contrast, Provost Hildebrand similarly alluded to rearmament in his speech "How do
we see the Future?," but from a position more akin to national-conservative orthodoxy.
Hildebrand's speech expressed concern that a weak de-centered government would be unable to
maintain order and authority, a position clearly formed within the framework of Luther's Two
Kingdoms. With an obvious retort of the Barthian position in mind, he stated, "The Christian
must understand the necessity of state power. The question is not whether state power is evil, but
rather how that power is handled."636 His argument implied that the state must rearm so as to
maintain order in accordance with its ordained role described by Luther. Therefore, in opposing
rearmament, and by extension centralized state power, one essentially rejected God's natural
order. The question at stake was not whether or not state power was essential, but rather how that
634
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power was wielded. To solve the problem of state power, Hildebrand advised avoiding the
divisive effects of party politics and placing checks on the unbridled and easily misled masses:
"The knowledge and the need to pursue politics in a democracy according to popular opinion,
does not obviate the requirement that a delegation take political responsibility seriously and have
the courage to make unpopular decisions."637 Hildebrand's statement posited that democracy
inherently subjected itself to the will of the masses, and therefore only a determined and
powerful executive authority could control such forces. In this respect, much like Gollwitzer,
Hildebrand maintained that Protestants must not oppose God's commands. By declaring that
democracy has the potential to upset this natural order, Hildebrand asserted that Protestants must
ardently seek to keep such forces in check so as to prevent any disruptions.
Unsurprisingly, almost all attendees and speakers at Stuttgart agreed that Christians
needed to have a voice in political life. What is more surprising however, is that many attendees
seemed to agree that parliamentary politicians and even Church leadership did not speak for all
Protestants, evidence that neither the exclusivity rhetoric by speakers such as Gollwitzer and
Hildebrand, nor von Thadden's attempts at building a united ecumenical community, had the
desired effect. In many cases however, their rejection of exclusivity claims did not affirm
widespread support of political pluralism, but rather the rejection of it. Participant Wilfried
Überschwer from Neuwied stated that "in the nature of a free democracy," one must be aware
that party representatives speak only for their political parties, not all Protestants. Überschwer
also argued that Christianity was incompatible with materialism and Marxism, because
Christianity required "commitment", something representatives of the SPD needed to come to
address more effectively. He argued "We [Christians] are subject to the binding of Christ, and
therefore we must put an end to the old teachings that are now considered outdated. Likewise, we
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must also not permit unfettered liberalism."638 Such statements reflected the ambivalence many
attendees felt toward party politics. Moreover, his argument suggested that political rhetoric of
exclusivity, which resulted as a product of "free democracy," fostered such divides. Christians
therefore, must find a way to adapt democracy to avoid being corrupted by "unfettered
liberalism."
Other attendees made even stronger claims. A Mrs. Emmi Welter put the matter quite
succinctly. Politicians, she argued, could not be counted upon to uphold Christian values;
because not only are they beholden to their political party, but politics in general corrupt one's
moral constitution. Therefore, "...a practical conclusion from our present knowledge [that
politicians cannot be trusted] arises: we have a responsibility in public life."639 Similarly, Kurt
Neumann, a professed supporter of the CDU, rejected the idea that Christians who supported the
CDU were somehow better than those who supported the SPD. Neumann exhorted Protestants to
temper their expectations of political leaders, stating, "…One cannot expect a politician, to be
considered from the outset a cheater and a liar only seeking political power, to take a stand for
everyone."640 Given such facts, Neumann encouraged Protestants to be active in politics and
work together to better the nation. While Neumann’s rejection of the need for exclusive
Protestant political positions drawn from the theological logic of speakers like Hildebrand and
Gollwitzer represented a minority position amongst participants, his agreement that politicians
were generally corrupt corresponded with the opinions of those like Frau Welter, whose clear
disdain for party politics can only be described as anti-parliamentarian. Similar to Neumann, a
Fritz Heidler from Berlin argued that Christians must learn that just because they may hold
different political opinions, it did not mean they should be bound to them. Instead, they should
638
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be bound together through Christ despite these differences.641 Heidler's willingness to accept
democracy and political pluralism outright obviously lent support to calls for Protestant unity,
which softened political divides and built political consensus. Efforts such as these, in addition to
the common ground most Protestants found in discussing the family and the nation, prevented
further splintering and factionalism.
Nonetheless, the stark differences in opinion shared by speakers such as Hildebrand and
Gollwitzer reflected the strained atmosphere at Stuttgart in 1952. Furthermore, speakers and
attendees alike continually addressed reservations about democracy and parliamentary rule.
Political action therefore, resulted not in the acceptance of democracy, but rather out of a distrust
of parliamentary politics. The solution to the structural issues presented in democratic societies,
could be countered with honest 'Christian' faith and political activism, even if Protestant leaders
contested what that meant and how it might be implemented. Benjamin Pearson has shown quite
conclusively that the 1953 Kirchentag in Hannover took place in a similarly highly charged
political atmosphere given its proximity to upcoming elections. As such, Kirchentag organizers
deliberately prohibited divisive figures like Gustav Heinemann from speaking, hoping to limit
political divisions. Nonetheless, speeches by Theodor Paul Pfizer, the mayor of Ulm, and CDU
politician Ernst Lemmer highlighted the tension between the various Protestant factions. Pfizer
blamed the breakdown of the middle-class political tradition in modern democracy, which
catered unabashedly to the masses unable to make rational decisions. The educated aristocratic
elite on the other hand, could make the fine political distinctions necessary to uphold order by
basing their political decisions on reason not emotion. Conversely, Lemmer stated that Germans
needed to fundamentally alter their understanding of politics and accept political difference,
arguing that while modern democracy may not be ideal, if carefully protected, it offered the best
641
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opportunity to guarantee individual freedoms.642
By 1956 in Frankfurt, discourse over political issues addressed the encroachment of
secularizing forces on public life in both East and West Germany. In this instance, attendees
again reiterated their distrust of political politics, this time directly confronting political
ideologies and the propagandistic impulses of political media. Multiple attendees compared
Soviet Bolshevism to a religious faith, emphasizing a need for a Christian response to communist
influences.643 CDU Bundestag Deputy Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, speaking at an open forum on
the "Nation and Politics," stated, "The functioning of a democracy, in which we indeed do not
want to leave only to rulers, depends on the fact that we do not exercise our right to vote as
members of a mass, but rather as individuals who choose freely..."644 Similarly to comments
made in Stuttgart, Schwarzhaupt advised political action to counter the potentiality of political
abuse by politicians. Indeed, again we see an apparent abhorrence of mass politics countered by
individual action on the part of an active Protestant believer.
By 1959, Kirchentag speakers abandoned, for the most part, rhetoric of moral superiority
and exclusivity. Fritz Erler, a leading member in the SPD, emphasized the importance of
political competition and the recognition of different viewpoints during the working committee
on "When Christians are Political Opponents." Erler defined politics not as a battle between
enemies, but rather a discourse in which people attempted to learn to live with one another,
summed up by his assertion that "In politics, there is not only one truth."645 Still, questions about
parliamentary democracy persisted, even as official rhetoric from both the SPD and the CDU
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accepted Protestant political divisions. CDU culture minister Edo Osterloh who also spoke with
Erler on the topic of internal Protestant political opposition, addressed the question directly,
stating:
We have been asked whether the parliamentary democracy of today...is just. It is the
hardest, most complicated, most vulnerable form of government on Earth...as long
as we want freedom, we should affirm the danger of parliamentary democracy, and
also, especially as, Protestant Christians.646
Osterloh's statement reveals the long-term effects of the anti-party mentality in Protestant
politics. At very few instances over the course of the 1950s did Protestant leaders or lay
members express a desire to proceed with party politics at the Kirchentage. In fact, Protestant
leaders and Kirchentag participants constantly sought to find a way to bridge their political
divisions and build a new political community which was to serve as a bulwark against the forces
of materialism and secularism. Nonetheless, this fear of parliamentary politics drove Kirchentag
participants to become active in public life. The "vulnerability" of parliamentary democracy
encouraged active participation on the part of lay Protestants to keep deceitful politicians in
check and prevent any abuses by the state. As such, West German Protestants came to accept
democratic pluralism, despite their persistent apprehension toward it.

Conclusion: Unintentional Pluralism

In 1961, the Kirchentag returned to Berlin for a third time.647 Held just before the building of the
Berlin Wall (the meeting occurred July 18-23, with construction on the wall beginning less than
a month later on August 13th), East German authorities proved unwilling to cooperate barring
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Western participants from East Berlin unless organizers agreed to ban "NATO pastors" such as
Otto Dibelius. Leadership refused, continuing the event in West Berlin only.648 With the border
between East and West Berlin sealed less than a month later, 1961 marked the last time the
Kirchentag movement included participants from both East and West Germany until after
reunification in 1990.649
For Kirchentag leaders, the Berlin Wall fostered institutional turmoil. Having lost its
signature political appeal as the "only all-German organization that has so far not been cut by
zonal boundaries," Kirchentag organizers reconsidered the future agenda of the meeting.650 Thus,
the Kirchentag would cease to function as a symbol of continued German unity, with attendance
falling considerably in comparison to the mid '50s.651 Questions of national identity still
continued, but new leadership led by Klaus von Bismarck,652 catered to the interests of a new
generation of Protestants, organizing forums on ecumenism and Judaism.653 Ultimately, the Wall
marked an end to von Thadden's vision of a united Protestant community, and an end to
conservative political and theological dominance in West Germany.654 The physical separation of
East and West mirrored Protestants’ inability to agree upon a united political or theological
worldview.
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The success of the original Kirchentag message at attracting large crowds, important
political figures and church leaders should not be overlooked. Its depiction of Christianity as an
alternative to totalitarianism and materialism was flexible enough to include the many disparate
factions of German Protestants, as well as garner institutional support from Catholic politicians
while also undergirding many of the traits scholars have identified with postwar Germany; the
restoration of the patriarchal family, the motif of German victimhood and the obfuscation and
tacit rejection of the Nazi past.
In many ways, Protestants’ distrust of parliamentary democracy was a continuation of
Weimar political views, although the experiences of the Second World War and Nazi
authoritarianism forced church leaders to rethink their relationship to the State and politics. Such
rethinking fostered divides, divides the Kirchentag sought to alleviate in favor of a new national
community designed to rebuild and re-Christianize the German nation on the basis of
confessional identity. Ironically however, as much as the Kirchentag initially attempted to foster
Protestant unity, it often instead highlighted the irreconcilable political differences of its
participants. By the late 1950s, despite claims of exclusivity regarding Protestant political
conduct, the majority of Kirchentag participants seemed willing to accept political pluralism.
The underlying cause of this political acceptance ironically stemmed from Protestants' distrust in
parliamentary democracy. This distrust provided the impetus for greater political involvement,
which, over the course of the 1950s, eventually eased fears and cultivated acceptance.
The concept of the Kirchentag demonstrates how postwar German society both departed
from and sustained Nazi norms and values. The Kirchentag’s emphasis on mass spectacle, anticommunism and concern for lost territories in the East all represented ways in which German
Protestants continued Third Reich practices well into the 1950s. However, new norms also
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emerged, most especially surrounding rhetoric on the ideal “Christian” marriage and family life
which aimed to reestablish the moral authority of Christianity. More important are the ways in
which the Kirchentag sought to redefine Nazi values. Reconstituting the Volksgemeinschaft to a
community based upon confessional identity created the necessary space for both the
continuation of Nazi values via a rehabilitation of German conservativism and the possibility of
political pluralism by shifting communal identity away from racial and national qualities.
Because in theory a confessionally based community was open to all peoples, the Kirchentag, as
a public forum, inherently gave voice to alternative interpretations and redefinitions of the Nazi
past. This in turn fostered the eventual breakdown of this imagined community, as a new
generation of Germans challenged the central tenants of postwar Christianity, most especially the
sexual rigidity of Christian patriarchy.655 Redefining 1950’s interpretations of the past in the
1960’s naturally led to challenges and questions about Christian responsibility for the Holocaust,
questions which would greatly undermine the moral authority Christianity had reestablished
during the 1950s leading to both secularization and an even greater splintering of
Protestantism.656
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Conclusion: The Effects of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy and National Renewal

In 1956 in an interview with West German media, the controversial former first head of West
Germany’s domestic intelligence service (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) Otto John,657
proclaimed “whomever was not a Resistance fighter had no right to call themselves a patriot.”
Continuing he claimed, “One could not be a Christian and a Nazi at the same time.”658 John’s
statement reflects the power of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in the postwar West. Not
only does he declare the incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity, but also positions true
patriots as members of the German resistance. Such argumentation undergirds the effectiveness
of the Dichotomy in rehabilitating German national-conservativism after the Second World War.
By defining oneself as a Christian, the Dichotomy facilitated a shift away from political and
ideological association with Nazism while still allowing for the continued respectability of
national-conservative beliefs such as anti-Communism, anti-Semitism and patriotism.
The birth of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy emerged within Western critiques of
Nazism, most especially within the United States and Great Britain. Its ascension to near
universal acceptance within the United States occurred in the context of American pro-war
propaganda and neo-liberal theological critiques of liberal Protestants and pacifism. Because
proponents of war positioned Germany and Nazism as anti-Church, anti-religious freedom and
ultimately anti-Christian, mainline American Protestants mobilized, sometimes reluctantly, in
opposition to Adolf Hitler’s Germany. As proponents of war reasoned the rise of European
“totalitarianism” occurred as a byproduct of secularization and a disregard for the God given
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rights of the individual, Americans internalized the link between Judeo-Christian values and
American identity.659
But because the mobilization of American Protestantism required concretely
demonstrating the anti-Christian tendencies of National Socialists and the heroic resistance of
“true” Christians in Germany, pro-war propaganda instantiated a narrative of fundamental
incompatibility between the two worldviews. This narrative most certainly embellished Christian
resistance and Nazi oppression of Christianity, while completely dismissing any cooperation or
intellectual affinity between German Protestantism and National Socialism. While adherents to
the Dichotomy rightly described the radical Deutsche Christen movement as heretical, their
outright dismissal of the sect obfuscated the ideological overlap between the movement and the
“neutral” and Confessing churches. This narrative quickly emerged during occupation, especially
as German pastors in opposition to Allied denazification measures found American pastors
sympathetic supporters both legally and publicly.
However, despite the Dichotomy’s political utility, many of the German Protestant Left
refused to embrace the concept wholeheartedly for a variety of reasons. Barthians especially
rejected the implicit hardline anti-Communist position for theological reasons660 and in fear of
becoming willing servants of the capitalist-materialist American agenda. Others, especially
Martin Niemöller, refused to embrace both the inherently pro-Western American position as well
as the unquestioned rhetoric of Christian resistance. While Niemöller’s American tour largely
propagated the Dichotomy, his continued open engagement with the political, theological and
moral failings of the Church threatened to undermine its entire basis. If Niemöller’s example
represented the best of Protestant resistance and still proved overwhelmingly unable to prevent
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Jewish annihilation, then surely the church’s resistance was ineffective at best. While this
particular point perhaps reinforced the proposed need for re-Christianization, it still demonstrated
the weakness of the church. Second, if, as Niemöller constantly claimed, the church ought to
have done much more to stop the Nazis and carried significant guilt for having not done so, then
the Dichotomy’s narrative of Christian resistance required revisiting. Finally, Niemöller’s open
willingness to deal with the Russians damaged proponents of the Dichotomy’s anti-communist
position and, especially on the part of the Americans, the insistence that a strong church would
and could function as a barrier toward totalitarianism.
Moreover, the fact that the overall veracity of the Dichotomy was consistently contested
by those with comparably strong resistance records demonstrates the degree to which it often
functioned as an exculpating tool for those eager to brush the failings of the church under the
rug, excuse away broader German participation in the Holocaust and counter parts of allied
cultural rehabilitation. Niemöller’s consistent emphasis on both personal and institutional
responsibility best demonstrates this point. But proponents of the Dichotomy in America needed
his person to continue to rehabilitate the image of Germany abroad especially because he was so
well-known in the United States thanks to wartime propaganda. In this respect, his contrition and
moving descriptions of Nazi totalitarianism did much to foster support and sympathy for
Germans in America and generally enhanced the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, even if at the
same time they hinted at the simplicity of the narrative.
From an American standpoint, the Christian World Order depended more on establishing
and spreading Judeo-Christian morality fused with democratic-liberalism and capitalism than any
real evangelization. The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore functioned as an important
arm of American nationalism, infused with rhetoric of moral international responsibility. This
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national globalism is most clearly visible in Protestant rhetoric in support of both German aid
and the Marshall Plan, as it emphasized the moral responsibility of American Judeo-Christian
democracy in the fight against international totalitarianism and communism.
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy functioned as a crucial tool of democratization
because it encouraged the creation of a Western Christian identity that facilitated a shift away
from National Socialism for German national-conservatives. While German Protestant distrust
for democracy lingered throughout the 1950s as demonstrated at the Kirchentage, the Dichotomy
facilitated a supra-national identity that ostensibly linked democracy to Christianity which
created the space for a gradual German Protestant embrace of democracy. However, the
Dichotomy also undoubtedly obscured the Nazi past and facilitated Protestant critiques of Allied
policies designed to end Nazism. Undoubtedly then, the Dichotomy served to transition German
conservativism away from National Socialism by whitewashing the record of former Nazis and
creating the necessary moral space for integration. Robert Moeller’s “useable past” emerges
distinctly within the context of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Its rise both facilitated
German democratization and West German “normalization” by linking German Protestants with
a theorized anti-communist Christian West. By distancing German conservativism from National
Socialism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy obscured the ways in which Nazism had
emerged from within the German national-conservative Protestant worldview and hid the
continuation of Nazi values in the Federal Republic.
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Epilogue: The Rise and Fall of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy

In 1948, the World Council of Churches finally convened its first meeting in Amsterdam.
The meeting, which brought together many of the most important Protestant leaders in the 20th
century, including Samuel Calvert, Willem Visser ‘t Hooft, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr,
Martin Niemöller and Karl Barth, set the stage for the central questions of postwar Christianity.
Principally among them, was “God’s Design” for man and the Church. Karl Barth’s opening
address entitled “No Christian Marshall Plan” caused an immediate stir.
Barth charged that Christians should begin from a common belief in faithfulness to
Christ, not culture or politics or the threat of the atomic bomb. The World Council of Churches,
he claimed, was perilously close to constructing “an order of justice and peace embracing our
whole planet.” The danger of such a path he warned, would root Christian concerns in the very
anxieties of human existence Christ had already resolved through crucifixion, not Christ himself.
What the World Council of Churches needed to achieve went far beyond some sort of “Christian
Marshall Plan” that addressed the world’s ills, but instead the very nature of Christian witness
and the purpose of the Church on earth.661 Barth, deliberately trying to provoke, stated, “We
ought to give up, even of this first day of our deliberations, every thought that the care of the
church, the care of the world, is our care.”662
Niebuhr, as one might expect, was furious.663 Over the course of his career, Niebuhr had
criticized Barthian theology for its tendency to discount the world in which human beings
resided for “otherworldliness,” but he had respected Barth’s position in the Kirchenkampf and
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the two had got along well enough in a meeting the year prior despite their differences.664 In the
time leading up to Amsterdam he had also invested considerable time and effort in hopes of
forcing a concrete resolution against the Soviet Union and plan of action of the of World
Council. He feared greatly the sort of vague obtuse statements that such gatherings tended to
produce.665 Barth’s opening address had thrown everything he had worked toward into chaos.
Both Niebuhr and Emil Brunner objected to Barth, Niebuhr seemingly impromptu at the
end of Barth’s speech. Brunner rightly noted that Barth had advocated passionately against
Nazism, yet refused to condemn Soviet communism. Brunner emphatically stated “Let me say
that the Church is duty bound to postulate two things unconditionally—social justice and
absolute negation of totalitarianism as implied in state socialism.” He called Totalitarianism “the
real devil in our time” and “the grave of freedom.”666 While Niebuhr conceded Barth’s point that
God would have final victory, he argued Barth “was wrong to preach this gospel…as if there was
no history.” Continuing, he noted “Christian life without a high sense of responsibility for the
health of our communities, our nations and our cultures degenerates into an intolerable otherworldliness.”667
But Barth countered there had been a qualitative difference between communism and
Nazism. Nazism, he argued, had threatened the very soul of Christianity. “We were in danger of
bringing, first incense, and then the complete sacrifice to it as a to a false god.” In opposition to
Brunner, Barth claimed communism did not possess this same quality because it did not threaten
to “hypnotize” the church as Nazism did, regardless of the detestable similarities between the its
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political structure and the much more vigorous suppression and persecution of religious belief in
the Soviet Union.668 In Niebuhr’s estimation, Barth’s failure amounted to a political misjudgment
stemming from Barth’s theology. The two never saw eye to eye again on this issue.669
Much to Niebuhr’s dismay, the World Council’s published reports condemned both
communism and capitalism equally. Niebuhr blamed Barth. Niebuhr would later accuse Barth of
being “obliquely pro-communist.” In his first article published in The Christian Century since
the founding of Christianity and Crisis in 1941, Niebuhr claimed Barth “seems inclined today to
regard the differences between Communism and the so-called democratic world as insignificant
when viewed from the ultimate Christian standpoint. But we are men and not God, and the
destiny of civilizations depends upon our decisions.”670 The two would spar continuously over
the issue, with Barth consistently arguing for neutrality from the Christian perspective. His 1958
declaration: “I regard anticommunism as a matter of principle an evil even greater than
communism itself,” summed up his political position quite succinctly. For Barth, the belief that
the church could in some way cure the world’s ills in fact infringed upon its ability to proclaim
the Gospel. Moreover, rabid anticommunism threatened to push the church toward political
positions that obscured its philosophical and theological aims, much as Nazism had. In so doing,
Americans, and in fact the World Council itself, were in danger of presuming to know and
understand God’s plan for the world.
This story, seldom told outside the narrow confines of theological history, offers
significant insight into American and German politics. First, it showed that the tentative
agreement formed around the Dichotomy during the Second World War had frayed at the seams.
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Barth was but one of several Western Protestants who back-tracked from direct condemnation of
Soviet communism. Second, it foreshadowed the desired uniformity of Realists like Niebuhr or
ecumenists like ‘t Hooft would be almost impossible to achieve. Without the urgency of war,
Realist arguments began to fall on deaf ears. Indeed, Niebuhr had never fully convinced many of
his liberal allies of the entirety of his theological worldview as it applied to political and ethical
action. More importantly though, the Dichotomy in America would take on a life of its own,
ironically coming back to haunt those who had advocated for it most forcefully. In Germany,
where reform minded Lutherans like Martin Niemöller joined the Barthian reluctance to embrace
political action against the Soviet Union, the Dichotomy likewise could not produce uniformity.

Weapons Turned Inward: “How Red is the Federal Council of Churches?”

In 1946, The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace submitted guidelines for conduct
with the Soviet Union. The guidelines, adopted by The Federal Council of Churches’ executive
council, urged a “formula of tolerance” with the Soviet Union. The Commission, now devoid of
John Foster Dulles’s leadership, argued that while “our people generally consider the faith and
institutions of Soviet communism to contain grave evils...The American people must be resolved
never to advance their own faith by forcibly crushing another faith.” The Council also warned
the Soviet Union must not persist “in methods of intolerance, such as purge, coercion, deceitful
infiltration and false propaganda…”671 The Council’s middle position resembled that of liberal
Protestantism’s pacifistic tendencies prior to the war. Just as liberal Protestants had initially done
with Nazism, offering value judgements while refusing to take definitive political action, so too
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they did here.
Crucially however, the Council still upheld the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. The
guidelines also stated “However, Marxist Communism in its orthodox philosophy stands clearly
opposed to Christianity. It is atheistic in its conception of ultimate reality and materialistic in its
view of man and his destiny. Its utopian philosophy of history lacks the essential Christian notes
of divine judgement, divine governance and eternal victory…Such differences will never be
removed by the compromise or surrender of faith by Christians.”672 Unbeknownst at the time, the
refusal to take a more aggressive stance would pave the way for a theological shift in America
toward an evangelical fundamentalism characterized by fierce anti-communism and strict
dogmatic belief.
Evangelical fundamentalists had always viewed the Federal Council of Churches with a
certain degree of skepticism if not outright hostility. They saw the entire Council as corrupted by
liberal theology and attacked it as a “modern church” seeking to diminish the uniqueness of
Christianity. Like most Christians during the 1930s and early 1940s, they too embraced the
Dichotomy, and needing little encouragement to see communism as incompatible with
Christianity.
However, by embracing the Dichotomy during the War and continuing to uphold its basic
tenets, the Federal Council and mainline Protestants painted themselves into a political and a
theological corner. The very concept of the Dichotomy emphasized the importance of Christian
Identity and spiritual fortitude. But by emphasizing the importance of Christian identity, the
Dichotomy created a need to define precisely who was, and was not, Christian. The very essence
of the politicization of the Kirchenkampf stemmed from this crucial frame of view. In the late
1940s and early 1950s, evangelicals characterized liberal theology as fundamentally unchristian.
672
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To be sure, such criticisms had existed for the better part of 30 years, and in fact many historians
trace the genesis of the fundamentalism movement in the United States as a response to liberal
theology.673 But the prevalence of the Dichotomy in American culture meant that such criticisms
hit home in ways they had not previously.
In the late 1940s as America approached the height of McCarthyism and anti-communist
hysteria, evangelicals launched a series of attacks against the Federal Council of Churches
accusing it of secretly supporting communism, housing communist spies and degrading the
moral integrity of Christianity. These attacks often bordered on the fantastical, but nonetheless
fostered all sorts of conspiracy theories about the Council, many of which still endure to this
day.674 Consistent attacks against the theology of the Federal Council also continued, though
these tended to be more accurate despite bordering on the hysterical.675
Likely the most important attack came in the form of Carl McIntire’s widely circulated
pamphlet entitled “How Red is the Federal Council of Churches.”676 The pamphlet, which
featured images of the Soviet Hammer and Sickle draped over the Cross and a sprawling red
spider web featuring individuals, initiatives and committees supported by the Council, included
673
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accompanying quotes or snippets describing all the items in question as communist. Most of the
quotes came from the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) but lacked any sort
of context and were devoid of any actual evidence.677 Nonetheless, the pamphlet accused the
Federal Council of promoting socialism, containing large numbers of communists and even more
“fellow travelers.” Even still they accused the Council of apostasy, specifically attacking Harry
Fosdick and G. Bromley Oxnam (former president of the Federal Council from 1944-1946) for
denying biblical inerrancy.
Yet despite the baselessness of much of the pamphlet’s claims, attacks against the
Council did have some validity. In 1922, Fosdick ignited a firestorm of controversy in a sermon
attacking fundamentalism titled “Shall the Fundamentalists Win?” There and in future sermons,
Fosdick defended progressive skepticism of belief in the Virgin Birth and Christ’s physical
resurrection, while deriding fundamentalists who refused to tolerate any view other than biblical
inerrancy. While Fosdick carefully avoided directly challenging those who still believed in
biblical literalism, he nonetheless professed his own position quite clearly. Fundamentalists
attacked Fosdick’s position with sermons of their own, including Clarence McCartney’s “Shall
Unbelief Win?” The particulars of the theological debate aside, Fosdick’s sermon created
significant tension between fundamentalists and modernists until well into the 1930s when the
rise of Neo-Orthodoxy and dialectic theology shifted the terms of debate.678 This meant that
opponents who wanted to dig up dirt against the Federal Council and ecumenists often did not
have to look very hard.
Even Niebuhr, who became in many ways became the representation of mainline
Protestant anti-communism, had at one time been a firm supporter of the Social Gospel and
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member of Socialist Parties. Indeed, Niebuhr himself consistently warned of the dangerous
tendencies the Dichotomy produced, particularly its sanctification of democracy, free-market
capitalism and liberalism. In 1947, he warned Americans “have only one religion: devotion to
democracy.” Their blind support of its values led many to “claim unconditioned validity for its
ideals.”679 Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s he would critique the very nationalist globalism
he had helped to engender, arguing that while American responsibility was paramount to
protecting western civilization, Americans needed to be wary of assuming the universal validity
of American values and especially ought not to impose those structures on others by force.680
Existing narratives concerning the rise of the “radical right,” evangelicalism and
fundamentalism in the 1950s and beyond all overlook the importance of the ChristianTotalitarian Dichotomy. Standard narratives argue evangelicalism emerges out of Cold War
hysteria, provincialism and resistance to religious pluralism and rising anti-racism in Northern
Mainline Churches.681 I suggest that the coalescence of American Identity as fundamentally anticommunist and Christian only becomes possible because of the war time alliance built around
the Dichotomy. While scholars correctly argue that the evangelical movement emphasized a
more racialized nationalistic understanding of Christian Identity, such narratives overlook the
shifting nature of Christian Identity which only became supremely politically important because
of the Dichotomy. Therefore in the late 1940s, fundamentalist accusations of subversion against
modernists and even Realists carried extra weight precisely because of the mainline Churches’
courtship of the Dichotomy. By reinforcing rhetoric that emphasized the “Christian” nature of
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America and the imperative of Christianity in the fight against communism and Nazism,
ecumenical Protestants opened themselves up to critiques from evangelicals who, perhaps
rightly, charged that the international non-denominational nature of ecumenical mainline
Christianity subverted its unique identity. This made Billy Graham’s shift toward biblical
revelation and away from the FCCoC’s Enlightenment and Modernism all the more possible.682
Consider Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam’s appearance before the House Un-American
Activities Committee in 1953. Oxnam, who claimed in 1946 that “Protestantism has been
inevitably cast for its role as chief adversary of communism,” went before the court to defend his
name after the “Minute Women,” an organization of evangelical women, accused Oxnam and the
Methodist Church more generally of supporting communism. Even the notorious House found
no basis to support the claims after Oxnam’s defense.683 Or when the Federal Council released
the New Standard Bible and evangelicals like Carl McIntire publicly burned copies denouncing
it as “Stalin’s Bible.” McIntire even accused secretary of state John Foster Dulles of anticommunism for his support of the “radical and pacifist leaders in the Federal and World
Councils.”684
The unequivocal failure of European nationalistic dictatorships likewise shifted
theological questions away from the quest of existential meaning and toward ethical practice, as
captured by the disagreement between Barth and Niebuhr. With the theological search for truth
seemingly resolved (or at least muted), leading Christian figures shifted toward questions of
Christian ethical conduct after 1945.685 Jason Stevens convincingly argues that Reinhold
Niebuhr’s emphasis on tragedy and original sin, which the American diplomat to Russia George
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Kennan internalized, contrasted poorly with the redemptive power of evangelical fervor in the
Cold War climate of the 1950s.686
The evangelism of leaders like Billy Graham better suited government structures that
sought to organize religious opposition to the Cold War687 precisely because it articulated a more
nationalistic redemptive form of Christianity while still maintaining a considerably degree of
universalism. However, while the more precise definition of Christianity posited by
evangelicalism harnessed unity amongst its own supporters, its specificity detracted from its
ability to draw from different spectrums of religious thought. This meant that over time, leaders
in government became frustrated with Protestantism’s inability to unite against communism.688
The fundamentalist bent of evangelism also carried with it a strong degree of racial hierarchy,
something evangelical blacks like Martin Luther King exploited to the fullest in the context of
the Cold War.689 Again, the Dichotomy came into play. If America symbolized Christian values
and free democracy, why then did so many evangelicals espouse racial inequality in the
South?690 Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke have also examined the ways in which exported
American racial segregation in American military bases in Cold War Germany influenced
German leftists and the ’68 Student’s Movement.691 This division, along with the polarization of
interpretations of the Dichotomy during the Culture Wars, would forever fragment Protestantism
mostly at the cost of mainline churches. That mainline churches began to broaden ecumenism to
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also mean religious pluralism only reinforced their separation from evangelicals.692 Thus
America’s “Christian” identity would come under increasing strain as the 1950s transitioned into
the 1960s.

The End of German Christendom: Germany and the collapse of the Dichotomy

In Germany, the terms set by the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy generally kept Christian
resistance narratives in place until the 1960s. The struggle against communism in addition to
serious concern for Protestants “left behind” in the East continued throughout the 1950s and into
the 1960s. Still, Protestants like Niemöller and his supporters challenged the very fabric of
postwar myths of resistance by engaging with the Nazi past in a way most shied away from. The
eventual decline of the Dichotomy in Germany was therefore inevitable. Niemöller’s importance
cannot be overestimated here, but not because he, and his cadre of supporters pulled Germans
into democracy, but because the Protestant Left’s unceasing critical self-reflection constantly
threatened and eventually overturned the Dichotomy. Standard narratives of Church
democratization might be best described as the a few brave souls pulling the cart forward. In
such narratives, left leaning reformers eventually bring the Protestant church face to face with its
own past, also democratizing and liberalizing its structure and political outlook.693 But recently,
some scholars have challenged these assumptions by instead arguing that a group of moderate
conservatives drove the churches more toward democracy than had previously been assumed.694
This dissertation offers evidence in support of the conservative democratization thesis in
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two distinct ways. First, the tug-boat narrative has multiple flaws when one looks outside the
context of the church. Because of his experiences during the war and his general shift toward
ecumenical Protestantism, Martin Niemöller and the Dahlemites were never likely to advocate
for extreme authoritarianism in postwar Germany. While Niemöller’s views still often lingered
inside that of the national-conservative milieu during the occupation period, his theological
outlook had shifted significantly as demonstrated in both his refusal to be sponsored by the
Lutheran Church during his tour in America and his consistent assertions that he now supported
ecumenicalism wholeheartedly. Niemöller would continue in this path for the rest of his life,
eventually becoming president of the World Council of Churches in 1961.
Karl Barth never quite attained the same authority in Germany after 1945, but his many
students continued to endorse his political and theological positions throughout the 1950s.
Helmut Gollwitzer, probably Barth’s most influential pupil, demonstrated this consistently
throughout his career.695 But as indicated in Barth’s theological dispute with Niebuhr,
Barthianism actively avoided a significant political profile. While Barth’s convoluted
relationship with democracy included many half-endorsements, neither did he ever reject its
basic premises.
In combination, these two groups were the least likely to oppose democratic rule in the
first place, and, as minorities, were not those that needed to be convinced of its validity. The
National-conservative milieu, with its strong anti-communist sentiment, refusal to critically
examine church conduct during the Third Reich and broad support for the traditional
conservative parties during the Weimar Republic, were those most skeptical. Given also this
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group continued to make up the majority of the EKD and occupied positions of authority, their
transition toward democracy was most important in the early years of the Federal Republic.
For this reason, the American interpretation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy
remained vital for German democratization. Because occupation enhanced the reputation of the
German Churches significantly—certainly to a higher level than it would ever see again in the
20th century—and because conservative Protestants had turned toward Nazism in more
significant numbers than any other demographic during the 1930s, binding conservative
Lutherans to an international system of ecumenical integration did more to build democracy in
Germany than likely any other cultural act. That Germany remained divided by the Cold War
increased the need for Western support against the Soviet Union and further reinforced this
case.696 The very concept of the Kirchentag demonstrates the ways in which nationalconservative Protestants used the Dichotomy as an attempt to reform their own desired State in
the fight against totalitarianism.
But in the 1960s as older conservatives left power, the Berlin Wall signified a more
permanent separation between East and West and the Dichotomy came under scrutiny from
younger Germans and disaffected Leftists, the hegemony of Christian Democracy in Germany
began to break apart. The Trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1961 has rightly been called a defining
moment in Holocaust and political memory and raised numerous questions about the nature of
the Holocaust, law and historical continuity into the present.697 Devin Pendas has referred to the
famous Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial (1963-65) as principally a “political trial” in that “Auschwitz
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was as much a contemporary political problem as it was a historical one.”698 Mark Ruff has
recently argued that the breakdown of historical mythmaking first centered on Catholicism
because Catholics were more closely associated with political power in the Federal Republic
(especially concerning the Adenauer regime and the political hegemony of the CDU in the mid1950s to the early-1960s) and therefore attacks on its historical record bought a greater degree of
political currency.699 Regardless, West German engagement with the Nazi past unquestionably
shook the Dichotomy to its core.
The association of Christian social conservatism with Fascism also engendered spiritual
experimentation. Challenges to the West German conservative construction of a carefully control
sexual-moral order likewise attempted to reconfigure precisely what proper sexual morality
looked like. Indeed, historian Dagmar Herzog notes that the mid 1960s and early 1970s were a
period of "rethinking God as much as rejecting God."700 Evidence of such a rethinking is clear
when one examines the multitude of theological shifts that took place during that time; with the
'Death of God' movement and Liberation theology on the left, and a turn toward fundamentalism
and evangelicalism on the right.701
Nonetheless, by the mid to late 1960s, social mobility, economic prosperity and rising
individualism ensured that Germans now had a very different experience with democratic
society. Moreover, conservatives now had a point of reference in relation to democracy. They
still believed it could fail at any moment, as evident in the grave concern in many levels of
698
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government over both a fascist coup or a leftist revolt, but they nonetheless would come to be
vigilant defenders of democracy.702 While aspects of the Dichotomy would make full
examination of Protestant complicity with Nazism an ongoing difficulty, by the late 1950s it had
created a “useable past” for democracy.
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